Pawning Sri Lanka

by Tisaranee Gunasekara

(September 04, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) The Emergency is dead. Long live the Emergency Consequential Provisional Bill.Ending the Emergency was a placatory exercise aimed at the upcoming UN Human Rights Council Session in Geneva. Underneath this reforming veneer, the regime seems determined not to lose any of its über-powers. Post-Emergency, the far more draconian PTA, augmented by three new regulations, will fill the gap, until the new Emergency-replacement legislation is born.

‘Too little, too late’ is a good epitaph for most fallen-tyrants. The removal of the Emergency is a welcome move but it must not be replaced with a more draconian law.

According to the Attorney General, the new law, verbosely titled the Emergency Consequential Provisional Bill (ECPB), will be enacted soon. In fact, it is likely to be presented to parliament as soon as the UNHCR session is over. A public discussion of the ECPB is unlikely and it may well contain more repressive measures than the Emergency. The ECPB is bound to be worse than the Emergency in one respect; it is likely to be established permanently (like the PTA), thus saving the regime the hassle of a parliamentary debate/vote every month.

Soon after the UPFA’s landslide win at the 2010 parliamentary election, Defence Secretary and Presidential sibling Gotabhaya Rajapaksa stated that the main task of the new regime would be to “thwart a fresh attempt by separatists operating abroad to throw a lifeline to the LTTE (backed by) a section of the international community… The new government should go all out against any local element promoting separatist sentiments regardless of political consequences…” (The Island – 17.4.2010). He urged the promulgation of “new laws to meet security requirement” (ibid).

Will the proposed ECPB be in line with this vision?

A controversy which erupted in the aftermath of the Presidential announcement on the Emergency demonstrates who the real power-wielders in Sri Lanka are (and the consequent disempowerment of even senior ministers). Minister of Justice Rauf Hakeem told the state-owned Daily News on August 31st that “one thousand two hundred former LTTE members will be released soon” (post-Emergency). The Defence Secretary expressed the polar-opposite view: “Terrorists will not get a pardon just because the state of Emergency has been abolished. Those presently under arrest will be dealt with under the Prevention of Terrorism Act…” (Sri Lanka Mirror – 31.8.2011). The reasonable assumption would have been that the cabinet member would prevail over the senior bureaucrat. Not in Rajapaksa Sri Lanka, not when the senior bureaucrat is a Rajapaksa Sibling. The AG announced that post-Emergency, no suspect held under the Emergency will be released and that they will be detained under the newly augmented PTA.

The family-centripetal nature of the Rajapaksas is the wellspring of many of Sri Lanka’s current woes. The Ruling Family does not want to share power with anyone outside the Ruling Family (and a handful of acolytes). This Rajapaksa-Will for absolute power contradicts antagonistically with both devolution and democratisation. This renders impossible internally-motivated reforms; even when reforms happen, due to external propulsion, these turn out to be cosmetic and ephemeral, like the repealing of the Emergency.

A Dependent State

There is a clear correlation between Sri Lanka’s external travails and the political agenda of her Ruling Family. The external problems faced by the regime stem mainly from its visceral opposition to devolution and democratisation; and the unwillingness to devolve and democratise results from the Rajapaksa determination to concentrate all power in Rajapaksa-hands. Incidentally, the Rajapaksa disinclination to devolve and democratise has created a thriving climate for pro-Tiger elements.

The Rajapaksa way out of this conundrum is to cosy up to countries uninterested in devolution/democracy. Thus the gravitation towards China, the only regional power willing to politically protect and financially bankroll the Rajapaksas, for now. Unfortunately, the increasing dependence on China is exacerbating Sri Lanka’s problems, regionally and internationally. The Rajapaksa efforts to pawn Sri Lanka to China, financially and politically, may involve us in regional and global power-contestations, with devastating results.

According to Indian media, “India detected a Chinese spy ship disguised as a fishing trawler in the Indian Ocean a few months ago… Immediately after detection, an Indian Navy ship went after it…. In order to avoid the Indian tail, the Chinese ship moved towards Sri Lanka and docked at Colombo. Inquiries by the Indian security agencies revealed that (the) ship (had) as many as 22 laboratories on board” (NDTV – 30.8.2011). If accurate, this story indicates that Rajapaksas’ growing affinity with China may plunge Sri Lanka into very dangerous waters, albeit inadvertently.

A possible Asia-ward shift in American foreign policy may complicate matters further. US President Obama’s National Security Advisor, Thomas Denilon, a strong advocate of ‘rebalancing’ American foreign policy, wants to “rapidly disengage American forces in Iraq and to focus more on China, Iran and other emerging challenges” (The New York Times – 8.10.2010). According to some analysts, President Obama is inclining towards this view. If so, Sri Lanka’s growing dependency on China may bring her within American sights, as an irritant to be dealt with.

So the Rajapaksas’ power-agenda is propelling Sri Lanka into a politico-economic dependency on China, which in turn can make both India and the US regard us with suspicion/hostility. The Rajapaksa determination to oppose devolution and undermine democracy will present these external actors with a veritable arsenal to be used against Sri Lanka. China, like all big powers, will not hesitate to turn Sri Lanka into a pawn, to be used and (eventually) discarded.

The Rajapaksa Rule is thus pushing Sri Lanka into the minefield of regional/global power-games and ordinary countries which become involved in the conflicts of global/regional powers always end up the losers, because big powers never hesitate to sacrifice their smaller allies/dependents. Thomas Denilon recently revealed how Beijing sacrificed Tehran – a key ally – to further its own interests: “We’ve worked closely with the Chinese on the Iranian problem… putting in place the most effective and detailed sanctions that Iran has faced… The current leadership in China…has assessed that a conflict with the United States (is) not in the interests of China…particularly during times of the development period” (International Wire – 22.7.2011).

Russia, the other powerful Rajapaksa ally, is no different. The Russians, despite their very close association with Muammar Gaddafi, did throw him under the Western-train. “(Hillary) Clinton spoke with her Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, who had previously told her that Russia would ‘never, never’ support even a no-fly zone. The Russians agreed to abstain. Without the cover of the Russians the Chinese almost never veto Security Council resolutions” (Ryan Lizza – The New Yorker – August 2011). China too played a double-game in Libya, maintaining relations with the Gaddafi regime while reaching out to the Benghazi-based rebel-administration.

‘Too little, too late’ is a good epitaph for most fallen-tyrants. The removal of the Emergency is a welcome move but it must not be replaced with a more draconian law. Such a measure will worsen Lanka’s international woes, as is evident from the American response. The US welcomed the Emergency-removal, but warned that the international community will have to step in if Lanka fails to comply with ‘international humanitarian laws and obligations.’