India and China: ‘Tamil issue’ a casualty?

by Ravi Sundaralingam

(July 07, London, Sri Lanka Guardian) The comments and questions from colleagues at work about ‘my’ defence minister raging and ranting on the BBC (Hard Talk, 28.01.10) threatening to kill Gen. Fonseka, for a Tamil was a paradoxical experience. Yet, having been through LTTE’s assassinations campaigns it wasn’t a new experience. However, the real shame was the realisation that for all the scorn we poured on the leaders of the LTTE, to their credit none sounded so unrefined and dreadful as Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Watched by millions across the world, the interview reminded the striking difference in refinement and knowledge, murderers or not, between the IRA spokespersons and the armed Unionists in Northern Ireland when they were in full flow.

For many non-Sri Lankans the cringe factor apart, minister’s performance answered the questions about the fate of the thousands of Tamils, unaccounted and wiped out from the face of the Earth during their ‘final phase’ May last year. It surely gave the world a snapshot of the mindset of those at the helm of the Sinhala society.

It may have also prompted many to question the position India takes in the region, and “the type of neighbourhood it wanted”. The 45 points joint declaration by India and Sri Lanka at the end of Mahinda Rajapaksa’s visit (Sri Lanka Guardian, 09.06.10) gives some clues to this question. There were references to the “potential available” for building principles of democracy & pluralism, establishing leverages to effect common strategic concerns and interests, enhancing connectivity, integrating economies, and reinforcing institutional framework for cooperation. For the cynics among us these are familiar phraseologies, meant nothing to the ordinary people, particular to the Tamils, but are the necessary guarantees for the wicked.

Tamil issue

Despite the misguided belief of some Tamils that Mahinda would reveal “the solution to the ethnic problem”, political expediency prevailed and the Tamil issue was presented as one of many important issues in the declaration.

If as expected India had demanded and Mahinda complied, the whole process would not have been in good faith, just as the 13th amendment before. The Tamils would have to pay even more, and end up in a worse situation than now. How much India care about the issue behind the scene is very important for the Tamils, though they are yet to be convinced by its ‘quite diplomacy’.

For many the ‘Tamil issue’ is the litmus test for the substance on pluralism, diversity and democracy in Sri Lanka. If Sri Lanka conforms to these ideals, it will also spell an end to the extreme Sinhala nationalism and democratisation of the state. However, these are fundamental issues also for the Sinhala communities, and to the Indians within the greater scheme of things in the region. While such expectation of public arm-twisting is no longer helpful to the Tamils, it also assumes a level of Indian influence over Sri Lanka and the importance about the rights of the Tamils in the Indian agenda. How does the ‘Tamil issue’ really fit in the present regional conditions, and how does it emerge from Indian perspectives?

First and foremost South Asia is predominantly about Feudal Democracies with its strong feudal structures in polity and societies, and in their dynamic relationships. India is a qualified exception with a political system firmly founded on democratic principles and an independent judiciary, though prone to corruption. It is developing a strong civil society that has firm roots in the history of its people and social justice. Newly emerging corporate-India may give modernity the democratic-India wants, for itself and the region. What the corporate-India wants may not what the democratic-India needs, and this is an added concern for many in the region set in their feudal ways. This also makes any advocacy on these issues difficult for India, which suffers from the same, therefore must approach with due care and attention.

Secondly, as feudal democracies at different stages of social transformation South Asia does not have a strong civil society as a whole to make Human Rights a framework to sort out the fundamental issues within, and between the societies and nations. Its medieval social systems, patches of high economical development, borrowed political systems, morally and politically corrupt bureaucracy, and ‘international legitimacy’ of its ‘states’ is a mixture difficult to completely understand or handle by any of its feudally propagating political classes.

In the absence of such a social advancement it is unproductive to use prosecution of the political leaders as a means to advance democratic reformations in any of its states. It is futile to expect the prosecution of the leaders of Sri Lanka for their atrocities against the Tamils, and the ‘supporters’ of the JVP. Or consider holding the Pakistani establishment for the excesses in their war against terrorism inside its ‘boarders’ while supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the Myanmar authorities for the destruction of its minorities.

The denial of human values is structurally ingrained even those fight against the atrocities commit counter-atrocities that makes an idea of common humanity a difficult proposition. This allows the statists, nationalists, and corporatists for their propaganda, making the level of atrocities as the measure to decide on the ‘rights’ of any struggle.

It is equally futile to expect the West, though with a strong civil society to be able to prosecute the alleged offenders against humanity other than use them as leverage. Even if it could what would be the purpose when there isn’t an institutionalised framework on human rights in South Asia? How could the end product be helpful towards such a framework, an imposition on societies with medieval social systems and traditions?

Would it really serve the Tamils to prosecute Gotabaya or Mahinda Rajapaksas for their atrocities, when they and the vast majority of the Sinhala intelligentsia truly believe they had fought and won a just war? What could the Tamils expect, after justifying the atrocities of the LTTE, in the hope of winning the war against the Sinhala state?
What would be the definition of a common humanity in all that?

Perhaps, lessons can be learned from the old ANC and South African leaders, who considered these issues seriously and took the “truth and reconciliation” option to progress from their nightmare, but still find themselves a long way away to avoid a return to it.

Undoubtedly, only a serious economical development can help to emancipate these ‘rulers’ from their feudalistic notions and concept of governance and, ownership of the resources and human potentials. We have made this point several times, long before the defeat of the LTTE.

Thirdly, having been identified exclusively with the Tamils, for strategic and local political reasons until recently, India needs the time to build trust and good will among the Sinhala feudal lords and chieftains. The help India provided to defeat the LTTE may sway some public opinion in the Sinhala Land, but it cannot be sustained if Tamil issue is prioritised whenever the Sinhala feudal-lord visits India.

It is noticeable during Mahinda’s visit the ‘Tamil issue’ had been “down graded” from the head-of-states to ministers of external affairs level. From the Tamils’ perspective this adds insult to injury. However bringing the issue to the MEA level, it can be consistently raised at the revived ‘Joint Commission Mechanism’ giving a firmer footing, without giving the impression of India of constant interference. In a round about way this allows India to make connection with the Indo-Lanka Accord, which is essentially a bilateral agreement about the security of India and the region, a sort of ‘legitimate’ way to interfere.

Fourthly, India has to ‘understand’ Sri Lanka’s need for Chinese support in the international arena to ward off any inquiries about human rights violation committed by its military forces and political masters during its war against the Tamils. The need to have a veto-power wielding friend in the UN has already been made by Col. R. Hariharan (Lanka Guardian, 07.06.10). India needs to work around these difficulties to counter the ‘Chinese influence’ creeping into the island, and on the ‘Tamil issue’ if it still remained on its agenda.

Fifthly, how much the ‘corporate’ approach to overwhelm the islanders will endear or give confidence to the ordinary Sinhala person is another question.

Sinhala Greater-nationalists have portrayed the Tamils as the “fifth column” of the Indians largely due to the political and military ‘interference’ by its Southern kingdoms in the past, perhaps also of the kinship between the Tamils on either side of the water. India’s covert support for the Tamil militancy and the misrepresentation of the Tamil Nadu sympathy for the plights of the Tamils may have helped to reinforce this false image.

The history however notes a different portrait: Sri Lankan Tamils being equally suspicious of their ‘brothers’ across the water, who formed alliances with Sinhala Kings to destroy Tamil states in the island or let them down in times of need. Eastern Tamils fighting along side Duttu Gemnu to defeat the Tamil king Ellalan. And recently, the LTTE based inside the Sri Lankan military camps with the help of Sinhala President R. Premadasa fighting to ‘defeat’ the Indian army (the IPKF, July 1987-1990).

Yet, the Tamils have continued to suffer badly of the image at the hands of the Sinhala rulers. Nowadays because of the worries the local petty/bourgeoisie have of the Indian ‘business’ classes in anticipation of difficulties than opportunities, and nationalists on both sides elevate these suspicions to an anti-Indian position when necessary.

Indian strategy

On hindsight the decision to support the Tamil militancy can be viewed a serious strategic mistake, yet it must be assessed over a period in the future. As for the Tamils in Sri Lanka it was a disaster from beginning to end. The Indo-Lanka Accord the end result of this strategy conceived in part to keep the US interests out looks as outdated as the thinking that produced it. So the need to endeavour with economic projects and soft-loans, China replacing the US in the tussle.

Some believe the assumption India ever had a cohesive strategy towards its neighbourhood is an intellectual fantasy to explain events that ‘inevitably’ happen. Even these cynics must notice a pattern that had provided the right circumstances to destroy Tamil nationalism in the island, which India mistakenly considered might affect Tamil Nadu. Allure of an opportunity to eliminate Tamil nationalism from any source at its roots was so great that India reverted back to its old method of bribing the Sinhala extremists with Tamil assets, veering away from its initial intention to bring Sri Lanka into its fold. This time its bribe was to allow the Sinhala extremists to eradicate the ‘Tamils issue’ along with its nationalism once and for all, which Sri Lanka use it as green light to ethnically cleanse the Tamil from their lands to make Sri Lanka ‘one country’.

