American counter-insurgency strategy is to clear, hold and build. The Afghan Army, likely to be expanded, is now the most respected institution in the country and by 2011, together with the police, it is expected to operate independently with US advisers for air and logistics support. While NATO is engaged in the world’s largest peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan, American, British and Canadian troops are fighting intense operations. As American forces pull out of Iraq, additional brigades are being pumped into Afghanistan, rectifying an original mistake. (Image: This handout picture taken 23 October 2007, in the northern Sri Lankan city of Anuradhapura, shows naked bodies said to be of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) members who staged an attack on the Anuradhapura Air Force Base 22 October, being paraded in the streets of the city. Sri Lankan authorities stripped the dead bodies of Tamil Tiger guerrillas who devastated a key military air base and displayed them publicly, residents said.)
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by Maj-Gen Ashok Mehta (retd)
(June 21, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) On a winning spree even before the stunning jailbreak in Kandahar, the Taliban were telling the Afghans that “the American (Western) soldiers might have the watches. We have the time”. They are merely recounting a historical fact that occupying forces do not have the stomach for prolonged engagement in Afghanistan. Researching counter-insurgency operations in Washington and London this month, I found it could be very instructive even for Indians — engaged in this game since Independence — to learn from the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Despite Vietnam, US troops fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq realised a deficiency of ideas in counter-insurgency operations. Hastily, copies of British manuals of such operations in Malaya and Northern Ireland were ordered. They forgot about the Indian experience in J&K, the North-East and Sri Lanka which regrettably has not been appropriately documented. By the time it was recalled this month, it was found to be practically irrelevant to Iraq and Afghanistan. But India, which has an unfinished internal security and counter-insurgency agenda, could learn from Britain and the US their post-9/11 expertise in homeland security and anti-terrorist operations.
What was found striking in both capitals and in sharp contrast to the Indian approach is the collective concern of the government, media and society for battle casualties, well-being of soldiers and the new-found zest for counter-insurgency operations as opposed to high-tech warfare. The willingness of military commanders to speak out for their troops is refreshingly different from the silent Indian record.
Earlier this month, the US fatalities in Iraq crossed 4000 and that of the UK soldiers in Afghanistan the 100 mark. Especially in London there was serious comment about wasted lives through media headlines: “Our men must know why they are fighting”, “Tell us why our soldiers have to die” and “Our soldiers are heroes but the truth is we’re failing in Afghanistan”. The 100th British soldier being killed by a suicide bomber in Afghanistan coincided with British Chief of General Staff Gen Richard Dannatt’s outburst that soldiers’ salaries were not even comparable to a London Traffic Warden’s. Unlike in India, the British have a separate pay board, which reviews soldiers’ salaries annually.
The concern for casualties seems hyped. The 100 British casualties in Afghanistan have occurred over a period of seven years. Nearly 300 Indian soldiers are killed annually in J&K alone. Britain lost 1109 troops in Korea, 763 died in Northern Ireland and 255 in the Falklands war. It is not the casualties that should worry the public but the prospect of failure. Despite the high-intensity operations by the British troops in Southern Afghanistan, an exit strategy is not on the horizon.
The far richer-resourced — now armed with anti-stress pills — Americans seem better prepared to fighting it out, being the primary victims of 9/11. The war for Kabul is now by a US-led UN-blessed coalition of NATO forces, but its outgoing American commander, Gen Dan McNeill, says his mission is seriously under-resourced referring to the inequity in burden-sharing among NATO members.
Back in Washington, Gen David Barno (retd), a recent US commander in Kabul, explains how warfare since 9/11 has changed. People would still prefer to engage with “shock and awe” even when the ground reality has changed, he says. General Barno advocates the formation of dedicated counter-insurgency forces for future wars, a debate that has crawled in the Military Operations Directorate of South Block. US troops are fighting urban insurgency in Iraq and its rural variety in Afghanistan. In both the military is creating the time and space for a political solution to end violence to restore peace and the rule of law through good governance. The fact is the counter-insurgency operations account for just 20 per cent of the overall effort, the rest 80 per cent is development and whatever else it takes to establish a stable government.
American counter-insurgency strategy is to clear, hold and build. The Afghan Army, likely to be expanded, is now the most respected institution in the country and by 2011, together with the police, it is expected to operate independently with US advisers for air and logistics support. While NATO is engaged in the world’s largest peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan, American, British and Canadian troops are fighting intense operations. As American forces pull out of Iraq, additional brigades are being pumped into Afghanistan, rectifying an original mistake.
