(October, 31, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) At the recent Counter Terrorism Conference in Colombo, organized by the Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute for International Relations and Strategic Studies, there was a session on the ‘Socio-Economic Costs of Terrorism’. The speaker and the two discussants showed very graphically how much terrorism and efforts to deal with it have cost the country in recent years. The general thrust of their remarks was that peace would provide very positive benefits in contrast to the costs that are now being incurred.
This proposition is unquestionable. However, some of the factors touched on in the presentations also indicated that the pursuit of peace requires great care. Some of the points made indicated that the abortive peace process of 2002 and 2003 had greatly magnified the current cost of the war.
It was noted for instance that the defence budget had risen over the last few years, and in particular after the revelation of LTTE aerial capacity. What was not mentioned was that the LTTE had developed this capacity during the 2002/2003 period when the then Sri Lankan government was avidly pursuing peace. During those two years the Sri Lankan defence budget was reduced, which is one reason why it has now to run twice as hard as before just to stay in the same place.
For we know that in those years the LTTE was bringing in weapons at a rate. The destruction by the LTTE of an entire ship when one of the Norwegian monitors found a gun on board made clear the level at which the LTTE was building up its arsenal during this period. Indeed, whereas the SLMM seems to have tried to prevent such a blatant violation of the Ceasefire, the government had tried to dissuade the navy from stopping the ship.
There is no need to suppose any sinister motivation behind this action, given the general desire to appease that characterized the approach of that government to the Peace Process. What is forgotten however is how expensive that appeasement proved. It contributed to the failure to prevent arms being brought in, the failure to stop the construction of an airstrip at Iranamadu, the failure to stop the build up of offensive emplacements at Sampur and elsewhere. When we look at our defence costs now, we have to realize that these have shot up precisely because of the need to defend ourselves against the offensive strength built up during the abortive Peace Process.
And it was not only a matter of omission. There was also the active assistance to the LTTE, in the form for instance of the sophisticated telecommunications equipment imported through the Norwegians and sadly delivered to the LTTE through this Peace Secretariat, on the instructions of the Prime Minister’s office. Indeed we even had to pay duty for vehicles brought in for the use of the LTTE, though this was subsequently reimbursed by the Treasury.
Then there was all the assistance permitted, nay encouraged, by the government to be supplied direct to the LTTE. There was for instance the $1 million dollars given by UNICEF for rehabilitation, money which has not led to any tangible results or been properly accounted for. More recently attention has been drawn to an even greater amount that came through Save the Children, supposedly to be used for rehabilitation work. In many such instances there is a lack of clarity about what was given and whether anything was achieved. I believe there has been no attempt to collate information about all such donations thus far, but this should be done as a matter of urgency, given how these funds too have contributed to the war efforts of the LTTE, and hence to our rising defence costs.
Some of this money we hoped had been used for the people suffering under LTTE control, though little of this was visible amongst those now liberated in the East. Some we hoped had been used to promote peace. But recent events suggest that such hopes are unrealistic. To deal with matters particularly close to us, whereas this Peace Secretariat received was set up with $2 million dollars from the Norwegians, the LTTE Secretariat received I am told $30 million. The sort of use made of such money was made patently clear last week when they proudly circulated pictures of the suicide cadres sacrificed by the organization in the attack on the Anuradhapura Air Base. It is to be hoped that at least at this late stage the Norwegians, and those others who – with the full agreement of the Sri Lankan government at the time – ploughed in money in the belief that it would bring peace, will realize the ends to which their contributions are used.
The funding referred to above was what might be termed official funding. In addition the period of the Peace Process allowed for much more concerted fundraising. Some of this was legal, given the great fillip the recognition of the LTTE as virtually an equal partner gave them. It is in this period for instance that we find respected financiers amongst others attaching themselves, understandably enough, to the LTTE bandwagon – and of course now unable to let go of the tiger’s tale.
But while this new found respectability made collection easier, it also made extortion easier. It led too to the concerted raising of revenue through taxation to which the then government turned a blind eye. Thus, even recently, I found the SLMM referring to an LTTE Customs House, whereas what they should have mentioned was a building used by the LTTE to extort illegal taxes. Certainly the massive amounts raised by the LTTE as taxation on the movement of goods and people along the A 9 would have justified a much earlier closure of it by the government, which however kept it open on humanitarian grounds until the ruthless assault at Muhumalai in August 2006.
And we have to remember that all this money was raised even while the Sri Lankan government continued, as now, to pay for government services throughout the areas controlled by the LTTE. This does not mean just the services governments provide in most countries, it includes the whole gamut of social services Sri Lanka provides to all its citizens, including free health, free education from infancy to university, free school uniforms, free school books.
With the government paying the salaries too of all officials in the LTTE controlled areas, even while with government acquiescence the LTTE started controlling these officials too, what did the LTTE spend its money on? Both the funds it received officially and those it obtained through extortion, taxation and otherwise? It was not only on weapons, not only on airstrips and gun emplacements, it was also on bunkers and extensive training as was forced on the poor girls dragged off to Sencholai and elsewhere.
The present government has to deal with all this. All this has added to the cost of countering terrorism. This is why, while the government remains as always open to negotiations, it must ensure that the cost of any abortive negotiation does not affect future generations as badly as the 2002/2003 peace negotiations did.
That experience made it clear that the LTTE uses negotiations to build up its own strength. Beginning from the time of the Thimpu talks, which it used to destroy TELO, this has been its practice. In 2002 it did its best to destroy other Tamil groups, by calculated murder after the disarming it had insisted on, and had the added bonus of a government that allowed it to build up an offensive armoury and fortifications at will. Having achieved what it wanted it withdrew from talks in April 2003.
It is conceivable that it only returned to negotiations in February 2006 because it wanted to pull off the same trick, and kill off the Karuna faction after it had ensured its disarmament. That attempt failed, and then it came back to talks in June and October perhaps hoping to open up again its avenues of supply, along with its ability to raise funds.
Fortunately this government has proved more sensible than its predecessors. This does not mean it should close the doors to talks. But then, no Sri Lankan government has ever refused to talk. The bottom line is that talks must be unconditional, and should not end up costing the nation even more than before. That message should be made clear to the LTTE by all those who are as anxious as we are for talks, whose generous contributions during the abortive Peace Talks were used for such nefarious ends by the LTTE as recent events have made all too clear.
(The Statement released by the Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process)
(October, 31, Trincomalee, Sri Lanka Guardian) Nine Tamil youths who fled from LTTE captivity sought refuge at the Sri Lanka Navy and Police Fishing Marshalling Point at Pallemunai in Mannar 30th October 2007 around 7.15 a.m according to a milittary source.
