The Future of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

By Sankajaya Nanayakkara

(February 10, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) The Sri Lankan government security forces have struck the Liberation Tigers hard. The Sinhala polity is in a state of euphoria which is rapidly morphing into hysteria. A southern consensus is emerging to sacrifice democracy and freedom for the annihilation of the dreaded Tigers. Ultimately, it is the Sinhala politicians and not the generals who have the power to bring the northern insurgency to an end.

The Military Front

On July 20, 2006, the Liberation Tigers closed the sluice gates of the Mavil Aru irrigation scheme in the Eastern Province, denying water to over 60,000 people. This incident triggered the Eelam War Four, which is now drawing to an end.

Soon after regaining control over the Mavil Aru sluice gates, on September 4, the government troops captured Sampur from the Tigers, the strategically important town in the Trincomalee District. The capture of Sampur prevented the Tiger threat to the Trincomalee harbour and the naval base. The government troops then marched into Tiger-controlled Vakarai and Kathiraveli in the Batticaloa District and regained control over these territories towards the end of January, 2007. The entire Eastern Province came under the suzerainty of the Sri Lankan government with the capture of Thoppigala on July 11, 2007.

After clearing the East, the government security forces focused on eradicating Tiger bases in the Mannar District. The capture of the four hundred year old shrine of Our Lady of Madhu, Sri Lanka’s holiest Roman Catholic shrine, in April, 2008, was a significant victory for the Sri Lankan security forces. After overrunning the strategic Adampan town in Mannar District on May 9, 2008, the Sri Lankan troops captured the largest Sea-Tiger base in the North Western coastal town of Vedithalthivu in July of the same year. The regaining of control over Vedithalthivu after early 1990s by the Sri Lankan forces denied the Tigers a vital supply route of military hardware.

On November 15, 2008, the Tiger bastion in the Northern Province, Pooneryn, fell to the advancing Sri Lankan security forces. The Sri Lankan troops take over the town of Kilinochchi, the political and administrative capital of the de facto Tamil Eelam, on January 2, 2009, after eleven years of Tiger control. Soon afterwards, on January 9, Sri Lankan troops capture the strategically important Elephant Pass, thus connecting the North and the South of the country through land after 23 years. Thereafter, the Sri Lankan troops overrun Mullaitivu, the Tiger military nerve centre, on January 25, 2009. At the time of writing, Tiger resistance has shrunk to a small pocket on the outskirts of Mullaitivu.

The assassinated Member of Parliament of the Tamil National Alliance, Nadarajah Raviraj, used to say in Sinhala with a Tamil accent that the Tigers did not descend on Sri Lanka from Mars but were born in the northern soil of Sri Lanka. What he attempted to convey to the Sinhala society was that the Tamil militancy germinated in a political context and not in a vacuum. Hence, the root political causes of the insurgency have to be addressed for any sustainable peace in Sri Lanka. While the government has been able to demonstrate concrete victories in the military front, it has so far failed to formulate a political package that addresses the root causes of the Tamil insurgency.

The Political Front

In June, 2006, the government of Sri Lanka set up the All Party Representative Committee (APRC) with the objective of developing a set of constitutional proposals which would serve as the basis for talks with the Tigers. The only thing of any worth that has come out of this so far is the Majority Report, which was submitted on December, 2006, by a majority of legal/constitutional experts, comprising six Sinhalese, four Tamils and one Muslim. Tragically, the report, a road map to democratize inter-ethnic relation in Sri Lanka, was discarded by ruling Sinhala politicians.

APRC has met over more than hundred times so far and yet to come up with an acceptable political package for Tamils and other minorities. The major obstacle to any progress in the APRC is the contradictions between the majority of parties which are pro-devolution such as, LSSP, CP, CWC, UPF, SLMC, NUA and UNP and the minority of parties such as, SLFP, MEP and JHU that oppose any genuine measure of autonomy to minorities. In these circumstances, the argument that the APRC has become a farce to deceive the international community about the government’s commitment to a political solution gains credence.

The Sri Lankan government is yet to enforce the interim proposal – the full implementation of the 13th Amendment - of the APRC. The newly elected Eastern Provincial Council (EPC) Chief Minister’s lament of not having the constitutionally guaranteed powers is telling of the situation. According to a report that appeared on January 6, 2009, in the TransCurrents, the maiden statute of the EPC enacted in early November is yet to get the approval of the EPC Governor, who the councillors allege is undermining the functioning of the EPC.

The recent victories in the military front by government security forces have emboldened Sinhala supremacist forces whose political agenda is to roll back even the minimum concessions the minorities have gained so far and bring Sri Lanka under the iron grip of a fascist-style majoritarian political hegemony. The international community, especially, India, is insisting on a political deal based on some measure of autonomy for Tamils. The sincerity shown by the Sinhala politicians in addressing the root causes of the conflict will ultimately determine whether the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam would wither as a force in Tamil politics or remain a legitimate politico-military movement of the Tamil people.

-Sri Lanka Guardian