Jihadi Winds from Pakistan

“It is not surprising that a coalition of this nature has not yet been able to come out with a coherent strategy to deal with jihadi terrorism. For all of them, an immediate objective is to make the current lull in suicide terrorism in Pakistani territory endure by reaching an agreement with Baitullah, hoping that he would be able to persuade other tribal leaders to fall in line and accept his agreement with the Government.”
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(April 27, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) One police officer and three civilians were killed and 30 injured in a car bomb explosion between a police station and a hotel in Mardan in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan on April 25,2008. The police station building collapsed due to the impact of the explosion.

Mardan is the home town of the new NWFP Chief Minister, Mr.Amir Haider Hoti, who belongs to the secular (friendly to India) Awami National Party (ANP). The ANP, which is a regional Pashtun party, emerged as the largest single party in the elections to the provincial Assembly held on February 18,2008, and also did well in the elections to the National Assembly in Islamabad. It is a member of the ruling coalition headed by Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gillani of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), which assumed office in Islamabad a month ago. Mr.Hoti is the nephew of Mr.Afsandyar Wali Khan, the President of the ANP. His selection by the party leadership for the post of Chief Minister was criticised by some party circles, who viewed it as family favouritism, but this has not created any enemity to him.

The responsibility for the explosion is reported to have been claimed by a spokesman (Maulvi Umar) of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). He projected it as in reprisal for the death of a commander of the Tehrik at the hands of the local police. The explosion came two days after Baitullah Mehsud, the South Waziristan based Amir of the TTP, had circulated leaflets in the Mehsud area asking his followers to strictly observe a ceasefire in view of the talks going on with some emissaries of the Government on a possible peace agreement.

The explosion also came some days after the NWFP Government, as a gesture to the TTP, had released Maulana Sufi Mohammad, the founder-Amir of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) of the Malakand Division, who had been detained in 2002 when he and his followers returned from Afghanistan after having sustained heavy casualties in an American air strike. They had rushed into Afghanistan to help the Taliban and Al Qaeda after the US had launched its Operation Enduring Freedom on October 7,2001. The TNSM was subsequently banned by President Pervez Musharraf.

During his detention since then, his son-in-law Maulana Fazlullah, also known as Maulana FM Radio because of his use of an FM radio station for mobilising his followers, assumed control of the TNSM. Under his leadership, the TNSM joined the TTP and contributed volunteers for the wave of suicide strikes in tribal and non-tribal areas after the commando action ordered by Musharraf from July 10 to 13,2007, to free the Lal Masjid in Islamabad from the control of jihadi elements close to the Taliban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Even before the elections of February 18,2008, the previous Government had Sufi Mohammad transferred to a hospital from the Peshawar jail after the TNSM followers of Fazlullah rose in revolt in the Swat Valley and took to arms against the Army in retaliation for the Lal Masjid commando raid. The Army's efforts to use him to restore peace in the Valley failed. While the Army was able to free those areas of the Swat Valley, which had come under the de facto control of Fazlullah and his followers, it was not able to neutralise him and his followers, who managed to escape into the mountains and have been operating from there. After his release by the new Government, Sufi Mohammad has called for an end to the attacks on the security forces. It remains to be seen what following he still commands from his former followers and to what extent his son-in-law is amenable to his influence. Moreover, Sufi Mohammad has been having many health problems. It is, therefore, doubtful whether his release would have any significant impact on the ground situation

The Mardan explosion also came after a month of lull in terrorist strikes in areas outside the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The lull had given cause for hope that the wave of Pashtun anger in the tribal areas triggered off by the commando action of the Special Services Group (SSG) in the Lal Masjid might be showing signs of subsiding. The commando action allegedly resulted in the death of 200 tribal students studying in the madrasas attached to the masjid. This anger set off a wave of Pashtun suicide terrorism not only in FATA and in the Swat Valley, but also in the non-tribal areas, including in Rawalpindi, Islamabad, Lahore, Tarbella, Sargodha etc. Mrs.Benazir Bhutto paid with her life at Rawalpindi on December 27,2007, because of Pashtun anger against her due to her support for the commando action.