Thus with a strategy or not, and pilloried for a series of failures India has seen to it that extreme Tamil nationalism on both side of Palk Straight is nullified. Along with the advent of globalisation Tamil Nadu has become one of the most integrated states in the Indian Union and the most ‘industrialised’ after Madhya Pradesh. The realities of economic progress and commercial enterprise are such, keeping any alleged state ministers from Tamil Nadu in place is more important now than the altruistic notions of Tamil-brotherhood.

Tamil Nadu has also been persuaded it can’t have a ‘foreign’ policy of its own and must abide by the general direction the Centre took, and raise its opinion within the established channels.
Furthermore with the complete annihilation of the LTTE, Inida has also ensured no one Tamil group represented the interests of the Tamils, and Delhi alone decided their fate.

Tough India had been decisive on Tamil nationalism its critics will argue there weren’t a real choice, because of the geo-political conditions and Sri Lanka’s ever growing relationship with China. For them this is the proof for the failure/absence/irrelevance of Indian strategy. This coherent argument for the failure leaves Indian policymakers in a long haul game in the region with unpredictable consequences.

However, the real failures are at human level with consequences to last a long time. Five points to note are, (i) depletion of the Sri Lankan Tamils as a strong society, (ii) institutionalising anti-democratic feudal political establishment (iii) enabling the extremists to fulfil their program to make Sinhala people the majority in all parts of the island, (iv) increase the suspicions among the Sinhala communities about India’s eventual intentions and, (v) the serious damage to the faith the Tamils had of India, who survived or witnessed or endured the pain from afar for the past 30 years.

Some of the consequences can be already seen. Tamils virtually wiped out as a political force in the island, and almost all the Sinhala political parties and groups are ‘anti-Indian’ with regard to their ‘nationalistic pride of place’ in the region, the strategic conditions for India are not entirely favourable but not threatening, at least for the present. And the Tamils, particularly the Tamileelam contingent of the Diaspora, opting to work with Sri Lanka “than India”.

Sri Lankan Tamils’ deep-seated mistrust of India goes back in the history in the medieval times in relations with Tamil speaking kingdoms and principalities in India. Despite the new-age feeling of pan-Tamilism, a sort of imagined Tamil-brotherhood entirely different to pan-Tamil Nationalism, they conspired with Sinhala or Tamil chieftains to destroy most of the embryonic Tamil states in the island. Even recently as the colonial era, the promises of help to the Jaffna Kingdom against the invading Portuguese turned out to be ‘betrayals’.

If these were distant memories, etched in the genetics and the Tamil psyche, the very recent events wiped away any hope of change in the behaviour many hoped of India.

Yet, they also know their future survival as a defeated people in the island depended entirely on the wishes of India. This poses a serious problem for the Sri Lankan Tamils, particularly for the Diaspora. Trapped between the propaganda of the LTTE and no place to put their trust in, it has been trying to extend some influence on the Indian policy makers, perhaps from a position similar to them with Sri Lanka.

Full cycle

Having failed bribing the Sinhala greater nationalists with Tamil assets, particularly helping them to deplete the Tamil population by agreeing twice the deportation of the Plantation Tamils, serious Indian program to contain Sri Lanka within its security sphere started when J. R. Jeyawardene was in office; 04.02.78 - 01.02.89. The Sinhala strongman was taking a pro-West stance to balance Indian influence, a trait followed by the Sinhala elite. At the end of the cycle of the strategy, we see Sri Lanka now taking a “pro-Asian” stance, by that it meant a closer alliance with China to counter balance Indian and Western influence, leaving India in the same position in its relationship. The strategy failing to convince the Sinhala ruling classes to bring Sri Lanka into India’s regional economic and security systems. Yet, twenty years down the line India is stronger in every sense, and having the West on board for its plan along its southern tip also strengthen its position.

During this phase, with the help of the LTTE the Sinhala polity has also been reduced to the condition not so dissimilar to what the Tamils had endured under the LTTE, and instead of a single Sinhala strong man pitting his wits against Indian strategists Sri Lanka now has the entire family of Rajapaksas to rely on.

“Where are the Tamils fit in this process?”

Chinese are here

Bang-Ki-Moon’s announcement (22.06.10) against his wish, to set up a panel to collect evidence on human right abuses in the island, and the bare coffers are good reasons to push Sri Lanka towards China. But why would the Chinese want to be in the island?

Various arguments of commercial interests, from oil fields to using the island as a bridgehead to penetrate the Indian market have been forwarded. From strategic point of view, old idea of “building a ring-around-India” and limiting India’s influence in the Indian Ocean are also being discussed. When consumerism overrides every aspects of life in the ‘globalising world’, one is forgiven for mistaking strategic interests of a country with its commercial interests. While all the listed reasons may be true, China’s intervention may involve rather fundamental issues, such as the ‘new world order’ and, ‘value and protection of its assets’, than the scrap with India.

As the global competition for shrinking resources gets tougher anything buried anywhere is a matter of interest for the economical powers. Newly emerging powers China and India, with vast populations need the resources at a faster rate than any other for the produces for export and to satisfy their own growing middle classes. While there is competition to mine or excavate, there is also competition for the fertile lands in Africa and other poorer countries to satisfy the voracious appetite for food produces.

It isn’t surprising the Chinese trade with Africa increased from $80 millions in 2003 to $1.4 billions in 2009, and the large portion of its imports was oil. China’s entry into Africa naturally causes worries in the West, which as the collection of colonial powers has always assumed the ownership of the African riches. However, of the oil find in Africa amounting to 117.2 billion barrels (Libya 35%, Nigeria 31%, Algeria 11%, Angola 8%, Sudan 5%, and Other 10%) only about 3% are signed up by Chinese NOCs. Despite the anti-Chinese campaigns of sucking the Africans dry, questioning its ethical position in their deals with the most oppressive African states, the Western NOCs control 35% of the oil stakes and the rest belong to the African NOCs (International Oil Daily, Wall Street Journal, 2009).

Yet, China’s aggressive entry into the new fields in Sudan and Angola and many former French colonies for oil and minerals with special deals does make the West to think that they will be locked out. Most often these deals are tied to China’s promises to build the countries infrastructures that are never there or devastated by years of civil wars. During the China-Africa summit in Egypt in June this year, China promised $10 billions of investment in Africa during the next three years for specific projects. Reacting to events President Sarkozy made a “No future without Africa” speech in the Franco-African summit (01.06.10) and promised permanent African representations without veto-power in the UN Security Council, and to invest to meet the challenges, meaning China. As promises go, France also volunteered an extra $5.2 billion in aid to poorer countries in the G8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland in 2005, but only managed $1.3 billion.

China’s venture into Africa, and in some Asian countries will become as intense as its search for natural resources. With it, its foreign assets said to be more than $2.5 trillion will no doubt grow. As the competition for resources becomes intense so would be the tussle between the West and China, which has been under wrap until now. With it arises the argument for its assets to be secured and serviced, and conditions for it to grow further.

Capital assets cannot be secured or serviced without human assets, and China has been building a network of support among the African countries since the 70s. These countries, from the Islamist Sudan to ‘socialist’ Zimbabwe have differing socio-political perspectives and, for all their false pretences and anti-West rhetoric, have tried to steer clear from foreign interferences. China as a non-invading power, not threatening with its military power to extract benefits towards assets, with a well-cultivated image of supporting African independent movement provides the cover they need. Its deals to build their infrastructures seem more genuine than the unfulfilled promises, coups and civil wars suffered at hands of the West and some times even their large companies.

If cultivating human assets are one of the necessary logistical needs, ports and facilities are other logistical requirements that China has been busy securing.

But, securing any asset also means preserving and enhancing the value of the asset. The West is always willing to go to war anywhere to place conditions on the resources belonging to smaller, weaker nations. It rightly argues that the passage of oil through the Red Sea to the West is vital to its interest; therefore assumes ‘all rights’ to take actions. Even without considering the invasions, the coups, and the civil wars it has been accused of, its action of simply being the guarantor of safe passage influences the production and the price of oil from the region. By placing constraints on the oil from the region it secures and even enhances the value of all its assets.

Therefore beside the ‘market’, who decides the prices of the valuable commodities depends on who can actually put conditions on them. They in turn become part of the decision on the value of the assets of every country or company.

Unilateral decisions on these matters by the West or by the US on behalf of the West are becoming almost impossible. How to secure assets and the currency of measurement of the assets are now debates even within the West. The ‘new world order’ so easy to understand at the turn of the millennium is now a multi-facet affair with G5 becoming G6, 7, 8, and 20 and the search for a revamped, reorganised UN mooted as a possible venue to regulate some of the issues has also begun.

Yet, the strategic reformulations may appear difficult to understand without the full knowledge of the complicated regional situations. For we see the US signing a strategic treaty with Pakistan but goes on undermining its ‘sovereignty’ by raiding its territory, and China “guaranteeing” Pakistan’s ‘nuclear-parity’ with India (Harsh Pant, rediff news, 22.06.10) and US considering the same request from Pakistan, while Iran continuing with its own nuclear program in the neighbourhood. China, India, Pakistan, and Russia working hard to prevent any investigation on human rights violations in Sri Lanka, while the West seemingly wanting to hold the Lankans responsible.

