“Eastern Province Muslims have conceived the notion of a Muslim homeland in their province. Most historians seem to be agreed that the bulk of the EP Muslims are the descendants of Muslim beneficiaries of the bounty of King Senarat, who allowed them to settle there as refugees from Portuguese oppression. The claim to an EP homeland with that kind of provenance is taken by many Sinhalese as signifying black ingratitude on the part of the Muslims.”____________________________________
by Izeth Hussain
(February 14, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) The so-called Oluvil Declaration, the core of which asserts supposed Muslim right to self-determination in the North East, has been noted in our newspapers as a development of possibly enormous significance. It has even been compared to the May 1976 Vaddukkoddai resolution which asserted a Tamil right to set up a sovereign state in the North East, in consequence of that same principle of self-determination.
It is too early to say, but the Oluvil Declaration could certainly prove to be fateful to the Muslims. It has to be seen in the perspective of processes that have been going on for many years. In that perspective, it clearly has the potential to vitiate Muslim relations with both the Sinhalese and the Tamils, and bring disaster for the Muslim. That would be a pity, because it would all be in consequence of a Muslim assertion of a right that is not a right.
The core of the Declaration is that the Muslims of the North East are part of a distinct nation, whose homeland is in the North East, in consequence of which they have the right of self-determination, and are entitled to an autonomous political unit linking Muslim majority areas in the North East. The Declaration also asserts that the political and other rights of the Muslims outside the North East must be ensured.
The essential problem about the Declaration’s formulation of the right of the Muslims is that it uses terms that are integral parts of the discourse of the nation-state. The terms in question are "nation", "homeland", and "self-determination". None of them have a valid application to the Muslims of Sri Lanka.
For the purposes of this article, it is crucially important to bear in mind a distinction that has to be made between two different types of minority ethnic groups. Only one of them can make a legitimate claim to be regarded as a nation. The claim is made on the basis that an ethnic group is indigenous to a particular territory, a "homeland" to which it is primordially linked, in the sense that the link goes back into the mists of antiquity. According to the theory of the nation-state, an ethnic group constitutes itself as a "nation" in relation to its "homeland", from which arises its claim to "self-determination" and the founding of a nation-state.
During the present "ethnic revival", dating from around 1970, there has been an immense amount of research into ethnicity. Among the more interesting findings of that research are that human beings sometimes, perhaps more often than not, take long periods to constitute themselves as a people, as an ethnic group, and history is often concocted in support of claims to homelands. There can be no doubt that the notion of the nation-state has led to a vast amount of mythologising. Consequently, the distinction drawn in this article between ethnic minorities which can legitimately claim to be national minorities and other ethnic minorities which can make on such claim, may sometimes be blurred.
However, in most cases there are no ambiguities and the distinction so clear enough between national minorities who are primordially lined to a territory and other ethnic minorities. For instance the Scots, who are now well on the way to establishing their sovereign state, are an ethnic minority in Britain. But they indisputably have had primordial links with the territory known as Scotland, and are therefore a national minority quite unlike the ethnic groups who came to Britain as immigrants after the Second World War.
Likewise, the link of ethnicity with territory is indisputable in the case of states which have been established after separatist wars, such as Bangladesh, Eritrea, and East Timor. It is indisputable also in the case of the former components of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia which have set themselves up as sovereign states. The point applies also to many of the aspirants to sovereign state status, such as the Northern Irish Catholics, the Palestinians, the Basques, the Kurds, and the Chechens.
The case of the Sri Lankan Tamils, however, looks rather peculiar, and may well be unique. Here we have one of the fiercest of all protracted ethnic wars which, at least up to now, has been spectacularly successful. And yet, the link of ethnicity with territory has been under serious dispute.
It is disputed on the ground that the whole island is the Sinhadipa, the land of the Sinhalese race, and furthermore it is the Dhammadipa, with the Sinhalese as a chosen people with the special responsibility of preserving the pristine and pure form of Buddhism. The Sinhalese presence in the North antedates the coming of the Tamils, it is said. As for the claim to the Eastern Province as part of the Tamil homeland, it is entirely spurious, as it is allegedly based on no more than lines of demarcation drawn for administrative convenience by the British.