During the last one month, there were no acts of suicide terrorism anywhere in Pakistani territory, but there were sporadic acts of non-suicide terrorism in the FATA. The indications of the dilution of the anger were attributed to the overtures made by the ruling coalition in Islamabad to the tribal elders constituting the TTP, through the Pashtun constituents of the coalition such as the ANP and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema Islam (JUI) Pakistan headed by Maulana Fazlur Rahman.

These overtures have been accompanied by hints that the new Government intends reviewing the counter-terrorism policies followed by the Army under President Pervez Musharraf, when he was also holding charge as the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS). These policies, which blindly aped the American model of over-militarisation of counter-terrorism, were viewed and continue to be viewed by many as having led to an Americanisation of Pakistan's counter-terrorism policies to serve the US objective of preventing another 9/11 in the US homeland mounted from the Pakistan-Afghanistan region, without regard to the impact on the internal security and stability of Pakistan.

While the coalition Government has welcomed the US offer of assistance for the economic development of the FATA, it has not reacted positively to US suggestions that in addition to the economic development, a programme should be undertaken for special training to the Pakistan Army and para-military forces such as the Frontier Corps in counter-terrorism in order to re-orient them to their counter-terrorism role, which till now has received low priority in preference to their conventional role against India. While reacting positively to all proposals for upgrading the counter-terrorism equipment now available with the Pakistani security forces and intelligence agencies, the coalition is averse to any major US role in training the Pakistani forces for operations against the jihadi terrorists.

The TTP is not a homogenous group. It consists of leaders of different tribes in the FATA and in the adjoining districts of the NWFP, each having his own inflated ego and his own agenda. The common bonds uniting them are their pro-Taliban and pro-Al Qaeda feelings and their anti-US and anti-Musharraf anger. The desire to avenge the Lal Masjid raid by the Army is no longer as strong a motivating factor as it was before the elections, but the desire to help the Neo Taliban of Afghanistan, headed by its Amir Mullah Mohammad Omar, and Al Qaeda in their jihad against the NATO forces in Afghanistan is still a strong motivating factor. While they rallied behind the leadership of Baitullah, who is a strong supporter of Serajuddin Haqqani of the Neo Taliban, in the wake of the Lal Masjid raid and contributed volunteers for suicide missions, the ability of Baitullah to make all of them implement the terms of any peace agreement eventually signed by him with the Government is doubtful. The Mardan explosion is as much a message to the Government as it is to Baitullah not to take for granted their support to any peace agreement between the Govt. and Baitullah.

While all the tribal elders are strong supporters of the Neo Taliban, their support for Al Qaeda varies. The tribal elders of North Waziristan, where the training infrastructure of Al Qaeda, the IMU and the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) is reportedly located, and the Bajaur Agency strongly support these organisations. The Mehud followers of Baitullah in South Waziristan strongly support the Neo Taliban, but their support for the Arabs in Al Qaeda is not that strong.

The various tribal elders, who identify themselves with the TTP and accept at least nominally the leadership of Baitullah, have their own definition of who are foreigners.None of them treats the Pashtuns of Afghanistan in the Neo Taliban as foreigners. For them, all Pashtuns---irrespective of whether from Pakistan or Afghanistan--constitute one community and to talk of locals and foreigners in their community is absurd. Even amongst the non-Pashtuns----mainly the Arabs, the Uzbeks, the Tajiks, the Uighurs and the Chechens--- they treat those who came into the area in the 1980s to participate in the jihad against the Soviet troops as no longer foreigners. Many of them---particularly Uzbeks--- have married Pashtun women and are accepted as members of the Pashtun community.

For them, a foreigner is an Arab, or an Uzbek or an Uighur or a Chechen or a Tajik, who had not participated in the jihad against the Soviet troops and who came into the area after the start of Op Enduring Freedom to fight against the Americans. Their number is very small. The anti-US jihad in Afghanistan has not attracted a large number of foreigners as the jihad in Iraq has. Most of those fighting against the US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan are Pashtuns from both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and the Arab and other foreign survivors of the pre-9/11 vintage. If they are all to be treated as de facto locals,any agreement between the Government and the TTP, which says the latter would not help foreigners and give shelter to them in their territory would be meaningless.