American commanders are being provided plentiful funds for Commanders Emergency Response Programme for civic actions. For the present, the counter-insurgency glass is half full with US support for Afghanistan unlikely to decelerate. In Iraq, however, the US is on the threshold of a politico-military victory. In both countries, rural and urban counter-insurgency is being relearnt the hard way.
The year 2007 was the least violent in Afghanistan. By contrast 2007 was the most violent year ever in neighbouring Pakistan. Many Pakistanis allege that the US was able to divert the war from Afghanistan into Pakistan, a backhander they intend to return with interest. Even before this month’s Rand Corporation report by Seth Jones alleging the Pakistan military’s complicity in arming and training the Taliban in sanctuaries in FATA, speculation was growing in the US that the next big attack against the US could originate from Pakistan.
American Generals noted “discontinuity in behaviour” in Islamabad after the regime change and are not enamoured of the peace deals being struck with the Taliban and the accommodation of Al-Qaeda in the tribal areas.
Counter-insurgency has never been the Pakistan Army’s forte. It has shown little appetite for it, preempting its need through cross -border insurgencies in J&K and Afghanistan. Army Chief Ashfaque Kiyani has reversed his predecessor’s policies of containing sanctuaries and curbing cross-border activities. In Washington’s strategic community, around Dupont Circle, conversation about both a preemptive drive against Pakistan’s tribal areas and a strategic response nearer the heartland to a terrorist strike against the US is audible. Either way, Pakistan is on the hallowed US target list.
There are serious implications and consequences for India in the run up to future scenarios in Afghanistan and Pakistan. While the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are interlinked, the insurgencies in J&K and Afghanistan are entwined in a common breeding ground. The path the suicide bomber has followed from Baghdad to Kabul to Lahore is going eastwards. The fencing across the LoC will not deter the ultimate Islamist jihadi seeking strategic depth on behalf of Pakistan in the east, on a par with his unrealised quest in the west.
The Indian Army must keep abreast with both the urban and rural insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan in insurgent tactics, technology, fire-power and motivation. Countering suicide bombers, the new roadside bombs and Taliban assaults are sound inputs for Indian counter-insurgency manual which is yet to be produced. The jihad in J&K is kid-stuff compared to the guile, grit and sophistication of attacks in Helmand (Afghanistan) or anywhere in Iraq. Designating forces for the rural and urban environment backed up by counter-terrorism teams equipped with light and robust hard and soft wares must begin soon.
For a country that has not fought a conventional war since 1971 and is unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future, its military has been slow in anticipating and adequately adapting to the warfare of the future — counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations. It must not get diverted by oddities like network-centric warfare. But restructure and modernise combat units to deal with external and internal security challenges, including the Naxalite People’s War which sooner than later will fall into the Indian Army’s lap. After all, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has described it as the most serious internal security threat faced by the country. It is insurgency in the making.
- Sri Lanka Guardian
(June 21, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) On a winning spree even before the stunning jailbreak in Kandahar, the Taliban were telling the Afghans that “the American (Western) soldiers might have the watches. We have the time”. They are merely recounting a historical fact that occupying forces do not have the stomach for prolonged engagement in Afghanistan. Researching counter-insurgency operations in Washington and London this month, I found it could be very instructive even for Indians — engaged in this game since Independence — to learn from the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Despite Vietnam, US troops fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq realised a deficiency of ideas in counter-insurgency operations. Hastily, copies of British manuals of such operations in Malaya and Northern Ireland were ordered. They forgot about the Indian experience in J&K, the North-East and Sri Lanka which regrettably has not been appropriately documented. By the time it was recalled this month, it was found to be practically irrelevant to Iraq and Afghanistan. But India, which has an unfinished internal security and counter-insurgency agenda, could learn from Britain and the US their post-9/11 expertise in homeland security and anti-terrorist operations.
What was found striking in both capitals and in sharp contrast to the Indian approach is the collective concern of the government, media and society for battle casualties, well-being of soldiers and the new-found zest for counter-insurgency operations as opposed to high-tech warfare. The willingness of military commanders to speak out for their troops is refreshingly different from the silent Indian record.
Earlier this month, the US fatalities in Iraq crossed 4000 and that of the UK soldiers in Afghanistan the 100 mark. Especially in London there was serious comment about wasted lives through media headlines: “Our men must know why they are fighting”, “Tell us why our soldiers have to die” and “Our soldiers are heroes but the truth is we’re failing in Afghanistan”. The 100th British soldier being killed by a suicide bomber in Afghanistan coincided with British Chief of General Staff Gen Richard Dannatt’s outburst that soldiers’ salaries were not even comparable to a London Traffic Warden’s. Unlike in India, the British have a separate pay board, which reviews soldiers’ salaries annually.