It appears that on both sides of the cadjan fence a good deal of mythologising has gone into claims and counterclaims about the North East, which is said to accord with normal procedure whenever disputes arise over ethnic links to territory. But it does seem that a cogent enough case can be made to show that the Tamils do constitute a "nation" with a "homeland" covering the North and part at least of the East. Such a claim can be disputed on serious ground. The difference in the case of a similar claim from the Muslims is that, on serious grounds, it can only be dismissed. It may be that the Tamils are not indigenous to the North East, and have no primordial links with it because they are immigrants for the sub-continent. There must be very few ethnic groups with primordial links to territory in a literal sense, and besides the Sinhalese are also immigrants according to their own historical legends. The important point is that the Tamils have certainly been inhabiting the North and part of the East for many centuries, and those can be regarded as areas of traditional Tamil habitation, as the phrase goes. Those areas therefore constitute a homeland in a widely accepted sense.
A further point of importance is that the Sri Lanka Tamils, as distinct from Indian Tamils, always acknowledge that they are either "Jaffna Tamils" or "Batticaloa Tamils", the latter term designating the Eastern Province Tamils. A so-called "Colombo Tamil"may have been born in Colombo, and have never even visited the North East, but he would readily acknowledge that his ancestors came from either the North or the East.
We have therefore an ethnic group, the Sri Lankan Tamils, who have had a compact and contiguous areas of traditional Tamil habitation, constituting their "homeland", for which arises their claim to be regarded as a "nation" with an entitlement of "self-determination".
None of that can apply to the Sri Lankan Muslims. But before dealing with that point, a terminological confusion has to be cleared away. It is that the term "Muslim" designates the follower of a religion, Islam, and not an ethnic group. The Sri Lanka Muslims consist of several ethnic groups, the largest of whom are the so-called Moors. The term "Sri Lankan Muslim" is usually meant to refer to them, and is so used in this article.
The Sri Lanka Muslims understood in that sense certainly constitute an ethnic group, and they certainly have a strong sense of ethnic identity. But they are not nation in the sense defined above. Some of their ancestors may have come to the island from even pre-Islamic times, but they have not been indigenous to any part of Sri Lankan territory, and consequently have not had the conception of a homeland in the shape of a compact and contiguous unit of territory. The Sri Lankan Muslims have always thought of themselves in terms of their territorial provenance as "Colombo Muslims", "Galle Muslims", "Kandy Muslims", "Eastern Province Muslims", and so on.
However, in recent years, some Eastern Province Muslims have conceived the notion of a Muslim homeland in their province. Most historians seem to be agreed that the bulk of the EP Muslims are the descendants of Muslim beneficiaries of the bounty of King Senarat, who allowed them to settle there as refugees from Portuguese oppression. The claim to an EP homeland with that kind of provenance is taken by many Sinhalese as signifying black ingratitude on the part of the Muslims.
It will take much ingenuity, and much dishonesty, for historians and archeologists to establish what even looks like a plausible case for a Muslim homeland in the EP. But even if a valid case is established, it will be a "homeland" only for the EP Muslims, and that will make sense only if the EP Muslims are regarded as a distinct ethnic group, which they certainly are not. The important point is that the vast majority of the Muslims outside the EP will emphatically refuse of subscribe to the notion that they have a homeland in the EP.
It should be clear enough that the terms "nation", "homeland", and "self-determination" can have no valid application to the Sri Lankan Muslims. There is one other way in which they are distinct from the Tamils. The latter did have a Jaffna kingdom, even though for a relatively brief period in our long history. The Muslims have had nothing comparable and therefore cannot possibly advance a supposed historic claim to self-determination.
The advocates of Muslim self-determination must also bear in mind that the international community today recognises no such right. Rightly or wrongly, it is held that there was such a right only in a colonial context. It is a fact that in the period of decolonisation several new states have been established after separatist struggles. It is also a fact that was not in consequence of a recognised right of self-determination.
