Negotiated settlement, or ‘political solution'?

“As the Minister pointed out, the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement (1987) visualised the change of that into eight Provinces, with a temporary merger of the North and the East. "We will go back to the old British model of nine Provinces," he clarified. It is here that sharper differences could emerge – and greater clarity required, for arriving at a negotiated settlement.”
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by N .Sathiyamoorthy

(June 30, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) After a break, Sri Lankan Government leaders have started mentioning 'negotiated settlement' as a way out of what is possibly emerging as an impasse to the ethnic war and strife, particularly in the North. For a time in between, the Government leadership was constantly referring to a 'political solution' in its place, either by accident or otherwise, but not many could or did take notice.

President Mahinda Rajapaksa "is always willing to have negotiations and a settlement," Basil Rajapaksa, Senior Advisor and brother to the President, said in a recent interview to the Daily Mirror. Reiterating the line less than a week later was Foreign Minister Rohitha Bogollagama. The Government had told the international community that it was ready for a negotiated settlement and was willing to adopt a political approach, he told the newspaper in an obvious reference to the talks with a three-member, high-powered team from India.

Clearly, the Indian team's visit may have been a cause for greater clarity on the side of the Sri Lankan Government, and also for the consequent reiteration of the known position from the past. It is also here that questions arise as to the 'representative character' of the LTTE and the Government's willingness to negotiate with the LTTE. "They represent the Tamil people, but they are not the only ones," Basil Rajapaksa said in this context.

"That has been proved," he said, in an obvious reference to the Provincial Council elections in the East, where you now have a Tamil Chief Minister who is not only an LTTE renegade who remains unacceptable to the LTTE. Sri Lankan Ambassador to the US, Bernard Goonatilleke would assert this line in a write-up in the 'Washington Times' within a few days.

As Basil Rajapaksa conceded, it was not as if the LTTE does not "have the strength, or they represent no Tamils. They do represent a fair amount of Tamil people. Unfortunately, their way of doing it can't be approved". He would go a step further to declare, "The best scenario is where we negotiate and settle it with the LTTE."

According to him, at present the Government "cannot forget the problems of the Tamil people till the LTTE comes forward (for talks). We are meeting the needs of the people… We are willing to look into their (LTTE) grievances."

Close. Or, least, it does not want to be seen as doing it – for now in particular. The Government also seems to acknowledging the ground reality that the LTTE continues to command the leadership of a substantial section of the Sri Lankan Tamil population and that there cannot be complete peace without engaging the LTTE, politically.

However, the Government also seems aware of the possibilities. The Government as an institution has gained a new confidence from the military victories over the last couple of years. Simultaneously, it has also been able to neutralize the LTTE both in psywar and PR exercise on the international front – areas in which the LTTE had excelled through and through.

As Basil Rajapaksa outlined, the Government remains convinced that the LTTE's is a 'terrorist problem' and that "we are crushing terrorism while inviting the LTTE for negotiations". According to him, "on the terrorism problem, certainly we will have to have some discussion with the terrorists.We will have to have some form of negotiations with them".

Here comes the question as to the form that such negotiations would / could take, and the hurdles en route. Over the past year and more, the LTTE had indicated a willingness to return to the negotiations table if the ceasefire situation was restored. Translated, it would mean a truce on the military front, return of the armed forces to pre-CFA position and the restoration of the North-East merger.

"That is like thinking of attaining 'nirvana' tomorrow," Basil Rajapaksa said about restoring a ceasefire, and referring to the Buddhist concept of ultimate bliss. "That takes time and effort. You can't just decide today and go for it tomorrow. It's too far away to think about at this stage. We have to be realistic."

This could be indicative of the Government's willingness to consider ceasefire options without reviving the Norwegian-facilitated CFA that it had abrogated unilaterally earlier in the year. It would have its terms and it would then be for the LTTE to decide which route to take, Basil Rajapaksa seemed to indicate.

If the two sides are serious about negotiations and a negotiated settlement, a lot of ingenuity would have to go into the pre-peace processes for facilitating the same. In turn, rather than a ceasefire facilitating confidence-building, it would have to be confidence-building that would have to underwrite a truce on the miitary front, if at all it came to that and if it were not to be formalised, too.

Even earlier some Government leaders had spoken about reviving the negotiations even while continuing the war. True, the LTTE had violated ceasefires in the past to re-arm, re-train and re-group. It is another matter if the Government would be arguing the same way if the military situation was different.

A related issue pertains to the LTTE wanting the armed forces to return to the pre-CFA positions for returning to the negotiations table. This could be the crux of a deadlock for recommencing negotiations, like the LTTE's demand on the merger issue. The merger "had never had the acceptance of the Sinhalese community, the Muslim community and the indeed the Tamil residents of the Eastern Province," Sarath Amunugama, Minister for Enterprise Development and Investment Promotion, told The Hindu in Chennai, India. Amunugama was obviously referring to the election of S Chandrakanthan alias Pillaiyan as the Tamil Chief Minister for and in the East.

Ambassador Goonatilleke was even more forthright in Washington. The election of a non-LTTE/anti-LTTE Tamil Chief Minister for the Eastern Province had "shattered the myth" that the LTTE was the "sole leader" and representative of the Tamils, he said.

According to Amunugama, "The Government's position is very clear. If and when the Northern Province is taken over by the security forces, we will follow the same Eastern Province formula. There will be election. Whoever is elected will be the Chief Minister."

As the Minister pointed out, the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement (1987) visualised the change of that into eight Provinces, with a temporary merger of the North and the East. "We will go back to the old British model of nine Provinces," he clarified. It is here that sharper differences could emerge – and greater clarity required, for arriving at a negotiated settlement.

"I do not at all wish to wage a war against the people of the country," President Rajapaksa is reported to have told a group of religious leaders representing different faiths. ``If the LTTE lays down arms at any moment, I am ready to work with them to achieve peace,'' he added. Some message this, for the LTTE. Some message this for the Sri Lankan Tamils -- and the international community, too.

(The writer is the Director, Chennai Chapter of the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), the Indian policy think-tank headquartered in New Delhi.)
- Sri Lanka Guardian