‘Threat To India’s Soft Underbelly’

“The Rajiv legacy that superseded the authentic Indian legacy began with the IPKF adventure. Again Anil has some candid comments on this. ‘India intervened in Sri Lanka with the sole aim of saving the Tamils. That subsequently it ended up fighting the Tamils themselves was the result of naiveté of the top Indian leaders, bungling of an egotist diplomat and the shrewdness of the then Lankan leadership’. The consequence, India the savior turned its guns on the victims. What brought about this change?”
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by V S Subramaniam

(June 03, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) One could postulate that Anil Athale’s ‘India’s soft under belly’ from a historical perspective refers to Sri Lanka’s (SL) emerging as an Israeli like ‘genie’ that turned the Middle East into the world’s hottest conflict spot. A rearmed SL also has the potential to extend the conflict beyond its boundaries to engulf the region, specifically TN that is in closest proximity. Like Herman Kahn the futurologist, Anil articulates this brutal possibility in his ‘Lanka Turmoil’ Rediff news 11 January 2008. Strategic thinking on such a ‘brutal possibility’ is must for long term peace and stability in the region.

India’s soft underbelly?

Anil referred to the strategic mistakes in the IPKF debacle caused by a shift in Indian SL policy that Rajiv began. In discussing Anil’s hypothesis V S Subramaniam, RediffiLand blog of 19 May 2008 briefly referred in ‘The Rajiv factor overkill…’ to the threat implicit in India supporting SL’s military solution. Expressions of support for Tamil aspirations are hardly audible today from Delhi. India’s support for SL’s genocide is no longer covert; arms, funds (US$ 100 million) for SL’s arms purchases, crucial intelligence and diplomatic support for SL at the UNHRC. India apparently is replicating the West’s role that turned the Middle East into a hotspot that torments the Arab world. A well armed SL emulating Israel is a ‘brutal possibility’ that India cannot ignore.

For Indraji, India’s role in the Tamil cause was to save the Tamils from SL genocide. But for Rajiv, India’s role transformed itself into one to neutralize the Tamil resistance/LTTE and render it ‘incapable of so-called ‘terrorism’. Rajiv once engineered the dismissal of the TN government to stifle Tamil opinion in TN supporting the Tamil insurgency. The Congress led government now prefers a swift military solution to end the Tamil resistance and Delhi using subtle coercion to still support for the resistance in TN. This includes intrusive overseeing of such activities and classifying them as punishable under the anti-terrorism laws. Delhi’s priority for SL’s sensitivities is above those of TN’s.

Appeasing SL at the expense of TN sensitivities

Rajiv’s approach involved undoing all the good work Indraji did for the Tamil cause. This approach is set in concrete to remain the policy of future Congress dominated administrations. Appeasing SL as a priority has reached levels that show scant regard for the sensitivities of mainstream TN Tamils. That far too many Delhi/Chennai differences surfaced recently over sensitive SL issues is unprecedented. These apparently were the result of Delhi abandoning the norm of basic state/central consultations. Hence the embarrassment over the Indian PM canceling the much touted visit for SL’s Independence Day celebrations on TN expressing disapproval. In a tit for tat move, Delhi to appease SL for this, lavished an unprecedented level of tamashas for the SL armed forces Chief Fonseka’s Indian visit especially at a time SL was waging a ferocious war on the Tamils in the Vanni. Apologists dismiss any underlying resentment amongst mainstream Tamils over this by deceptively claiming that the Tamil cause is a non-issue in TN. Mainstream Tamils who are familiar with the sectarian elements hijacking the IPKF mission are concerned over the Indian navy’s conduct/statements on the Tamil fishermen’s issue. Anxiety also reigns over the growing intrusiveness of central personnel overseeing their Tamil counterparts on intelligence and security matters in TN. The US$ 100 million to SL for arms purchases, India voting for a SL seat on the UNHRC; all attest to the Central/state relations not being ideally cordial. Has India become a captive to some form of SL blackmail and why?