These regional configurations will have some effect on the global strategic trend, if not on the assets of the countries involved. However, they will be minimal compared to the effect the amount of assets, and the efforts of maintaining the value of the assets will have on the global trend.

It is in this context the arrival of China to the southern shores of India, into Sri Lanka is more important. Securing the sea lanes, servicing transport vessels and safeguarding and facilitating its communities, and exploring for more wealth will always be China’s aims. But these are secondary in terms of its priorities, we would argue, compared to its priority to maintain/enhance the value of its assets by not allowing India or any other new competitive power to assert direct or indirect control over the riches. That means denying/undermining the measure of their positions or aspirations in the international organisations and ‘arenas’.

Reorganisation of the UN is an interesting example where China would rather have a whole host of devalued powers included into the Security Council to undermine its structure than allow India become a veto-holding member. China may very well of the opinion that US and itself, and perhaps Russia and not every nuclear power should hold the ‘veto-power’ on any major global issues.

Comparisons and adverse competitions between the two Asian powers are discussed or encouraged by many outside the region, and insiders wearing old cold war goggles. Those aware of the full details of the future pathways will decide whether these giants should really collide or not for the benefit of their people and those in their regions. We at best can only speculate with the best available information and a keen and acute eye.

It is clear these apparent competitions and conflicts are limited to the South and Central Asian regions and no more, at least for the present. The comparisons made perhaps are necessary, but they are like the ‘pound for pound’ comparisons made by the ‘experts of boxing’ between the great champions heavyweight Muhammad Ali and the middleweight Sugar Ray Robinson, though they never would have fought. They could have speculated whether Sugar Ray would put on weight and challenged Ali one day, perhaps. Until India grows into the economic power China is, these are mere speculations.

Yet, it is essential for India’s to maintain its regional assets and their value. The worry some of these speculators rightly touch is the devaluing process that has taken place to its assets in its own region. In Sri Lanka, if Indian strategists thought the Tamils were part of their assets, then they no longer have them. If they were counting on the flourishing relationship with the Sinhala elite as an asset, for helping them to defeat the LTTE, it is not forthcoming.

India has been ‘investing’ heavily in Afghanistan, and it may have laid out more than $2 billion so far. It provides direct humanitarian help running its own medical services and in IT and educational fields. It has adopted 100 or so villages to promote rural development in the form of rain harvesting and solar-energy, and helped to launch the national air, the ‘Ariana’ by gifting few Airbus crafts. The parliament house in Kabul is being built at a cost of $25 million, and installed 200 km power line cable erecting 100 towers bringing electricity from Uzbekistan. Its major capital investments involved the Salma Dam project, 150 km away from Heart, electrifying Western Afghanistan, and the 220 km long Zeranji-Delaram road, starting in the town Zeranji on the Iranian border linking Heart and Kabul, which has opened up the remote villages to have access to the Iran and other Central Asian states, at a cost of $85 million and 1.5 lives per km due to the Taliban campaign against it (Rohan Joshi, Pragati and Guardian, Jan 2010).

India’s financial & political investment in Afghanistan is recognition of its geo-strategic position as a gateway to the oil & mineral rich Central Asia States. By 2015 Caspian Sea Basin states, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and others will produce 4 million barrels of oil a day and gas production equally important, hence the competition between the US, Russia and China, and now India. Its squadron of MIG-29 based in Ayni, Tajikistan is considered by many as a forward step in this direction, and some consider will help to contain Islamic terrorism in South Asia and Central Asia (Prof. Blank, US army war college, March 2009).

Then the question is whether India is in a position to put constraints on the riches/assets of others in the regions it considers as its security zone. The arguments that its ‘soft power’ should be turned into a ‘strong power’ with direct military intervention into Afghanistan in the event of US capitulation is a sign that India is willing to work towards such a position.

Then, does it have to sacrifice what it already has in order to achieve more is the next question. Soft or strong its power, if India doesn’t have the means or the resolve build its human assets within and inside the region, establishing a measure of control over the assets and their values would be a harder task than its past endeavours. These can only be done with a sense of social justice and full democratic participation for all people in the region within the state and regional structures. As the US experiences in the South and Central Americas show without these aspects in place attempts to maintaining the value of any assets would be require cycles of violence and recriminations.

Since China emerging as the regional power the fear among the South Eastern economies, prone to raid on their currencies by the ‘market’ and instant collapses, have been allayed and now there is an air of stability in the region, no doubt achieved with the enormous help of Japan and South Korea. The value of Chinese assets, so are that of Japan, are enhanced by the security and conditions placed on the assets belonged to the region, releasing the regional potential. It was perhaps a lesson learned from Japan, which invested heavily on China even it were aware of China’s eventual power and dominance.

In contrast, South Asia as a whole is a region of failed states and instability requiring more than the attention of the only successful economy, India. Its leaders still hampered by their feudal enmities, not being able to learn form the Chinese-Japanese history and their relations, limited inside their own regions, believe one-by-one they all can reach their promised land, and their enemy’s enemy will be of help.

So on one hand we see many nations of people, who believe in the authority of their state and the place of an individual or community defined within, working together knowing their regional responsibilities. And in South Asia, we have nations of people wanting their ‘identities’ and ‘individualities’ to define their state, knowing firmly those ‘rights’ to be fundamental, yet with high socio-economical expectations, not being able to know their regional responsibilities that could help to fulfil them. It is between these two positions the answers must also lay, and expecting the feudal and failed states to take a lead on this matter is as futile as to expect them to respect the value of the life of their people.

(The writer can be reached at academic.secretary@gmail.com ) Read more...

Refining India’s Policy in Post-War Sri Lanka

By R.Swaminathan

(April 15, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) There was some thought about titling this presentation as “Fashioning a New Policy Towards Sri Lanka”, till I remembered that there are too many constants levied by geography, history, demography and strategic considerations that one can only think of refining and fine-tuning India’s policy in post-war (and post-election) Sri Lanka and not of really fashioning a new policy.

India and Sri Lanka are so close that there is not enough sea between them for both to have the full limits of their territorial waters in accordance with international law. The International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL) in the Palk Strait curtails the extent of the territorial waters to much less than the normally permissible limit. So, the Palk Strait is in reality a shared legacy and waterway and should not be treated as a contested territory. Historically, particularly during the period when both countries were governed by colonial Britain, the movement of people and goods between the two countries was practically unregulated. Demographically, there is a sizeable minority (3.5 million out of 21.3 million) of Tamil-speaking people (of Indian origin) in Sri Lanka. A look at the map of the area will show the strategic importance of Sri Lanka to India’s security and economic well-being and that an orderly neighborhood is an Indian strategic imperative.

Constants in India’s Policy

1. India has to maintain cordial relations with the elected government in Sri Lanka and with all the major political parties in the island.
2. India has to ensure the stability and territorial integrity of the Sri Lankan state.
3. India has to strive for the persons of Indian origin to be treated as equal citizens, without any adverse discrimination because of their language or their origin.
4. India has to develop very close and productive relations with Sri Lanka in the fields of security & national defence, economic development & cooperation, bilateral trade, infrastructure development, education and public health.
5. Overall, India has to make herself so much a part of Sri Lanka’s well-being, security and development that the dependence on (and influence of) China, Pakistan, Iran and other non-regional actors does not grow any further.

Post-War and Post-Election Refinements

The civil war situation is over and President Rajapakse has got the double mandate that he wanted. One cannot disagree with Barbara Crosette, UN correspondent for The Nation and a former New York Times correspondent and bureau chief, when she wrote on 18 February 2010 that “Sri Lanka has never had a better chance than it has now to stamp out the last fires of ethnic hatred, violence and mindless chauvinisms that have left more than 80,000 people dead in civil wars”. The President’s election victories, following the military defeat of the LTTE, have placed him in a unique position to resolve the ethnic problem. He had also kindled general expectation that he would take this up after the elections. He has however neither offered a creative solution nor a time-bound path for reconciliation. As Col. Hariharan has written, Rajapakse thrives on divisive politics and hence there is a feeling of uncertainty about how he will function in his second term, particularly when he has no military agenda to pursue. After winning the presidential election in January 2010 and his ten-party-alliance’s victory in the parliamentary election on 8 April, the apprehension is that President Rajapakse may become increasingly autocratic, thus harming the possibility of a lasting peace between the Tamils and Sinhalese and also threatening the multiparty democracy that has been in vogue in Sri Lanka. India faces the major task of making special efforts to persuade the President to improve the lot of the Tamils and to persuade the Tamils to talk to and cooperate with the President towards that end. India will not be alone in this effort. US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, Robert Blake, told the BBC in an interview on 9 April 2010 that the USA feels that Mahinda Rajapakse should reach out to the Tamils in the new political environment following the defeat of LTTE. "It is important that they (Tamils) feel that they are going to be able to live a future of hope and of opportunity that the internally displaced people that are now in camps - there are still approximately 100,000 of them - be allowed to go back to their homes."

The Indian government has to maintain its firm stand that the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka has to be resolved through a negotiated, permanent political settlement based on credible devolution of powers within the framework of a united Sri Lanka; and acceptable to all communities in Sri Lanka, including the Tamils and the Sinhalese. This would require the full implementation of the 13th Amendment and the early announcement of a credible devolution package. The package would have to include devolution of powers to a Tamil-majority province in relation to sensitive subjects such as land and the police, even though the centre may retain some over-riding powers (to protect national security and territorial integrity) on both these issues. Suitable models are available in India and in Northern Ireland.