The question of importance of the further of the Muslims is what kind of significance should be attributed to the assertion of a right of self-determination in the Oluvil Declaration. D. B. S. Jeyaraj, in his detailed and perceptive analysis noted that one of the important respects in which it differs from the Vaddukkoddai resolution is that it is not scessionary, since it asks for no more than an autonomous unit of devolution.
While that is true, it remains that "self-determination" in its primary meaning asserts a right to set up separate and sovereign sate. The claim may stop short of it for the time being, but it carries that potential for the future. The Sinhalese will be inclined to believe that just as in the case of the Tamils, the present claim to autonomy among the Muslims will inevitable lead to a future claim to a separate state.
The Oluvil Declaration should be seen in the perspective of the evolution of Muslim politics since the 1970s, notably the emergence of the SLMC in the following decade. One of the important reasons why it emerged was the shocking failure of Muslim politicians in our two major parties to properly represent Muslim interests. But in recent times, disillusionment has been growing with the performance of the SLMC as well. Perhaps that disillusionment provides part of the explanation for the fact that the Oluvil Declaration, adopted with much spectacular fanfare, was a students’ affair without any notable participation by Muslim politicians.
The future may show that to have been a fateful development. It is certain, in any case, that the Declaration has the potential to jeopardise Muslim relations with both the Sinhalese and the Tamils to a dangerous extent. What should be done to prevent that?
I suggest that the students responsible for the Declaration explicitly disavow the claim to "Self-determination", and eschew future use of that terms along with the terms "nation" and "homeland", all of which have inescapable meanings as parts of the discourse of the nation-state.
I suggest also that the SLMC make a similar disavowal. That would be advisable even if the SLMC does not claim a Muslim right to self-determination. The news paper reports are no-confidence motion against the Defence Minister contained the following sentence about Mr. Rauf Hakeem, "He asserted that the SLMC would not on any account allow the government and the LTTE to ignore the Muslim right to self-determination."
What will the Muslims lose by that disavowal? Nothing, absolutely nothing whatever. The EP Muslims can still make their claim to an autonomous unit, though not on the ground of supposed right to self-determination. The Muslims as a whole can struggle, when necessary, to secure their group rights and their individual rights as citizens. It is on that basis that innumerable ethnic minorities are living in peace and dignity, in amity and co-operation, with dominant ethnic majorities all over the globe. Why not in Sri Lanka as well?
by Izeth Hussain
(February 14, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) The so-called Oluvil Declaration, the core of which asserts supposed Muslim right to self-determination in the North East, has been noted in our newspapers as a development of possibly enormous significance. It has even been compared to the May 1976 Vaddukkoddai resolution which asserted a Tamil right to set up a sovereign state in the North East, in consequence of that same principle of self-determination.
It is too early to say, but the Oluvil Declaration could certainly prove to be fateful to the Muslims. It has to be seen in the perspective of processes that have been going on for many years. In that perspective, it clearly has the potential to vitiate Muslim relations with both the Sinhalese and the Tamils, and bring disaster for the Muslim. That would be a pity, because it would all be in consequence of a Muslim assertion of a right that is not a right.
The core of the Declaration is that the Muslims of the North East are part of a distinct nation, whose homeland is in the North East, in consequence of which they have the right of self-determination, and are entitled to an autonomous political unit linking Muslim majority areas in the North East. The Declaration also asserts that the political and other rights of the Muslims outside the North East must be ensured.
The essential problem about the Declaration’s formulation of the right of the Muslims is that it uses terms that are integral parts of the discourse of the nation-state. The terms in question are "nation", "homeland", and "self-determination". None of them have a valid application to the Muslims of Sri Lanka.
For the purposes of this article, it is crucially important to bear in mind a distinction that has to be made between two different types of minority ethnic groups. Only one of them can make a legitimate claim to be regarded as a nation. The claim is made on the basis that an ethnic group is indigenous to a particular territory, a "homeland" to which it is primordially linked, in the sense that the link goes back into the mists of antiquity. According to the theory of the nation-state, an ethnic group constitutes itself as a "nation" in relation to its "homeland", from which arises its claim to "self-determination" and the founding of a nation-state.