India’s moves to meet in full Rajiv’s deal/commitments to JR/SL

The Congress establishment at both the central and state level continues to use for political advantage the emotive Rajiv’s assassination. Readers however are now aware of the tenuous nature of the surname link unlike the lineage link to the (Mahatma) Gandhi family. Only strategic thinkers of Anil’s caliber are able to de-link the real from the rhetoric. Hence the need for a re-appraisal of Rajiv’s contribution to the Indian legacy. Anil’s focus on the threats to India’s soft underbelly reveals the shallow premises on which Indo-SL relations are presently based. SL’s objective to eliminate the Tamil resistance goes beyond ethnic cleansing of all Tamils. Its historical antecedents are memories of the Pandyan and Chola invasions of SL; these are drummed into the psyche of the Buddhist/Sinhalas. Hence their deep anti Tamil/Indian prejudice expressed in the familiar name calling of Tamils ‘para demalas’ that even Basil Rajapakse indulges in as a past time. The term ‘kallathoni’ once used is also not a term of endearment for Indians. Under the guise of supporting the fight against the Tamil insurgency India overlooks SL’s build-up of the military infrastructure along the entire stretch across the waters that face TN. With India supplied radars SL has the capacity to monitor India’s military activities in areas where sensitive nuclear complexes are also located. What guarantee does Delhi have that SL will not follow Israel’s example and act as proxy to powers that may not like India emerging as super-power?

Congress India pursuing on Rajiv’s deal commitments to SL

In the absence of the bulwark that the Tamil resistance now provides Buddhist/Sinhalas once rearmed aspiring for an Israeli type regional role need not come as a surprise to keen observers. In that event the insurance for Delhi lies in accepting in good faith the loyalty of the mainstream Tamils in TN as most other Indians are. This also involves TN Tamils not feeling being treated as a dispensable community within the Indian Union purely to appease SL. Respect of TN sensitivities to be authentic has to come naturally from Delhi and not be the result of pressure from TN. The present policy of appeasing SL at all costs needs urgent review and mere statements ‘no military solution to the Tamil cause’ convince none. A perceptive Anil has also observed ‘Sri Lanka has become a ‘Buddhist’ state, much on the lines of many Islamic states ....Many, specially Indian commentators, have flippantly ‘advised’ Tamils to accept Sri Lankan unity without realizing that Sri Lanka is not a secular state like India nor..’ Again Anil’s profound comments ‘World and major powers like the US and Japan have to convince or coerce the Sri Lankans into abandoning the path of military solution. India has to act and realize that between inaction and military intervention, there are many tools available to it’ is worth India’s serious consideration.

A return to Indraji’s approach not in the Indian radar

A return to Indraji’s approach is in the long term interest of India. The present policy originated by Rajiv failed the IPKF mission. Indraji moved by the sufferings of the Tamils and respecting the sensitivities of brethren ‘mainstream Tamils’ in TN envisioned the emergence on a viable armed resistance that she ‘mothered and nurtured’. Though inter-group violence instigated by RAW did occur in TN, Indraji never labeled the resistance ‘killers’ or ‘terrorists’ for this reason. Indraji a leader of eminent strength did not allow space for RAW and the sectarian pundit class bureaucrats to create mischief instigating inter-group rivalries to demonise the Tamil armed insurgency. Indraji successfully delivered to the cousins of the Indian Bengalis in West Bengal a Bangladesh free from oppression by Pakistan. Pakistan was far more powerful than SL. Tragedy struck for the Tamils with the assassination of Indraji, whose mourning is low keyed; mourning for Rajiv is orchestrated driven by political compulsions.