The Government of India should take steps to work with the Government of Sri Lanka in order to encourage large scale and effective people-to-people relations, for the mutual benefit of the two countries and their populations. The nearly half a million strong Sri Lankan Tamil diasporas has so far been more or less ignored by India. Active dialogue with the groups and efforts to convince them that cooperative (even if demanding) approach to the Sri Lankan Government would be more helpful to the Tamil cause than continued support of the idea of an independent Eelam, may be worthwhile and productive.

India’s policy in Sri Lanka has in the past ranged from intervention and mediation to facilitation, but never isolation or neglect. The twin track of diplomacy and coercion has to be changed to diplomacy and incentives.

Economic

Nature abhors a vacuum and India should try to fill the space as much as possible. India should seriously consider a very pro-active role in the restoration of the war-ravaged economy of Sri Lanka, without being coy about her preference for the rapid return to normalcy in the Tamil areas in the north and the east and for helping those areas to reach at least the same levels as the rest if Sri Lanka. There should no hesitation to adopt a policy of providing funds (as grants or loans) for infrastructural, educational, public health and job creating projects in these areas, in the same manner as the Government of India would assist a State in India that had suffered comparable distress. Massive support for building approach roads, schools, hospitals etc. would pay rich dividends by way of goodwill and stability.

In the areas of trade and commerce, India could be much more generous in offering concessions based on “asymmetric reciprocity”. The Government of India may also usefully consider giving tax concessions and other incentives to Indian industrial houses and entrepreneurs to invest in infrastructural and job-creating enterprises throughout the island, with special emphasis on the north and the east. India could be more open in stating her preference for helping the Tamil majority areas in the fields of education, public health, job opportunities, trade/commerce, investments etc. This approach might also produce a positive side effect of making the political parties of Tamil Nadu happier.

India had sanctioned the equivalent of USD 1.75 million in May 2009 for reconstruction activities. A part of this amount is being spent on the supply of 530,000 Metal Roofing Sheets and 400,000 cement bags (the first lot handed over on 1 April 2010) for distribution among the resettled population in the Northern Province, through the Sri Lankan Ministry of Resettlement and Disaster Relief Services. Such directly felt and traceable help deserves to be increased manifold.

India’s Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao, after her three-day visit to Sri Lanka (early in March 2010) spoke of India's intention to continue supporting the task of development and reconstruction in the northern and eastern regions. She announced India's support for housing projects to be taken up in the Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu districts for the benefit of the IDPs. This will include setting up temporary shelters, repairing and rehabilitating damaged houses and building new houses. The Foreign Secretary also indicated that additional Lines of Credit are being considered for railway projects in northern Sri Lanka. There is an urgent need to follow up on these assurances, without the normal procedural delays.

On 6 January 2010, India and Sri Lanka signed a Line of Credit agreement for $67.4 million to fund the second phase of upgrading the Southern Railway Line from Colombo to Matara. The Export-Import Bank of India had earlier provided $100 million Line of Credit for the first phase, under an agreement signed in July 2008. The project will double the average operating speed to 80 kmph, allowing an express train to cover the Colombo-Galle distance within two hours.

Fishing in Palk Bay

The ticklish issue of fishing in Palk Bay may seem to be (at the same time) political and economic, but is basically a human issue. Prof. Suryanarayan and I have written often suggesting the creation of a joint Palk Bay Authority to ensure the equitable sharing of the marine resources for sustainable fishing. Sustenance and development of fishing resources, environmental protection of bio-diversity, cooperative utilization of the marine resources etc. could come within the ambit of this authority. Primarily, the governments should mostly facilitate people-to-people agreements between the fishing communities. This would require significant changes in the thought-processes of the bureaucracies of both countries. Such changes can come if the political leadership shows the way.

Defence Cooperation

In the post-war scenario, without any fear of being accused by Tamil Nadu political parties of helping in the war against LTTE, India should take the initiative of placing on the fast track the proposal for a Defence Cooperation Agreement. There is already a history of military cooperation between India and Sri Lanka, since independence. It could be argued that if Sri Lanka has sought defence supplies from Pakistan or China in recent times, it was mainly due to exasperation with India’s policy approaches and reluctance or hesitation to supply the military equipment needed by Sri Lanka.

Conclusions

Sri Lanka has emerged stronger and more stable after the military success in the Eelam war and the two elections at the national level. It has to build on this position through sagacious and appropriate political dispensation to prevent the resurgence of Tamil militancy. The President should not hesitate to seek from India such political/economic/military help that Sri Lanka may need. India, on her part, should not hesitate to provide all the needed help, subject only to any limitations imposed by her supreme national interests. India will therefore have to refine her political, economic and military policies towards Sri Lanka, to make itself more relevant to Sri Lanka than other nations.

In the process of refining and fine-tuning her policy towards Sri Lanka in the current situation, India needs to be particularly careful to avoid giving any impression of condescending and/or patronizing attitudes, as that would only serve to antagonize the proud President and people of Sri Lanka.


[This note formed the basis of the author’s presentation on 13 April 2010 at the two-day National Seminar on Ethnic Reconciliation, Economic Reconstruction and Nation Building in Sri Lanka, organized at Chennai (on 12 & 13 April) by the Indian Centre for South Asian Studies and Center for Asia Studies. R.Swaminathan is currently the Chairman of the International Institute of Security and Safety Management, New Delhi and and Vice President of the Chennai Centre for China Studies. He is former Special Secretary, DG (Security), Government of India and can be contacted at rsnathan@gmail.com] Read more...

Rajapaksa’s victory & after

This article is a summary of answers to questions put by various national and international print and electronic media on January 27, 2010.
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By Col R Hariharan

(January 28, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) President Mahinda Rajapaksa has won a second term as President of Sri Lanka with a handsome margin. Did you expect this victory? Would you take it as peoples’ recognition of his leadership role in the victory against the Tamil Tigers?

Of course President Rajapaksa’s rise in popularity was mainly due to his contribution in designing and orchestrating the actions of the entire government to achieve military victory. While he provided the canvass for the victory, it was Fonseka who led the campaign and made it a reality .So both gained public acclaim after the military victory. According to one assessment the popularity of Rajapaksa and Fonseka on this count was in the ratio of 60:40 respectively.

Many of us had forecast a victory for the President by a narrow margin. In fact he was expected to scrape through. So winning by over 58% plus majority was indeed a surprise. This is a sizeable increase over the 50.3% majority he secured in the 2005 election.

Actually a popular poll prediction in the early days of election ring said he would win by 62% and nobody was prepared to believe that. On the other hand, another pollster on January 21 had forecast a lead of 12% for Fonseka. So much for poll predictions.

However, it is too early to carry out a detailed analysis of the polling patterns. We need more inputs to do that. But it is clear that majority of Tamils in the north did not vote and the President was elected by overwhelming Sinhala support.

Do you think the President’s victory came by fair means? How did he achieve it?
Stuffing of ballot boxes is not an uncommon phenomenon in South Asia and in particular in Sri Lanka. Probably there were such cases in this election also. The detailed reports of monitors would surface in due course, I presume.

But there was considerable misuse of state media by the ruling coalition; and government servants campaigned openly against the opposition candidate. The Election Commissioner was so disgusted at the utter disregard shown to his directions that he decided to retire from office before the next parliamentary poll in April. Even while announcing the results of the election, the Elections Commissioner said that though he tried his level best to ensure the polls were conducted in a free and fair manner, it was “largely out of his control to manage, especially in areas like Puttalam, Anuradhapura and Matale.”

In spite of all this, it would be unfair to the voters to trivialise the overwhelming mandate Rajapaksa has secured as solely due to electoral malpractices.

I think President’s victory came about because of overwhelming Sinhala majority support, and large scale abstention of Tamil voters of Northern Province, just as it happened in the 2005 presidential poll. Many Tamils in Vanni have not been able to get back to their normal life savagely destroyed by the war. Many believed there was nothing much to choose between the two main candidates. In their eyes probably both the candidates lacked credibility particularly on the Tamil issue. Though theTamil National Alliance (TNA) had supported General Fonseka, it could influence only those who voted, but not the majority who stayed away from voting. In the end only around 19% of them voted. As a whole it has exposed the lack of credibility of Tamil political class among the public.

At the same time the ruling coalition had generally created a climate of fear and suspicion in the country before the election. There was intimidation, high handedness and muzzling of opposition media. By January 24 there were over 900 incidents of election related misconduct. Five people were killed. In this kind of environment the explosion of a few bombs in Jaffna in the early hours of Election Day probably came as a final straw for the voters not to stir out of their houses.

Rajapaksa’s overwhelming support came from Southern Sinhala voters particularly in rural areas. Apparently, Fonseka had not been able to make a dent in this vote bank. Even Mrs Chandrika Kumaratunga’s belated show of solidarity with Fonseka had only symbolic effect.

General Fonseka had alleged that the troops had surrounded the hotel where he was staying and it was part of a plot to kill him. What are your comments?

