- It took all of New Delhi’s diplomatic skill, tact and patience to put Sino-Indian relations back on track. Indicating that bilateral relations still remained fragile, Mr Mukherjee said that "working together does not mean that we won’t have problems. To convert the divergence into convergence is what we are trying to do."_________________________________
by S. Viswam
(March 25, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) It was an entirely fortuitous coincidence that foreign policy issues dominated parliamentary proceedings this week. It is not often that events occur in different parts of India’s neighbourhood at the same time or that developments in other parts of the world impinge on India’s external relations. But thanks to the public interest getting focused on the fate of an Indian prisoner on death row in Pakistan and on the Tibetan uprising, and thanks also partially to the concern over the status of the India-US nuclear deal, the week belonged to the external affairs minister, Mr Pranab Mukherjee.
Mr Mukherjee was under pressure from the combined opposition in the Rajya Sabha to elaborate on a suo motu statement on some specific foreign policy issues he had made to Parliament a few days ago. In the Lok Sabha, he was being urged by all sections of the House to take up with Pakistan the issue of the announced execution of Sarabjit. The matter came up in the Upper House in the form of a short-duration discussion that was meant primarily to understand the official position on the nuclear deal. Mr Mukherjee’s response turned out to be a comprehensive enunciation of India’s positions vis-a-vis relations with many countries. India’s relations with the United States, China, Pakistan, Palestine, Israel, Nepal and Sri Lanka came to be analysed.
It is noteworthy that the issue of India’s relations with all or most of these countries has assumed controversial overtones in recent times. Testifying to this fact was the rather defensive tones the minister had to strike while expounding on Indian policies. Uncharacteristically for him, he was forced to resort to some verbal quibbling too. For instance, he argued that China was not "patting India on its back" for New Dehi’s handling of the Tibetan crisis. It was not "patronage", he said, but only "appreciation."
Significantly, there was no demand in either Houses of the Parliament for a strong condemnation of China for suppressing the revolt in Tibet through use of excessive force nor was there any specific suggestion that the Indian position on Tibet should be modified. This was largely because national public opinion while being sympathetic to Tibet’s plight recognises that the Indian position accepting Tibet to be an autonomous region of China was unavoidable and dictated by national interests. By describing China as a "grand reality", Mr Mukherjee was in effect justifying the Indian official line.
However, it is also a fact that where Sino-Indian bilateral relations are concerned, New Delhi is always cautious to the point of being politically correct even when and if Beijing is palpably in the wrong. This over-caution is borne out of historical compulsions that marked the decline of bilateral relations from one extremity of "bhai-bhai" equations to the other extremity of bitter hostility and diplomatic distance. The kind of excessive caution that New Delhi resorts to is extremely irritating for the public at large which fails to see how relations with any country can suffer if the government’s response to a given situation only reflects the public view. However, public opinion is one thing, diplomatic relations and diplomacy something else.
It took all of New Delhi’s diplomatic skill, tact and patience to put Sino-Indian relations back on track. Indicating that bilateral relations still remained fragile, Mr Mukherjee said that "working together does not mean that we won’t have problems. To convert the divergence into convergence is what we are trying to do." In the case of Tibet, while India had given sanctuary to the Dalai Lama and his followers and was co-ordinating with the Tibetan government-in-exile, the condition on which the Dalai Lama was given refuge was that neither he nor his followers would indulge in any anti-Chinese political activity.
The permission given by the then prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, to the Dalai Lama to set up a government-in-exile in Dharamshala (Himachal Pradesh) when the Tibetan spiritual head was forced to flee Lhasa along with 80,000 followers in March 1959 was influenced by India’s historic, cultural, social and religious ties with Buddhist Tibet.
After 1959,Tibet became an irritant in the development of Sino- Indian ties, but the controversy over India’s tolerant policy towards the Dalai Lama and his government diminished in intensity after New Delhi announced in 1965 that it accepted Tibet as an autonomous region of China. There was an acrimonious debate since 1959 whether India recognised China’s sovereignty or suzerainty over Tibet.
Tibet is no longer an irritant in bilateral relations, but Beijing is fully aware that the popular and official positions on Tibet do not converge. The respect and reverence in which the Dalai Lama is held in India does not make Beijing happy, but till now the government has ensured that Tibetans observe restraint where activity against and criticism of China are concerned. Incidentally, it is almost half-a-century to the date since the Dalai Lama arrived in India and assumed the leadership of Tibetans in exile all over the world.
The news of Beijing’s military response to the Tibetan uprising has undoubtedly shocked public opinion in India. The public at large has been caught between understanding and appreciating New Delhi’s official policy on the one side and its restraint on Tibetans in India from organising and participating in demonstrations on the other. However, the Tibetan uprising began on ominous notes but has been quelled with minimum loss of lives, although even one life lost is one too many in situations of this kind. Officially China has admitted to 13 deaths while Dharamshala spokesmen have placed the figure at 99. India’s Tibet policy was put to the test once earlier when Lhasa erupted in anger in March 1989 following the death of the 10th Panchem Lama who was handpicked by the Dalai Lama before he fled Lhasa. The Chinese had to impose martial law on that occasion to quell the riots. Forty-nine years after the Dalai Lama left Lhasa, there has been yet another uprising in Tibet, but fortunately, Beijing has been able to suppress the trouble without resorting once again to martial law. It was clear, however, that the military in the autonomous region was preparing for a full-fledged armed showdown with the Tibetan public when Beijing indicated that it was receptive to the Dalai Lama’s offer of unconditional talks.
One does not know, nor can one speculate on possibilities or probabilities on how the situation would have developed in Tibet had the Dalai Lama not shown extraordinary political sagacity and wisdom at the hour of extreme crisis. His message to Beijing was unambiguous. He was not insisting on independence for Tibet but only political autonomy.
He did not support, instigate or favour violence as a solution to the Tibetan stalemate. Thirdly, he categorically asserted that if his followers persisted with violence, he would resign his position in the government-in-exile.
It is a testimony to the Dalai Lama’s intellectual integrity and personal credibility that his position struck a responsive chord not only among his followers, a majority of whom publicly rejected non-violence as an option, but also in Beijing. The Dalai Lama thus was largely influential in persuading Chinese Preme Wen Jiabao to inform his British counterpart Gordon Brown that he was willing to enter into a dialogue with the spiritual leader on the basis of his stated positions. New Delhi has good reason to welcome Beijing’s response.
- Sri Lanka Guardian
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