The ruling coalition in Islamabad is not a homogenous group either. It is a hotch-potch of political opportunists, each biding his time and watching over his shoulders till they are able to assert their primacy. The PPP led by Mr.Asif Ali Zardari is amenable to accepting US ideas and suggestions regarding the fight against terrorism without outwardly seeming to be doing so. They are prepared not to rock the boat for Musharraf if the US prefers his continuance as the President. Mr.Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (known as PML-N), strongly distrusts the US because of its support to Musharraf and for him teaching a lesson to Musharraf, who had him overthrown, is more important than teaching a lesson to Osama bin Laden, Mulla Omar and Baitullah. The ANP is truly secular and leftist-oriented, but too idealistic to be able to make an enduring impact on the ground situation in the Pashtun belt at a time when large sections of the belt have been Talibanised. Maulana Fazlur Rahman is the father of all opportunists. Nobody can say with certainty on whose side he will be tomorrow.

It is not surprising that a coalition of this nature has not yet been able to come out with a coherent strategy to deal with jihadi terrorism. For all of them, an immediate objective is to make the current lull in suicide terrorism in Pakistani territory endure by reaching an agreement with Baitullah, hoping that he would be able to persuade other tribal leaders to fall in line and accept his agreement with the Government. Among the conditions reportedly being imposed by him are:

Release of all those arrested during the commando action in the Lal Masjid and the withdrawal of the cases registered against them under the Anti-Terrorism Act.
Withdrawal of the Army to the barracks in the tribal areas, with the responsibility for internal security re-entrusted to the Police and the Frontier Corps.
Non-use of the Air Force and heavy artillery in the counter-terrorism operations.
A reversal of Musharraf's policy of handing over to the US without following the due process of law anybody characterised by the US as an Al Qaeda suspect. Publication of a complete list of those so handed over by Musharraf and their present whereabouts and legal status.

Review of all arrests made by the Police after 9/11 under the Anti-Terrorism Act in order to identify and release innocent persons.

A re-investigation of the Benazir Bhutto assassination case. Baitullah reportedly alleges that the Army had cooked up the investigation in order to have him implicated as the mastermind.

While his other demands may be acceptable to the ruling coalition as a whole, his demand relating to the Benazir case is tricky---- since both the Pakistan Army and the US intelligence agencies seem to be in agreement that he played a leading role in her assassination. To accept his condition to re-investigate the Benazir case could invite criticism that for Mr.Zardari saving his own life and ensuring his rise to power are more important than bringing to justice those who had his wife killed. Already critics of Mr.Zardari in the PPP and the followers of the late Murtaza Ali Bhutto, the brother of Benazir, who was killed during a mysterious police firing in Karachi in September 1996, when she was the Prime Minister and Mr.Zardari was literally running the police department and the Government as a whole, have been drawing attention to the significant fact that Mr.Zardari is no longer as vociferous as he was before the elections in demanding an UN-sponsored international investigation into the assassination of his wife. He no longer talks of the need for a thorough investigatin into the assassination.

Any agreement reached by the ruling coalition with the Pakistani Taliban could prove to be as short-lived as the agreements reached by Musharraf with the very same elements in 2005 in South Waziristan and in 2006 in North Waziristan. While thus focussing on reaching a peace agreement at least with Baituulah and his followers in South Waziristan and with Fazlullah and his followers in the Swat Valley, the coalition has been silent on its attitude towards the terrorist infrastructure of Al Qaeda, the Neo Taliban and pro-Al Qaeda organisations in the Pakistani territory. It has been equally silent on the demands being voiced in jihadi circles for lifting the ban on anti-India jihadi organisations and anti-Shia organisations imposed by Musharraf in January 2002 under US pressure and for unfreezing the bank accounts of identified financiers of Al Qaeda and the Neo Taliban such as Al Rashid Trust.

Both India and the US have reasons to be equally concerned over the demands being made in Pakistan to reduce the pressure on the terrorist organisations and ultimately restore the status quo ante as it was before OP Enduring Freedom started. If the jihadis have their way, India would be the first to feel the impact and the US thereafter. The developing situation requires close monitoring. (26-4-2008)

(B.Raman, Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
- Sri Lanka Guardian