“Politics of revenge” became the order of the day in Sri Lanka ever since the ambitious General fell out with the President and his brothers. Its pitch increased when he decided to contest the presidential poll. The General has since moved out of the hotel to his house. The government had said the troops were out there “to protect the opposition leaders” (from whom?) and the search was carried out to apprehend deserters holed up in the hotel. This is hardly a credible story as police can to carry out these tasks.

The General’s accusation of a plot to kill him needs to be substantiated. The allegation was probably a manifestation of the confrontational politics. Presumably, the aggressive act of massing of troops was a continuation of pressure tactics used against Fonseka starting with allegations of corruption and nepotism. The General’s statement also could be to enrol international sympathy for his plight and uncertain future after his defeat.

The General Fonseka led the army to victory in the Eelam War under President Rajapaksa. Despite this he appears to be daggers drawn with the President. What was most important reason for his relationship with the President going wrong?

Basically, the General was an ambitious person. He felt the President had not given the recognition he deserved for his contribution to the military victory that eluded Sri Lanka for 26 years. After the General became the CDS, he spoke of a grandiose vision of building 300,000-strong army. His talk of building a huge and powerful army, when even the 200,000-strong army was becoming redundant after the war, made political classes uneasy.

The President apparently felt uncomfortable in handling him and sidelined him from the mainstream of decision making. This process of “downsizing” reached its low point when he was appointed Secretary of Sports Ministry.

The differences between the President and the General came out in the open and culminated in the fight for presidency. And the opposition parties desperately looking for a suitable candidate to oppose the President, they found a useful foil in Fonseka.
What was India’s equation with the two candidates?

Over the years, President Rajapaksa has built a strong relationship at various levels of Indian leadership. He is quick to acknowledge India’s help and appreciates the political limitations of India in supporting him during the Eelam War. Even though India had harped on activating the 13th amendment to the Constitution on provincial autonomy, it chose to ignore when the President deferred action on it and went to war. India had consistently supported Sri Lanka under his leadership in international forums even on some of the critical issues like human rights violations.

On the other hand, Fonseka was an unknown quantity to Indian leadership. The UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, who is on a good wicket with Indian leaders, had tried to plead for India’s support to the General. Apparently, India was not comfortable with the idea. When he was the army commander, General Fonseka’s pronouncements had smacked of Sinhala nationalism and support to him would at best be controversial.

Moreover, India considered Rajapaksa a safe bet, as it probably expected him to come on top in the election. So probably India favoured his victory although it stand on the subject was never made public.

President Rajapaksa has been elected with a sizeable majority votes for a second term. Do you expect him to be dictatorial in his second term? Will he use the majority Sinhala support he enjoys to crush the Tamils?

I agree there are instances where presidents repeatedly given a democratic mandate tended to be dictatorial. And the executive presidency gives considerable leeway for the president to be dictatorial. But Sri Lanka has an enlightened political class and strong civil society which had become vocal during the election. It had always opposed such tendencies as was seen during the Jayawardane regime. So it would not be easy for the President to behave like a dictator.

Rajapaksa is a seasoned politician who uses existing political instruments to get his writ through. He has demonstrated this a number of times say by splitting political parties in his favour, buying time on the Tamil issue etc.

Tamils are a sizeable minority who can make a difference between the winner and the loser in national elections. So over the years, all major parties have tried to cultivate a Tamil lobby. So I do not expect the revival of vintage anti-Tamil attitude of rabid Sinhala nationalism as a major political force. Already Rajapaksa enjoys huge Sinhala support and he will gain no political advantage by “road rolling” Tamils and their concerns.

There is also the lingering India factor in Sri Lanka, however reluctant India might be to acknowledge it. Rajapaksa knows that across the Palk Straits, Sri Lanka Tamils enjoy considerable empathy and emotional support. This has already been tested during the war. And Tamil Nadu has a big clout in New Delhi in the ruling coalition. So Rajapaksa would always keep India at the back of his mind while dealing with the Tamil issue. India is also likely to come under considerable pressure to bring up the issue with Rajapaksa as Tamil Nadu gets ready for the 2011 assembly polls.

Overall, although the election mandate has boosted Rajapaksa’s power, I expect the President to show a nuanced approach during his second term. However, he could be encouraged by those around him to deviate from this path when pressure builds up against him internally or externally.

It had been reported that the U.S. favoured Fonseka in the presidential poll. What are your comments?

It is true the U.S. had been quite unhappy with the Rajapaksa regime on two counts: its indifference to the U.S. concerns over gross human rights violations, and its contacts with the anti-US club – Venezuela, Iran, Cuba, Myanmar etc. Moreover, considerable anti-U.S. feelings were whipped up in the closing stages of war when the U.S. wanted to extricate the beleaguered Tamil Tigers.

Countries do act at times in strange ways but I do not believe the U.S. ever seriously considered supporting Fonseka, despite its frosty relations with Rajapaksa. I am sure the U.S. is realistic enough to know of Rajapaksa’s strengths as demonstrated in his success against the Tamil Tigers. I am sure this was the reason for Senator John F. Kerry led Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s call for friendlier relations between the U.S. and Sri Lanka in December 2009. Moreover, the U.S. does consult India on key issues relating to Sri Lanka. And India’s lack of enthusiasm for a regime change in Sri Lanka would have definitely discouraged the U.S. from any thought of favouring Fonseka.
When Mrs Indira Gandhi was Prime Minister she reacted strongly to America’s planned foray into Sri Lanka. China has already made an entry into Sri Lanka. As Sri Lanka is in a 1987-like situation now, do you expect Rajapaksa to slowly marginalise Indian influence in the island to accommodate the Chinese?

The Cold War scene of Mrs Gandhi’s time does not exist anymore. The world and this region have changed considerably along with international power equations. China is poised to become a global power; it has become the financier to boost up America’s sagging economy. Its economic influence is spreading the world over and in support its military reach is also growing. This is the reality.

And the Chinese influence in Sri Lanka is a part of this reality. And Sri Lanka would need China’s economic support to build its war ravaged economy as much as it needs India’s support. In spite of this, Sri Lanka had carefully tried to balance the relationship. In fact, it offered the Hambantota project to India first; it went to China only after India failed to respond. On the other hand as China’s foot print increases in Sri Lanka, India’s security concerns would also increase. And India should constantly keep a watch on Chinese activity in Sri Lanka, regardless of its nature.

At the same time, India has also become an important economic power and militarily a strong regional player. It is building its strategic security relationship with the U.S. This is likely to grow in the coming years. As the U.S. sees India as a factor to balance the Chinese power projection in this region, despite India’s reluctance to acknowledge it. So India of today is not the same as it was in 1987.

Sri Lanka-India relations are closer than ever before. It has a fairly successful free trade agreement with India. Indian capital flow to Sri Lanka is poised to increase and this would boost employment and economic opportunities for Sri Lanka. There is considerable similarity of perception on many international issues between the two countries. So it is doubtful whether Rajapaksa would gain any major advantage by enlarging his relationship with China at the cost of India. In fact, it would be strategically risky for him to do so as India is physically too close to Sri Lanka. This is an advantage that China does not enjoy.

The President is politically savvy enough to understand these nuances of the Sri Lanka, India and China triangular relationship. He would probably try to reap maximum advantage for his country from India using the China card.

(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90.He is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. Blog: www.colhariharan.org E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com) Read more...

Election War and its bloody battles

“There are only a few days left for the people to decide their choice. To say it is will be a close race is probably an understatement; if we go by the virulent passions the election has unexpectedly generated it has all the makings of a bloody fight.”
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By Col R Hariharan

(January 24, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) Both President Rajapaksa and General Fonseka appear to be following the strategy of ‘indirect approach’ in their “electoral war.” Sir Basil Liddell Hart, one of the great military thinkers of 20th century propounded this key military concept as early as 1929. In his famous work The Decisive Wars of History he explained the indirect approach as seeking “a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by battle is guaranteed to do so".

Adopted in the election campaign, perhaps unwittingly, this strategy can produce a host of problems not only during the election but in the aftermath also. Unfortunately, violence and thuggery adopted as weapons of electoral war in Sri Lanka will have a bitter aftermath of the election. And that could be a destabilizing development impacting the parliamentary poll due to be held after electing the new president

The transformation of democratic election into a war is the last thing Sri Lanka needs as it has to rebuild itself first. But it has become a war; that is the impression one gets while reading the latest media note of the Centre from Monitoring Election Violence (CMEV) of Sri Lanka. It shows a definite trend of targeted violence using weapons of war against supporters of the opposition candidate across the country. Already at least four people have been killed.

Nothing illustrates the situation better than the “bomb” attack on the house of Tiran Alles, one time friend of the President and now the Secretary and National Organizer of the SLFP Mahajana Wing rooting for General Sarath Fonseka. Although the bomb did not harm either Alles or his family, it caused “severe” damage to his vehicle and house.” Alles had been hounded in the past also.

The attack came just a day after Mangala Samaraweera, the leader of the SLFP (Mahajana), alleged that the Rajapaksa regime had hatched a plot to assassinate Alles. His allegation appears to have come truer than the predictions of astrologers swarming around politicians.

And attack on Alles was not the only one. Opposition UNP’s Southern Provincial Councilor Gayan Sanjeewa was shot at while traveling in a car and he believed that it was an attempt on his life. Two UNP workers were injured.