Congress continues Rajiv’s undoing of Indraji’s work

An incapable Rajiv abdicated Indraji’s style of governance to embark on undoing the ‘beautiful work of Indraji’ for the insurgency. An insight into Rajiv’s shortcomings is given in Maj General (retd) Harkirat Singh’s book ‘Intervention in Sri Lanka’. Mr Singh narrates the truths about RAW, Rajiv’s active role in engineering inter-group killings and the infamous ‘kill Prabhaharan order’. The facts are corroborated with reproductions of internal communications involving several generals. Hence Delhi’s open alignment with SL genocide comes as no surprise including the US$ 100 million in soft loans to SL to fund the purchase of fire-power to incinerate the Vanni safe havens, the handiwork of Indraji. To bolster the flagging progress of the SL forces Indian armed personnel are reportedly on the ground in the Vanni front lines, complementing the support the Indian navy gives to the SL navy to ‘render it (LTTE) incapable of terrorism’. Overt support goes further to the diplomatic front (a UNHRC seat for SL with an atrocious human rights record) in an affront to the pre-Rajiv era Indian legacy. Delhi’s mantra ‘there is no military solution to the Tamil issue’ sounds more and more hollow.

Indraji’s and Rajiv’s legacy – an analysis

Indraji with Shree Nehru and Shastri before was the pace setter of an Indian legacy that kept ‘the flame of humanity and justice’; championing the aspirations of NAM, freedom from oppression for millions under colonialism; end to the obnoxious apartheid, Pakistani oppression in Bangladesh, the Palestinian cause, wars in general, the cold war and for arms control; all noble causes. How does an India with such a legacy support a seat in UNHRC for a virtual pariah state as far as human rights record is concerned? On this issue perhaps Indian leaders unashamedly prefer the company of the savage SL leaders over eminent humanists/Nobel laureates like Desmond Tutu and Jimmy Carter.

The Rajiv legacy that superseded the authentic Indian legacy began with the IPKF adventure. Again Anil has some candid comments on this. ‘India intervened in Sri Lanka with the sole aim of saving the Tamils. That subsequently it ended up fighting the Tamils themselves was the result of naiveté of the top Indian leaders, bungling of an egotist diplomat and the shrewdness of the then Lankan leadership’. The consequence, India the savior turned its guns on the victims. What brought about this change?

The Rajiv’s deal legacy provides the explanation. The questionable 1987 Rajiv/JR one-to-one tête-à-tête led to a deal glossed over by most Indian commentators. Rajiv’s rule was infested with numerous other questionable deals/scandals as well. The Bofors deal unearthed by the Hindu news group being the most notorious. The Rajiv/JR deal was to finish off the Tamil armed resistance/LTTE for which Rajiv issued through Ambassador Dixit the famous ‘kill Prabaharan order’ to IPKF General Harikirat on 15 September 1987. The General disobeyed the order for breaching accepted military codes. There is no mention of this episode in Dixit’s ‘Southern assignment’. Interesting disclosures in Singh’s book de-mystifies the Rajiv legacy to place the present Indian policy in perspective as meeting the inherited Indian obligations under Rajiv’s deals/commitments.

Dark shadows over Rajiv’s contribution to India emerge

The undoing of Indraji’s work involved India associating with anti-Tamil regimes with notorious ethnic cleansing and genocidal records. The present Congress led government as successor of the Rajiv legacy leaves a perception amongst lobbyists that SL still buys influence into the Indian establishment using sectarian elements in the Indian bureaucracy. Political opportunism drove Rajiv to undemocratically engineer dismissals of numerous state governments including the TN government in 1990. The deterrent effect of that dismissal is still felt in the TN polity. These and much more downgrade Rajiv’s contribution to India as not worthy of being gloated about.