During the present "ethnic revival", dating from around 1970, there has been an immense amount of research into ethnicity. Among the more interesting findings of that research are that human beings sometimes, perhaps more often than not, take long periods to constitute themselves as a people, as an ethnic group, and history is often concocted in support of claims to homelands. There can be no doubt that the notion of the nation-state has led to a vast amount of mythologising. Consequently, the distinction drawn in this article between ethnic minorities which can legitimately claim to be national minorities and other ethnic minorities which can make on such claim, may sometimes be blurred.
However, in most cases there are no ambiguities and the distinction so clear enough between national minorities who are primordially lined to a territory and other ethnic minorities. For instance the Scots, who are now well on the way to establishing their sovereign state, are an ethnic minority in Britain. But they indisputably have had primordial links with the territory known as Scotland, and are therefore a national minority quite unlike the ethnic groups who came to Britain as immigrants after the Second World War.
Likewise, the link of ethnicity with territory is indisputable in the case of states which have been established after separatist wars, such as Bangladesh, Eritrea, and East Timor. It is indisputable also in the case of the former components of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia which have set themselves up as sovereign states. The point applies also to many of the aspirants to sovereign state status, such as the Northern Irish Catholics, the Palestinians, the Basques, the Kurds, and the Chechens.
The case of the Sri Lankan Tamils, however, looks rather peculiar, and may well be unique. Here we have one of the fiercest of all protracted ethnic wars which, at least up to now, has been spectacularly successful. And yet, the link of ethnicity with territory has been under serious dispute.
It is disputed on the ground that the whole island is the Sinhadipa, the land of the Sinhalese race, and furthermore it is the Dhammadipa, with the Sinhalese as a chosen people with the special responsibility of preserving the pristine and pure form of Buddhism. The Sinhalese presence in the North antedates the coming of the Tamils, it is said. As for the claim to the Eastern Province as part of the Tamil homeland, it is entirely spurious, as it is allegedly based on no more than lines of demarcation drawn for administrative convenience by the British.
It appears that on both sides of the cadjan fence a good deal of mythologising has gone into claims and counterclaims about the North East, which is said to accord with normal procedure whenever disputes arise over ethnic links to territory. But it does seem that a cogent enough case can be made to show that the Tamils do constitute a "nation" with a "homeland" covering the North and part at least of the East. Such a claim can be disputed on serious ground. The difference in the case of a similar claim from the Muslims is that, on serious grounds, it can only be dismissed. It may be that the Tamils are not indigenous to the North East, and have no primordial links with it because they are immigrants for the sub-continent. There must be very few ethnic groups with primordial links to territory in a literal sense, and besides the Sinhalese are also immigrants according to their own historical legends. The important point is that the Tamils have certainly been inhabiting the North and part of the East for many centuries, and those can be regarded as areas of traditional Tamil habitation, as the phrase goes. Those areas therefore constitute a homeland in a widely accepted sense.
A further point of importance is that the Sri Lanka Tamils, as distinct from Indian Tamils, always acknowledge that they are either "Jaffna Tamils" or "Batticaloa Tamils", the latter term designating the Eastern Province Tamils. A so-called "Colombo Tamil"may have been born in Colombo, and have never even visited the North East, but he would readily acknowledge that his ancestors came from either the North or the East.
We have therefore an ethnic group, the Sri Lankan Tamils, who have had a compact and contiguous areas of traditional Tamil habitation, constituting their "homeland", for which arises their claim to be regarded as a "nation" with an entitlement of "self-determination".
None of that can apply to the Sri Lankan Muslims. But before dealing with that point, a terminological confusion has to be cleared away. It is that the term "Muslim" designates the follower of a religion, Islam, and not an ethnic group. The Sri Lanka Muslims consist of several ethnic groups, the largest of whom are the so-called Moors. The term "Sri Lankan Muslim" is usually meant to refer to them, and is so used in this article.
The Sri Lanka Muslims understood in that sense certainly constitute an ethnic group, and they certainly have a strong sense of ethnic identity. But they are not nation in the sense defined above. Some of their ancestors may have come to the island from even pre-Islamic times, but they have not been indigenous to any part of Sri Lankan territory, and consequently have not had the conception of a homeland in the shape of a compact and contiguous unit of territory. The Sri Lankan Muslims have always thought of themselves in terms of their territorial provenance as "Colombo Muslims", "Galle Muslims", "Kandy Muslims", "Eastern Province Muslims", and so on.