A few days back a grenade was thrown near the house of a supporter of Sri Lanka Muslim Council (SLMC) Buhari Mohommed Mubharak in Ottamavadi in Eastern Province. In another shooting incident the UNP North Central Provincial Councilor Prasanna Mahindarathne was targeted. He alleged that miscreants of ruling alliance had fired as many as 30 shots on his home and car in Kalundegama on January 22. According to him, soldiers of nearby army training camp have identified the bullets as those used only by the police.

Significantly, all these acts of violence against the opposition have happened in the last few days.

Of course, other less violent but equally undemocratic misuse of the state machinery including the media had been going on for sometime. Senior government officials have been making partisan statements in favour of the President. In fact the Supreme Court had to intervene to order the state and private media to obey election commissioner's guidelines on such misuse.

The Election Commissioner Dayananda Dissanayake had appointed a Competent Authority to oversee the conduct of state media during election campaigning following complaints from the opposition parties. But their utter disregard for his representative vexed the Election Commissioner so much that he withdrew the officer. He has also announced that he would not be available to conduct the parliamentary election that is to follow the presidential poll.

The increasing incidents of violence and lawless conduct and the tendency of authorities to ignore such aberrations have triggered fears of large scale violence among people as the day of election (January 26, 2010) approaches. There could also be obstruction of voting on the Election Day by lawless elements.

In a joint statement, civil society representatives have called upon both the President and General Fonseka “to jointly issue a statement for a cessation of violence and restoration of law and order with regard to the current election campaign. The government needs to immediately implement this call.” They have also drawn attention to an issue not usually expressed in public - politics of revenge - “the fear that they will become victims of the politics of revenge if they choose to go with the side that does not win.” This factor also might result in people abstaining from voting. Stuffing of ballot boxes is a real possibility in case people abstain from voting.

United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has expressed concern at the violence during the run-up to the election. He has appealed to all parties to refrain from violence and to avoid provocative acts. As the U.S. ambassador to Sri Lanka Patricia Butenis has cautioned a violent election is sure to tarnish Sri Lanka’s international image. But are the rival candidates in the mood to care for international image?

Unfortunately South Asian elections are increasingly determined by “coercive persuasion” using extreme tactics. But what is happening in Sri Lanka’s pre-election scene of violence and lawlessness, and intimidation and misuse of state apparatus has been unprecedented. As Rajapaksa is in office and in a better position to restore public order and governance, it has affected his reputation more than his rival. By default, the General - never known as a champion of liberalism - is suddenly being looked upon by many to change in a complex mess of authoritarianism, corruption, lawlessness and poor governance that Sri Lanka has become.

Only six months back many people had hailed the President as the great king (maharajanani) for winning the war; but many among them see him as seemingly helpless leader to restore good governance in a period of peace. Why is this? Although poll predictions are far from accurate a recent pre-election poll has predicted a healthy lead for Fonseka. Is this triggering nervous act of violence? Or is it the desire to put the fear of god in the minds of opposition supporters? Whatever be the cause, there is no doubt that each and every act of violence against the opposition brings down the President’s image little by little.

There are only a few days left for the people to decide their choice. To say it is will be a close race is probably an understatement; if we go by the virulent passions the election has unexpectedly generated it has all the makings of a bloody fight. One can only hope the winner would succeed in canalizing this passion into constructive energy to restore confidence in the government and amity between the various ethnic groups. And that is going to be a tall order for either candidate if the election run up is any guide.

(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90.He is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. Blog: www.colhariharan.org E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com) Read more...

Mega trends 2010

How is the year 2010 going to be for Sri Lanka? What are the likely trends?

By Col R Hariharan

(January 03, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) The year 2009 had been a remarkable year of achievement for Sri Lanka. By May 2009 President Mahinda Rajapaksa managed to lead the country to eliminate the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Tigers (LTTE) founder leader Prabhakaran its entire leadership. But significantly, he failed to carry the nation as a united entity to handle post war problems of economic woes of the poor, human rights and humanitarian aberrations and ethnic distrust. So it was a dismal ending of a great year.

Here is an assessment on three issues – politics, international affairs and human rights - based on analysis of major events of 2009 to identify Sri Lanka’s major trends in 2010. However, this analysis does not cover trade and commerce, which is a speciality in itself. Similarly, the trend in Tamil insurgency is excluded here as it has been covered in detail in Sri Lanka update No 188 dated December 23, 2009. Strategic security trends and Indian policy options in Sri Lanka in 2010 are proposed to be covered in a separate piece.

Political

The remarkable year of 2009 ended in a sour note when the President allowed political expediency to take over and advanced the presidential poll by two years to January 26, 2010. When one of the chief architects of military victory General Sarath Fonseka challenged the president’s bid for a second term in office, the polity and people have been polarised. The nation is divided vertically when unity was the key to reap the dividends of peace.

Thus we find the nation using irreplaceable resource of human endeavour on a political exercise instead of addressing vital national issues that have a strategic connotation on Sri Lanka’s future. The issues include kick starting the national economy to pay off war debts, upgrading human resources stunted durrng the war years, redress of historical grievances of minorities and rectifying human rights and humanitarian aberrations.

The President is leading the race in the run up to the elections. However, General Fonseka, the common opposition candidate, is improving his competitiveness. He has revamped his campaign making a foray into Jaffna peninsula, a no-go area for any erstwhile army commander without escort for the last 25 years. Apparently Fonseka is determined to improve his trust quotient among Tamils which suspects his new found sympathy for Tamils plight. However, unless the former political ally of the LTTE – The Tamil National Alliance (TNA) –makes up its mind to support him he is unlikely to get no large scale Tamil support. With the government in power in a position to indirectly trade off favours, the TNA's much delayed decision may not be wholehearted even in the unlikely event of favouring Fonseka.

Compared to the General, President Rajapaksa is better placed to win Tamil votes despite historical Tamil tilt towards the rival United National Party (UNP). Thus it would be reasonable to expect the President to win the mandate for a second term.

If that happens we can expect him to become even more assertive in the run up to the parliamentary poll. His aim would be to strengthen his coalition numbers in parliament as no single party by itself has a chance to get a absolute majority in the proportional representation system.

So the year 2010 will probably see the deferring of contentious questions like abolition of executive presidency. Even with all good intentions, in the coming year we can expect no dramatic improvement in other hardy perennials – human rights, Tamil autonomy, and enforcement of 13th and 17th amendments to the constitution. At best expect there would probably be cosmetic changes through a patchwork quilt of measures to buy time and space rather than paradigm changes because politically that would be more convenient.

International affairs

Sri Lanka is likely to adopt a more conciliatory profile with nations which matter because it would need their support to prop up its war ravaged economy, handle embarrassing human rights and humanitarian issues coming up internationally, and take maximum advantage of the strategic power play in the Indian Ocean and South Asian regions.

Sri Lanka's relations with the U.S. are likely to undergo a face lift with. The Obama administration already indicating its mood to ‘forget and forgive’ in reshaping its Sri Lanka policy. Of course, Sri Lanka has to thank the increasing footprint of China in the country for change in the U.S. attitudes. Otherwise the U.S. would not have suddenly discovered it should have "an integrated strategy that leverages political, economic, and security tools for more effective long-term reforms" in Sri Lanka.

Of course 2010 will be the year of sizeable increase in the Chinese profile beyond its projects in Sri Lanka. We can expect the markets to open up for a flood of Chinese goods giving a run for the money to Indian and local brands. Towards the year end probably we would see the first of the Chinese tourists in large number.

Indian response to the Chinese moves could be slow in its own ponderous pace. The focus would be on developmental activity in the Tamil areas and taking up other projects long in incubation. In 2010 Indian concerns with Af-Pak region are likely to occupy greater space in its foreign policy preoccupations due to the likely downsizing of the U.S. profile in the region as prelude to progressive military disengagement in that region. Despite this, with the Tamil Nadu legislative elections due in another year the Tamil issue could be brought back to the top of the open agenda from backroom parleys. So Sri Lanka will be required to handle this isue whether it likes it or not.

The EU despite periodic fulminations about extending the GSP+ tariff concessions may well end up striking a compromise. The EU rarely takes abrupt or precipitate action in handling such situations. Usually it provides enough space for the other nation to evolve a workable solution. Moreover, it has both strategic and commercial interests in the region and cannot exclude itself in the power game in the region.

Britain’s Sri Lanka relations had a forgettable year in 2009. They are unlikely to fare any better in 2010 due to Britain’s own political compulsions in responding to ethnic Tamil lobbying and human rights pressures outweighing other considerations.

Human Rights issues

It is pay time for Sri Lanka’s human rights aberrations and alleged war crimes. In 2010 there is likely to be more international pressure on Sri Lanka to show concrete actions to prevent economic and diplomatic stand off with powerful entities like the EU and the U.S. In view of this Sri Lanka could move away from its hard positions and take face saving measures so that it presents a reasonable image to a more friendly U.S.

However, if past experience is any guide, Sri Lanka is likely to fall short of translating words into action. Usually it works out a slew of half way measures to ease international pressure and to buy time. Though executive presidency gives adequate freedom for the president to do so he is unlikely to expend it on this count to make a radical departure from past practice for want of political incentive to do so.

