“But the international reaction led by the United States was immediate and severe. President Clinton imposed economic, military and technological sanctions and went out of his way to make China an ally against India’s nuclear weapons requirement and aspirations. The Indo-US cooperation slate was wiped clean. After the US many other countries also imposed similar sanctions.”___________________________
by Gen V.P. Malik (retd)
(May 12, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) Nearly seven months after I had taken over as Army Chief, Director-General, Military Operations, informed me that although there was no official information, 58 Engineer Regiment supporting the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) at Pokharan had intensified its activities. Both of us understood its significance. Earlier, 8 Engineer Regiment had maintained two deep shafts in the area dug in 1981-82, added some more, and had gone through similar activities in 1995. Besides, the newly installed NDA regime had already declared that it favoured India becoming a nuclear power state.
So, when a call came asking me to meet Prime Minister Vajpayee at his residence — 5 Safdarjang Road — on a holiday morning without indicating any agenda (similar calls had gone to the other two Service Chiefs), I had some idea of the discussion that was likely to take place. A few days later, India conducted Operation Shakti and became a nuclear weapon state!
It is very unlikely that any political leader or nuclear scientist will remember the Corps of Engineers on the 10th anniversary of Operation Shakti. I must, however, do my duty to acknowledge and compliment the Corps, particularly its six regiments — 62, 113, 107, 267, 8 and 58 Engineer Regiments — which were deployed at Pokharan from 1973 onward till the success of the mission in May 1998.
Post-nuclear tests reaction in military circles was of “great satisfaction”. Ever since 1979 when the Joint Intelligence Committee had informed the Chiefs about Pakistan’s efforts to go nuclear (China had conducted a nuclear weapons test in 1964), they had recommended “nuclear deterrence” as the best security option. It was better late than never!
But the international reaction led by the United States was immediate and severe. President Clinton imposed economic, military and technological sanctions and went out of his way to make China an ally against India’s nuclear weapons requirement and aspirations. The Indo-US cooperation slate was wiped clean. After the US many other countries also imposed similar sanctions.
A decade later all that is history. India and the US are not open-ended “natural allies” but Washington is prepared to sign the nuclear deal with New Delhi that would enhance India’s nuclear energy, technological and strategic capabilities. Unfortunately, many of our political leaders have not learnt the basic lesson from this episode, i.e. national interest and security are the ultimate goal of any government. This must be pursued relentlessly without fear or favour.
Let us now turn to some other nuclear security-related issues.
India prepared its draft nuclear doctrine -- an extremely fine job -- in 2001. But the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) did not give it the official clearance for two years. We did not know whether it was an official policy or just a draft. Mr Jaswant Singh kept it ambiguous but used its contents depending upon the occasion. As a result, there was no clarity on its operational mechanism. Operationalisation of the nuclear doctrine was reviewed officially in January 2003.
The Press release on the subject had eight one-line statements restating important contents of the doctrine. It also made public the formation of the National Command Authority, the Political and the Executive Councils. According to the Press release, the CCS reviewed the existing command and control structures, state of readiness, targeting the strategy for retaliation and operating procedures for various stages of alert and launch. The CCS approved the appointment of C-in-C, Strategic Force Command, and the arrangements for an alternate chain of command.
Since this last review publicly we continue to remain silent on strategic and operational aspects of our nuclear doctrine except the not-so-frequent missile tests. The Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile Agni -3 was tested a few days ago. It is yet to be inducted into the strategic arsenal. Whatever improvement may have taken place so far, there has been little impact on our nuclear capability, credibility and deterrence. There some obvious weaknesses and doubts in our nuclear capability and credibility:
Technical claims of Pokharan-2 have been challenged by many scientists. One is not worried about the challenges made in the Western media. But many of our own scientists have created doubts in the mind of the public and, more importantly, of the end users — the armed forces. This doubt is compounded by the fact that our DRDO scientists are known for tall claims and over-optimistic public statements.
Our long-term policy on fissile weapons and thermo-nuclear weapons is not yet clear. What progress has been made in this regard? Do we have adequate material for warheads to be made in future?
How long are we going to take to develop the triad i.e. land, air and naval-based launch systems? The time taken to develop the Agni missile system shows that the current progress is far too slow. Why is the government unable to push this programme? Is it a political or technological problem?
The nuclear doctrine calls for full integration of the doctrines concerning the armed forces, foreign policy, atomic energy, the DRDO and several other elements. How far have we been able to achieve this?
Do our political leaders have the idea and the will to employ nuclear weapons in times of crisis? The lack of consensus on serious strategic issues like the Indo-US nuclear deal or our policy towards China does not inspire confidence.
We now have the Strategic Forces Command, an inter-Services entity for strategic command and control. Have the Services developed a joint operational doctrine on the employment of nuclear weapons? Have we been able to interface the nuclear capability with conventional capability and plans in military strategy and force structuring?
Nuclear doctrine calls for multiple agencies involved with storage, movements and assembly of devices. Has the Strategic Forces Command been able to interlock with the other agencies involved in this effort? Will these agencies be able to achieve these tasks in different contingencies in the “shortest possible timeframe”?
Then there is also the psychological aspect of the deterrence. We should remember that if our leaders indulge in nuclear rhetoric about our nuclear arsenal/deterrence, it is considered irresponsible by the international community. But if we keep the capability highly secret, nuclear deterrence does not become credible. Our people must follow a clearly laid down public policy.
There is no doubt that Pokharan-2 created some political, economic and technological difficulties for India initially. But before long, political and strategic advantages began to accrue. Besides enhanced security, we also achieved enhanced status in the international community. However, there is also a feeling among many strategists that the gains that we made soon after Pokharan-2 have been frittered away because we have succumbed to international pressure and due to lack of political consensus within the country. We have not pursued a clearly laid down nuclear deterrent policy with adequate determination. This must be done in the interest of national security, political differences notwithstanding.
( The writer is a former Chief of Army Staff)
- Sri Lanka Guardian
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