However, in recent years, some Eastern Province Muslims have conceived the notion of a Muslim homeland in their province. Most historians seem to be agreed that the bulk of the EP Muslims are the descendants of Muslim beneficiaries of the bounty of King Senarat, who allowed them to settle there as refugees from Portuguese oppression. The claim to an EP homeland with that kind of provenance is taken by many Sinhalese as signifying black ingratitude on the part of the Muslims.
It will take much ingenuity, and much dishonesty, for historians and archeologists to establish what even looks like a plausible case for a Muslim homeland in the EP. But even if a valid case is established, it will be a "homeland" only for the EP Muslims, and that will make sense only if the EP Muslims are regarded as a distinct ethnic group, which they certainly are not. The important point is that the vast majority of the Muslims outside the EP will emphatically refuse of subscribe to the notion that they have a homeland in the EP.
It should be clear enough that the terms "nation", "homeland", and "self-determination" can have no valid application to the Sri Lankan Muslims. There is one other way in which they are distinct from the Tamils. The latter did have a Jaffna kingdom, even though for a relatively brief period in our long history. The Muslims have had nothing comparable and therefore cannot possibly advance a supposed historic claim to self-determination.
The advocates of Muslim self-determination must also bear in mind that the international community today recognises no such right. Rightly or wrongly, it is held that there was such a right only in a colonial context. It is a fact that in the period of decolonisation several new states have been established after separatist struggles. It is also a fact that was not in consequence of a recognised right of self-determination.
The question of importance of the further of the Muslims is what kind of significance should be attributed to the assertion of a right of self-determination in the Oluvil Declaration. D. B. S. Jeyaraj, in his detailed and perceptive analysis noted that one of the important respects in which it differs from the Vaddukkoddai resolution is that it is not scessionary, since it asks for no more than an autonomous unit of devolution.
While that is true, it remains that "self-determination" in its primary meaning asserts a right to set up separate and sovereign sate. The claim may stop short of it for the time being, but it carries that potential for the future. The Sinhalese will be inclined to believe that just as in the case of the Tamils, the present claim to autonomy among the Muslims will inevitable lead to a future claim to a separate state.
The Oluvil Declaration should be seen in the perspective of the evolution of Muslim politics since the 1970s, notably the emergence of the SLMC in the following decade. One of the important reasons why it emerged was the shocking failure of Muslim politicians in our two major parties to properly represent Muslim interests. But in recent times, disillusionment has been growing with the performance of the SLMC as well. Perhaps that disillusionment provides part of the explanation for the fact that the Oluvil Declaration, adopted with much spectacular fanfare, was a students’ affair without any notable participation by Muslim politicians.
The future may show that to have been a fateful development. It is certain, in any case, that the Declaration has the potential to jeopardise Muslim relations with both the Sinhalese and the Tamils to a dangerous extent. What should be done to prevent that?
I suggest that the students responsible for the Declaration explicitly disavow the claim to "Self-determination", and eschew future use of that terms along with the terms "nation" and "homeland", all of which have inescapable meanings as parts of the discourse of the nation-state.
I suggest also that the SLMC make a similar disavowal. That would be advisable even if the SLMC does not claim a Muslim right to self-determination. The news paper reports are no-confidence motion against the Defence Minister contained the following sentence about Mr. Rauf Hakeem, "He asserted that the SLMC would not on any account allow the government and the LTTE to ignore the Muslim right to self-determination."
What will the Muslims lose by that disavowal? Nothing, absolutely nothing whatever. The EP Muslims can still make their claim to an autonomous unit, though not on the ground of supposed right to self-determination. The Muslims as a whole can struggle, when necessary, to secure their group rights and their individual rights as citizens. It is on that basis that innumerable ethnic minorities are living in peace and dignity, in amity and co-operation, with dominant ethnic majorities all over the globe. Why not in Sri Lanka as well?
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