Of course a strong peoples’ movement could change this. There are no signs of such a movement in the near future. It is extremely doubtful whether the opposition parties with their own tainted record would be inclined to do so.

Allegations of war crimes are much more serious in the international eye. But politically it is going to be difficult for the President – regardless who is in the chair - to seriously investigate allegations of war crimes and take them to logical conclusion. So this issue is likely to be a major challenge for the new president. China is likely to be the gainer if the West confronts Sri Lanka on this issue. China has a history of taking advantage of such confrontations. Usually it uses them as opportunities for strengthening its relations by preventing concerted international action. Myanmar and Sudan are two shining examples of this strategy. Moreover, the international process of handling war crimes is bureaucratic and time consuming. So the Western powers are likely use the time delay and economic pressures, rather than direct confrontation, as tools to try and bring Sri Lanka on line. In view of this issue is likely to hang fire during the year 2010.

(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90.He is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. Blog: www.colhariharan.org E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com ) Read more...

Selling a Soured Dream to the Disillusioned

“The LTTE’s international elements appear to be split into two factions. The “militant faction” led by Norwy-based Nediyawan that continues to advocate an armed struggle to pursue the goal of an independent Tamil Eelam. It would like to keep up the memory of Prabhakaran to draw strength.”
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By Col R Hariharan

(December 22, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) The overseas supporters of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have been in disarray ever since the founder leader Prabhakaran and the entire insurgent leadership were eliminated in May 2009. The expatriates who had unquestioningly followed Prabhakaran's orders are now trying to come to terms with the reality of decision making on their own.

They appear to have a major dilemma in deciding the future course of action, particularly as they do not want to carry out an impartial analysis of the LTTE’s course of action in the past. If they had done it, by now its positives and negatives could have provided useful pointers to the direction for taking the struggle back to Sri Lanka. But that would be a sacrilege as Prabhakaran and his leadership continue to be treated as holy cows beyond the pale of public scrutiny.

In the absence of a united leadership to lead them, the pro-LTTE expatriate Tamils appear to have pitched upon ‘referendum’ as the democratic method to find out popular opinion on the future course of struggle. Had they adopted this method earlier, when the war was nearing the point of no return, lives of thousands of youth who perished in the war could have been saved. But unfortunately, that was never an option open to them in the LTTE lexicon.

They held a series of “referendum” first in European countries. The organisers probably knew that if they had carried out a referendum on continuing the LTTE's armed struggle for Tamil Eelam, not many might have voted as it would be inconvenient to remain in their adopted land.. So they appear to have pitched upon the Vaddukoddai Resolution adopted in May 14, 1976. It holds a nostalgic appeal for expatriate Tamils as it represented the united and assertive Tamil political opinion of that time calling for the creation of independent Tamil Eelam. It formed the basis for the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF)’s overwhelming electoral victory in the general election that followed. It is an irony of fate that expatriate Tamils have to fall back on this resolution after the LTTE had systematically hunted down TULF leaders out of existence. The fact that this resolution was dusted up shows the pro- LTTE expatriate elements have indirectly acknowledged the failure of the way the LTTE conducted the struggle. Of course Vaddukoddai Reslution has been made irrelevant in the course of subsequent history of blood and gore.

The recently conducted “referendum” in Canada was also a part of this exercise. According to Tamil expatriate media (which have turned their colours from the bright red of LTTE to Sri Lanka blue immediately after ‘thalaivar’s death) most of the 48,000 plus people who turned up (out of an estimated 300,000-350,000 Sri Lanka Tamils) voted for the Vaddukkoddai Resolution. Some of the media have dubbed it as a minority vote and hence of no consequence.

It would be incorrect to look at it only from the point of view of total expatriate population. The organisers of the referendum, by and large, were pro-LTTE elements or its fellow travellers. Referendum is important because it provides a barometer of existing potential support for the revival of LTTE. It should come as a relief to the organisers that 13 to 15 % of the Canadian expatriates voted and still subscribed to the notion of an independent Tamil Eelam. This comes even after the LTTE itself had given up hope of an independent Eelam and accepted Tamil autonomy within a federal Sri Lanka when it opted to negotiate the peace process 2002. Of course, the referendum also helps in establishing the legitimacy of organisers as inheritors of the Tamil leadership that fell vacant after the demise of LTTE leadership in Sri Lanka.

However, the referendum would have been more meaningful if there had been an honest soul searching among expatriate Tamils who had supported Prabhakaran.That would have revealed glaring short comings in the way he operated which has now left the Tamil community in Sri Lanka disunited and weak. As this had not been done, the purpose of the referendum would appear to be only to garner expatriate help to revive the old cry of an armed struggle for Tamil Eelam. And that may not come through in the near term as there are neither any takers nor a foothold in Sri Lanka. So it will continue to be in the realms of emotion for sometime unless the revival is helped by Sinhala obscurantists in Sri Lanka.

While tasking the army in the north and east after the war ended, the Sri Lanka government and the security forces appear to have gone on the premise that the revival of the LTTE was possible. So the process of eliminating the LTTE from its internal and overseas roots is going on rigorously. This is evidenced by the Sri Lanka navy’s recent seizure of MV Christina, said to be the largest ship of LTTE’s tramp fleet. Of course chances for LTTE’s revival diminishes as more of its caches of arms and military equipment are recovered and cadres eluding arrest are rounded up and identified. Already 12,000 LTTE cadres of various kinds are in custody.

Tragically the war also displaced around 280,000 Tamils living in areas under the LTTE control. They had to undergo a grim process of screening at the hands of Sri Lanka army. They now face a bleak future as they have lost their livelihood and homes. This is more so in the absence of charismatic and assertive leadership of Prabhakaran.

In a recent interview to the Daily Mirror, Colombo, Dr Rohan Gunaratne, Head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, had said the LTTE has been “dismantled” in Sri Lanka. This is probably correct as no worthwhile leader is in the horizon to collect the remnants, marshal the assets, unite supporters and coordinate their activities to rebuild the organisation either at home or abroad. Given this internal environment, the revival of the LTTE within the island does not appear feasible in the near future.

In this context, a recent report of The Times, London, about the formation of a new Tamil militant outfit - the Makkal Viduthalai Ranuvam (People’s Liberation Army) – is interesting but not credible. In an interview of a self styled commander Kones (pseudonym) of the new Tamil militant group claimed the PLA comprised mostly of ex-militants with Marxist ideology and opposed to the LTTE brand of militancy was formed four months back. At present it was 300-strong and it hoped to raise a force of 5000. Sri Lankan Tamil media considers this as a Sri Lankan intelligence ploy politically motivated to keep the Tamil militant threat in the public eye. This may well be true.

However, as Dr Gunaratne said in the same Daily Mirror interview, the LTTE international presents “a challenge to Sri Lanka progress, ethnic harmony, and unity. Future peace in Sri Lanka can only be sustained, if the LTTE is dismantled comprehensively, both at home and overseas.” There is no doubt about it.

The LTTE’s international elements appear to be split into two factions. The “militant faction” led by Norwy-based Nediyawan that continues to advocate an armed struggle to pursue the goal of an independent Tamil Eelam. It would like to keep up the memory of Prabhakaran to draw strength.

The “political faction” led by Viswanathan. Rudrakumaran, New York based attorney, wants to carry o on the Tamil struggle politically. In June 2009, LTTE sympathizers and remnants overseas put together an advisory committee for the formation of a Provisional Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (PTGTE), with V Rudrakumaran as the coordinator, in a bid to keep the quest for self determination alive. It swore to follow a fundamentally democratic path. It opened its platform for those who accepted the tenets of “Tamil Nationhood, a Tamil homeland as recognized in the 1987 Indo- Sri Lanka Agreement, ……and the Tamils’ right to self-determination” as per the 1976 Vaddukoddai Resolution, the 1985 Thimpu Declaration and the LTTE’s 2003 Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) proposal.

Although Rudrakumaran has in his Heroes Day message of November 27, 2009 reiterated the PTGTE would wage “a non- violent political struggle”, it is clear that the PTGTE has close connections with the LTTE international This is evident from the display of the LTTE’s Heroes Day message 2009 sporting images of Prabhakaran and LTTE flag in the PTGTE website. It is not clear how the PTGTE had wished away three decades of LTTE’s armed struggle which sacrificed nearly 300,000 Sri Lankan lives of all ethnicity, and decided to adopt a non-violent strategy without a critical examination of the earlier strategy. Of course there are also other political contradictions in this stand; but that only shows the dilemma faced by the political faction in trying to talk of peaceful means without disowning the history of Prabhakaran.

Apart from diehard supporters of the Eelam Cause and faithful followers of Prabhakaran, majority of expatriates probably realise that an independent Tamil Eelam would continue to remain a distant dream. So Rudrakumaran’s prescription appears to be pitched to attract support from this majority.

At present Sri Lanka Tamil political parties, including the political conglomerate of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) are looking for financial and political support from this majority expatriate segment. The expatriate Tamils are divided into small groups with their own personal and political agenda just as the Sri Lankan Tamil parties are. So how they can be convinced to extend support for political campaigns in Sri Lanka remains to be seen.