On the1987 ‘kill Prabhaharan order’ a sectarian clan apologist justifies it as India’s ‘punish (ment)’ for the Tamil resistance for Rajiv’s assassination (a 1987 punishment for a to be 1991 offence) and as an after thought the apologist adds ‘to render it (LTTE) incapable of ‘terrorism’. To summarily ‘punish’ someone by ‘killing’ and elevating that to the status of a nation’s objective is revolting in civil societies except those infected with the savagery of the Buddhist/Sinhala legacy. Similarly the apologist applies the same logic to the 1991 killing of Padmanabha in an inter-group fight in the heart of Chennai. Rajiv was alive then and was involved with the RAW in instigating the inter-group fights. General Harkirat’s book throws light on how the blame for the Padmanaha killing was easily shifted totally on the heads of the Tamil resistance omitting any mention of the acts of Rajiv and RAW. In insurgencies inter-group fights are RAW instigated purely to keep the groups weak and compliant and for intelligence on each others’ activities. Partisan coverage absolved RAW’s role in the inter-group killings.

The savage SL genocide after ridding more than one million SL Tamils overseas; the rest internally displaced over and over again left half a million in the Vanni safe havens. Now SL’s scotched earth war funded by India’s US$ 100 million targets them for displacement. Fearing death, injury and assets for basic habitation destroyed the Vanni Tamils have to move out as a last resort and join the half a million already in the South (Colombo and suburbs). B Mudaliyar Reddy an anti-Tamil had to admit the savagery of SL’s scotched earth policy in Jaffna in one exceptional sentence ‘it is rare to come across a structure that is intact’ in his Jaffna diary in Frontline 26 April 2008. The narrative (of S Hariharasharma) quoted in the New York Times of 8 March 2008 vouch to the tenuous (and terrifying) conditions of those already living in the South. What purpose is served by the Congress polity reciting ‘there is no military solution’ mantra while funding the purchase of fire power to drive the Vanni Tamils out and with it erase the reality of Tamil homelands. The Buddhist/Sinhalas and Delhi are hands in glove in this Tamil pogrom.

Congress legacy be-spoiled - SL’s divisive politics heads to Delhi

The shrewder Buddhist/Sinhalas successfully sowed divisive politics that Delhi-Chennai consultations on Indo-SL relations do not occur naturally following erosion in Delhi’s confidence in Chennai toeing its new SL line. Chennai is kept in the dark about the nature of commitment that Rajiv made to JR in the Rajiv/JR deal that India is unable to extricate itself from. Hence the twists and turns in India presenting Indian SL policy to the Indian public. One may surmise that under the mischievous spell of the sectarian bureaucrats in Delhi the strength of the Tamil resistance vis a vis the Buddhist/Sinhalas is interpreted as precedent setting for contrived separatist sentiments in TN. For this, DMK’s essentially anti Brahmin agitation is tarnished as separatist and resurrected for India’s SL policy making. SL’s success in using sectarian elements within India itself to engineer divisive tendencies in India is remarkable. The urge for unity is strongest when it comes from below (the people) not when forced down from the top. Creating a lack of trust in the loyalty of TN mainstream Tamils within the Indian Union is SL’s success story. Hence the words and actions of Delhi show evidence of the SL divisive viral infecting Delhi polity via the ruling Congress. India’s SL policy is much muddled thanks to the inter-interest politics (over sharing the spoils) within the sectarian establishment in Delhi. Promises and actions do not move in tandem. Reports on the US$ 100 million in soft loans for SL’s arms purchases came within a couple of days of PM Singh promising Vaiko that India does not and will not supply arms to SL. Was the PM over-ruled or did he view that his promise to Vaiko referred to the supply of Indian arms not funding SL’s arms purchase elsewhere?. Being rhetorically clever alone in not clever politics.

Is limitless appeasing of Buddhist/Sinhalese such a priority for India?

India’s interest is best served by setting limits on the Buddhist/Sinhalas appeasement before it becomes counter-productive. This prevents mainstream Tamils viewing that Delhi metes out to it a step motherly treatment that no amount of double speak will sooth the deep seated resentment that results. To re-enforce TN Tamils’ loyalty, Delhi’s policies need to go to its roots giving priority to nurturing unity within the Indian Union above everything else. Hence the call to all patriotic Indians to re-dedicate themselves to the true Indian (pre-Rajiv) legacy, putting out of business those who thrive by the divisive trade.
- Sri Lanka Guardian