The concern for casualties seems hyped. The 100 British casualties in Afghanistan have occurred over a period of seven years. Nearly 300 Indian soldiers are killed annually in J&K alone. Britain lost 1109 troops in Korea, 763 died in Northern Ireland and 255 in the Falklands war. It is not the casualties that should worry the public but the prospect of failure. Despite the high-intensity operations by the British troops in Southern Afghanistan, an exit strategy is not on the horizon.
The far richer-resourced — now armed with anti-stress pills — Americans seem better prepared to fighting it out, being the primary victims of 9/11. The war for Kabul is now by a US-led UN-blessed coalition of NATO forces, but its outgoing American commander, Gen Dan McNeill, says his mission is seriously under-resourced referring to the inequity in burden-sharing among NATO members.
Back in Washington, Gen David Barno (retd), a recent US commander in Kabul, explains how warfare since 9/11 has changed. People would still prefer to engage with “shock and awe” even when the ground reality has changed, he says. General Barno advocates the formation of dedicated counter-insurgency forces for future wars, a debate that has crawled in the Military Operations Directorate of South Block. US troops are fighting urban insurgency in Iraq and its rural variety in Afghanistan. In both the military is creating the time and space for a political solution to end violence to restore peace and the rule of law through good governance. The fact is the counter-insurgency operations account for just 20 per cent of the overall effort, the rest 80 per cent is development and whatever else it takes to establish a stable government.
American counter-insurgency strategy is to clear, hold and build. The Afghan Army, likely to be expanded, is now the most respected institution in the country and by 2011, together with the police, it is expected to operate independently with US advisers for air and logistics support. While NATO is engaged in the world’s largest peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan, American, British and Canadian troops are fighting intense operations. As American forces pull out of Iraq, additional brigades are being pumped into Afghanistan, rectifying an original mistake.
American commanders are being provided plentiful funds for Commanders Emergency Response Programme for civic actions. For the present, the counter-insurgency glass is half full with US support for Afghanistan unlikely to decelerate. In Iraq, however, the US is on the threshold of a politico-military victory. In both countries, rural and urban counter-insurgency is being relearnt the hard way.
The year 2007 was the least violent in Afghanistan. By contrast 2007 was the most violent year ever in neighbouring Pakistan. Many Pakistanis allege that the US was able to divert the war from Afghanistan into Pakistan, a backhander they intend to return with interest. Even before this month’s Rand Corporation report by Seth Jones alleging the Pakistan military’s complicity in arming and training the Taliban in sanctuaries in FATA, speculation was growing in the US that the next big attack against the US could originate from Pakistan.
American Generals noted “discontinuity in behaviour” in Islamabad after the regime change and are not enamoured of the peace deals being struck with the Taliban and the accommodation of Al-Qaeda in the tribal areas.
Counter-insurgency has never been the Pakistan Army’s forte. It has shown little appetite for it, preempting its need through cross -border insurgencies in J&K and Afghanistan. Army Chief Ashfaque Kiyani has reversed his predecessor’s policies of containing sanctuaries and curbing cross-border activities. In Washington’s strategic community, around Dupont Circle, conversation about both a preemptive drive against Pakistan’s tribal areas and a strategic response nearer the heartland to a terrorist strike against the US is audible. Either way, Pakistan is on the hallowed US target list.
There are serious implications and consequences for India in the run up to future scenarios in Afghanistan and Pakistan. While the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are interlinked, the insurgencies in J&K and Afghanistan are entwined in a common breeding ground. The path the suicide bomber has followed from Baghdad to Kabul to Lahore is going eastwards. The fencing across the LoC will not deter the ultimate Islamist jihadi seeking strategic depth on behalf of Pakistan in the east, on a par with his unrealised quest in the west.
The Indian Army must keep abreast with both the urban and rural insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan in insurgent tactics, technology, fire-power and motivation. Countering suicide bombers, the new roadside bombs and Taliban assaults are sound inputs for Indian counter-insurgency manual which is yet to be produced. The jihad in J&K is kid-stuff compared to the guile, grit and sophistication of attacks in Helmand (Afghanistan) or anywhere in Iraq. Designating forces for the rural and urban environment backed up by counter-terrorism teams equipped with light and robust hard and soft wares must begin soon.
For a country that has not fought a conventional war since 1971 and is unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future, its military has been slow in anticipating and adequately adapting to the warfare of the future — counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations. It must not get diverted by oddities like network-centric warfare. But restructure and modernise combat units to deal with external and internal security challenges, including the Naxalite People’s War which sooner than later will fall into the Indian Army’s lap. After all, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has described it as the most serious internal security threat faced by the country. It is insurgency in the making.
- Sri Lanka Guardian
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