In this context, the conference of Tamil speaking people under the theme “The role of the elected representatives of Sri Lanka’s Tamil and Muslim population in a process of national reconciliation, reconstruction and reform” jointly organized by the Tamil Information Centre (TIC), the International Working Group on Sri Lanka (IWG) and the Initiative on Conflict Prevention through Quiet Diplomacy (ICPQD) at the University of Essex from 20 to 22 November 2009 is of significance.

More importantly the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and the All Ceylon Muslim Congress representing the Muslims of Sri Lanka as well as three Tamil parties representing plantation Tamils also participated in the deliberations .The conference hosted by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs appears to be only a beginning. It had carefully treaded the common ground, recognising the difficulties in forging unity.

The conference has set the modest goal of committing “to the engagement by all segments of society towards a just and durable political solution” through a dignified, respectful and peaceful process. However whether the well intentioned effort would politically result in concerted action for the promotion of interests of Tamil speaking minorities in Sri Lanka remains a big question mark. This is going to be a long and tedious process as evident from the vertical divide among them in supporting the rival candidates in the presidential poll.

With the Tamil ethnic issue still remaining wide open, it is doubtful whether the expatriate actions as of now would help in resolving the problems of Tamil speaking people in the island. The only way they can contribute would be to strengthen the process set off in the November 2009 conference for a unified movement inclusive of all Tamil speaking people of Sri Lanka. Resurrecting separatism either politically or militarily would require selling a soured dream to the disillusioned. That would be embarking on another self defeating proposition.

(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90.He is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. Blog: www.colhariharan.org E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com) Read more...

‘Sarath-Mahinda ‘war’ gets dirtier

By Col R Hariharan

(December 15, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) The Sunday Leader (Dec 13, 2009) interview of General Sarath Fonseka, the challenger of President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s re-election, shook the Sri Lanka government’s carefully built edifice of waging a “humanitarian war” it had built to ward off accusations of genocide and human rights violations committed by the army during the Eelam war.

The General accused the Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa of instructing a key ground commander in the north that all LTTE leaders must be killed and not allowed to surrender. The three key LTTE leaders allegedly done to death were probably Nadesan, Pulidevan and Ramesh who wanted to surrender. According to the armyTheir bodies were found on May 18 during operations on the last stronghold of the LTTE. The General’s accusation only confirms earlier suspicions on this count. There were similar accusations of Prabhakaran’s death also but few appear to believe that.

However, the General appeared to have learnt the fine art of politics in double time. Like a good politician, he quickly denied that he made the accusation, and said he was misquoted. Despite the denial, as it always happens in political misquotes, the damage was already done. And it is clear that the General has challenged the government on its weakest wicket – accusations of human rights violations and genocide – in its war against the Tamil insurgents.

The Sri Lanka government has been left red in the face because it reinforces international suspicion of the government indulging in genocide. So far the government had been calling the international outcry against its poor human rights record a foreign conspiracy of INGOs, Western nations, and LTTE moles to tarnish Sri Lanka’s reputation. In response to the General’s allegation Human Rights Minister Mahinda Samarasinghe called it a “great betrayal,” and said the ‘baseless allegation’ was made for personal gains and such allegations were ‘extremely harmful’ and provide ‘oxygen the US State Department attempt to inquire into the so called Human Rights violations during the humanitarian operation.’

In response to international community’s concerns, President Mahinda Rajapaksa has already appointed a six-member committee to look into the charges of human rights violations during the war. However, performance of such committees in the past had been shoddy and left the international community unconvinced of the govrnment’s sincerity.
Now the General had questioned the credibility of the government stand, it is unlikely to let him off easily. The government has sought the opinion of Attorney General for recording a statement from General Fonseka on his remarks to the media regarding Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa.

In an indirect response to the General’s allegation, Army Commander Lieutenant General Jagath Jayasuriya, while addressing the troops at the Army Headquarters said that the Army faced its “biggest betrayal.” He asked them to be conscious about this betrayal and face it together.

General Fonseka is believed to have a personal following of loyalists in the army. This had been worrying the Rajapaksa government and the President’s campaigners. Rumours of an impending coup d’tat by the army were in the air sometime back and quickly denied. But it is clear that army is slowly being drawn into eddy of election politics in support of the President. Already senior army officers have appeared on the TV in a bid to downgrade the role played by General Fonseka signaling the increasinglypartisan role of the army in this murky contest.

In an indirect response to the allegations of politicization the army, the Army Commander while recently addressing the Defence Services Command and Staff College had cautioned that the loyalty of the troops “should be to the organization and not individuals.” Asking them to “work with the interest of the organization and the country first” he said “individuals will come and go but the organization needs to function with equality and without a conflict in loyalties. This can make or break an organization and is very detrimental to a fighting Army and to the services. This is something that we have to guard as advocating disloyalty to the organization amounts to subversion.” There are serious words coming from the army chief within seven months of a resounding military victory and shows how seriously the risk potential of Fonseka loyalists is being viewed by him. After General Fonseka’s latest allegations the situation could get worsen on the issue of divided loyalties.

Quickly responding to the government accusation of “betrayal” the General said today (December 14) that he would take responsibility for what happened in the hands of the army throughout the war and as the then army commander, and no field commander acted in violation of any international law.

At the heart of Rajapaksa’s problem is that General Sarath Fonseka almost matches him in national popularity. As the two “national heroes” have been claiming credit for the success in the Eelam war, both should responsible for any offences committed by the troops operating under their directions.

The General’s latest salvo is only one more episode in the dirty drama that the government has been playing ever since it became clear that Fonseka could spoil the cake-walk victory President Rajapaksa was hoping for in the presidential poll scheduled for January 26, 2010. Not to be outdone, the General has now entered the fray. Skeletons of misconduct and corruption are tumbling out everyday as mutual recriminations are exchanged by both sides. More and more salacious details of favouritism, nepotism, and corruption in a whole range of things from arms deals to rehabilitation projects are floating in the air. In a way it is good that these allegations are being aired in public; at least it will provide some hope for remedial action subsequently.

But the tragedy is instead of fighting on concrete issues and pressing national problems both sides are out with their tar buckets. Apart from brad and butter and human rights issues that affect all, the Tamil issue has now been relegated to the sidelines, much to the detriment of permanent peace that could have followed the end of war. This has been the sad story of Sri Lanka. And nothing seems to have changed.

(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90.He is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. Blog: www.colhariharan.org E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com )

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India takes a small strategic step

By Col R Hariharan

(December 15, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) India took a small strategic step when it successfully launched Dhanush the 350 km range ship based anti-surface missile from INS Subhadra in the Bay of Bengal on Sunday, December 14. This should come as some consolation after the failure of its nuclear-capable IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) Agni-III in May and November 2009 test firings. Navy carried out the test firing as part of a user training exercise.

The media quoted official sources of the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) to claim the missile successfully hit the target with pin-point accuracy after covering 350 km. Two naval ships anchored near the target tracked the splash of the missile which followed a pre-designated trajectory. . The media also said radar systems of the Integrated Test Range (ITR), located along the Orissa coast, monitored the missile's entire trajectory. The missile took eight minutes and 40 seconds to hit the target.

Dhanush is the naval version of Prithvi. The single-stage 10-metre long liquid propellent missile weighs six tones and carries 500 kg warhead.

In March 2009, India had for the third time successfully tested the ballistic missile defence shield being developed by the DRDO. A ballistic missile defence system is highly automated and comprises of radars that can detect missiles in flight, interceptors that can take out the looming threat, and control systems that coordinate the whole operation. In the test in March, the ‘enemy’ missile (fired from a naval ship 150 km from Orissa coast to simulate Pak Ghauri missile) was quickly picked up on radar and the two-stage Prithvi Air Defence missile successfully intercepted and destroyed the intruding warhead.

Defence research scientists have also been successful in developing Pinaka Multi Barrel Rocket system and BrahMos, a supersonic cruise missile for the Navy, in collaboration with Russians. While Pinaka has already been introduced in the army, DRDO hopes BrahMos to deliver 240 missiles in the next two years. Although it was developed as an anti-ship missile, DRDO claims it can also be launched from air and land.

However, DRDO's successes do not cover up some of its multiple problems. The most notable of them has been its inability to develop an engine for the indigenous Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA). The Kaveri engine under development for two decades drew bitter criticism as it was underpowered. According to defence columnist Ajai Shukla, in its place, two alternatives were short-listed: the Eurojet EJ200, and the General Electric F-414 engines.

However, the Ministry of Defence appears to have changed its mind and decided to go for co-development. The DRDO’s Gas Turbine and Research Establishment (GTRE), which has a design partnership with French engine-maker, Snecma, has been asked to design a more powerful successor to Kaveri. The Business Standard had quoted Minister of State for Defence, Dr Pallam Raju’s rationale for this decision. He said: “It is important for India to have indigenous capabilities in engine design. And having invested so many man-hours of work into the design of the Kaveri engine, it would be a national waste to fritter away or dilute those capabilities”. (Snecma) is willing to co-develop an engine with us; they are willing to go beyond just transfer of technology. It is a value-added offer that gives us better technology than what we would get from ToT from Eurojet or GE."

But that was in 2008. The DRDO is notorious for its delays and well known for its non-adherence to time schedules. So presumably Tejas continues to be where it was: in the realms of development.

(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies)

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