Pak Army faces tricky challenges
If the Army fights them seriously, then more and more Army units get sucked into this mission, resulting in the dilution of the military posture on the eastern border. In such a situation, the Army will be perceived as fighting at Washington’s behest, and there can be possible alienation of the political/tribal leaders of FATA and the NWFP.
by Gen V. P. Malik
(August 14, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) The Pakistan Army’s summary reversal of the government’s notification placing control of the ISI under the Interior Ministry did not go well abroad as well as within Pakistan. The US, while welcoming Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani to Washington, had let the world know of the ISI support to the Taliban and others responsible for the July 7 bomb blast at the Indian Embassy in Kabul. Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai has often accused Pakistan of supporting the Taliban. He has termed the ISI as the “world’s biggest terrorists”. India’s National Security Adviser, not known for any adverse comment on the India-Pakistan security relations, has also accused the ISI of the embassy attack.
The ISI’s involvement in toppling democratically elected governments, rigging elections, autonomous handling of foreign relations, vigilantism, picking up people and making them disappear have tarnished its own image and that of the Pakistan Army. Shuja Nawaz, in his book Crossed Swords, writes of a sworn affidavit filed by Pakistan’s Defence Secretary in a High Court confirming that “his ministry had no operational control over the two rogue agencies (ISI and ISPR) and, therefore, he was unable to enforce the court’s orders on either agency in matters relating to detentions”.
But the ISI is not the only challenge facing the Pakistan Army. It faces some more serious strategic, operational and credibility issues. After nine long years of command, General Musharraf had handed over a thorny baton of the Chief to his successor, Gen Ashfaque Kiyani!
Pakistan has always been concerned with the non-acceptance of the Durand Line by Afghanistan along its Western border. From time to time, Afghanistan has claimed the Pashtun areas of Pakistan, exacerbating Pakistan's security concern. Although the Pakistan Army does not fear any outright attack from the much weaker Afghan military, any Indian footprint in Afghanistan creates unrest among Pakistani military planners fearing the prospect of a two-front war.
For long, they have followed the “strategic depth” policy to be able to use influence and space in Afghanistan to overcome Pakistan’s geostrategic disadvantages vis-a-vis India. The continuing support to the resurgent Taliban and covert ISI operations show that the Pakistan Army is still determined to convert Afghanistan into a client state for “strategic depth”. In the post-Cold War and 9/11 geopolitical environment, when it is no longer possible to redraw national boundaries with or without a conflict, the extension of “strategic depth” into Afghanistan makes no sense. Such a strategy not only causes antagonism and regional tension but also inhibits Pakistan from extending trade, commerce and culture to its western neighbours and beyond.
Pakistan’s military planners fail to realise that after 9/11, no one in the world is willing to accept the Taliban’s influence or wishes to see the Karzai government destabilised. The US and NATO forces cannot withdraw from Afghanistan without tangible results. For them, it is a question of their homeland’s security. The Americans lost 28 soldiers in June; the largest number in any one month since 2001. Since then Pakistan is under tremendous pressure to deal decisively with jihadis living across the 1,350-mile-long porous and rugged Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
Linked to the Pakistan policy on Afghanistan is the challenge of the rising tide of radical Islamic militancy in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the NWFP which threatens to tear the country asunder. The lawless FATA, an insurgent haven, is perceived not just as a national but a global threat. The Frontier Constabulary and the Frontier Corps, staffed by tribesmen from FATA have often surrendered rather than fight their fellow tribals involved in militancy. The casualties have been mounting due to an increase in the number and intensity of militants’ attacks on Army and para-military units that are ill-equipped and untrained for a low-intensity conflict.
The Pakistan Army has considerable experience in inducing terrorism and insurgency in other countries, but it has little experience in combating insurgents in its own country. This is obvious from the manner in which it has been handling the situation in Waziristan. Its policy of appeasement, striking deals and peace agreements with militants in return for “no attacks on government forces and installations” and “aerial assaults” shows a lack of will, experience and improper multi-disciplinary doctrine for such operations.
The Army is in a Catch-22 situation. Peace negotiations with militants in the present operational situation implies the following: One, socio-political fundamentalists’ influence gets encouraged and may increase eastward. Two, there can be greater international pressure. Three, the damage to Pakistan’s moderate Islamic image is bound to be caused.
If the Army fights them seriously, then more and more Army units get sucked into this mission, resulting in the dilution of the military posture on the eastern border. In such a situation, the Army will be perceived as fighting at Washington’s behest, and there can be possible alienation of the political/tribal leaders of FATA and the NWFP.
From a broader strategic cultural viewpoint, the Army continues to believe that Pakistan must be physically and ideologically protected from India’s influence. It neither accepts India’s geo-strategic advantages nor the fact that for regional security, India believes in Pakistan’s social, political and economic stability. According to Pakistani strategic analyst Ayesha Siddiqa, “Pakistan has never ventured to extend its security vision beyond India”.
The latest revival of the “bleed India, especially in J & K” policy along the LoC and in other parts of India may also be linked to the overall strategic insecurity. But there is a flip side here, too, of causing a setback to the confidence building achieved during the last three-four years and threatening to derail the India-Pakistan peace process, as warned by Dr Manmohan Singh on August 2 in Colombo. There will also be disappointment among people on both sides of the border, particularly in J & K, who support the ceasefire on the LoC and further dialogue.
The other challenges before the Pakistan Army are of its vested interests and institutional credibility. Criticism of the military, once rare, is now becoming widespread and well informed. General Musharraf’s initiative in Kargil without political approval became Pakistan’s Waterloo from the politico-military-diplomatic viewpoint. The demand to institute a public enquiry continues to be strong in civil society. Recently, Ayesha Siddiqa revealed a huge financial empire and vested interest of the Pakistan Army in her book, Military Inc. She estimates that Pakistan’s military-industrial complex is worth around $20.7 billion, covering hotels, malls, insurance companies, banks, farms, industrial units and 12 per cent of the state-owned land.
Military Inc analyses the internal and external dynamics of this gradual power building and the impact it has on Pakistan's political and economic development. The challenge for the Army is to make it publicly transparent in terms of financial reporting and in creating a distance between such operations and the military high command.
General Kiyani also has to cleanse the Army of fundamentalists and those who maintain organic links with the jihadis. As the “Zia bharti” (those who joined during General Zia’s time and are considered conservative and fostering religious ideology and dogmas) officers and men gain seniority, more and more soldiers may become vulnerable to the influence of fundamentalist outfits and their ethos.
Pakistan’s “strategic enclave” is dominated by the military with the support of professional bureaucrats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This group, like most bureaucracies, is slow to admit mistakes, remains resistant to alternative world-views, and tends to lean on organisational preferences when faced with new situations. The new political set-up is too weak to influence the antiquated, narrow and shortsighted outlook and agendas like the “strategic depth” idea and the use of Islamic groups in Afghanistan and India. There is nothing to suggest that the “strategic enclave” has the vision, will or inclination to change the course that the Pakistan Army has adopted since the days of General Zia.
( The writer, a former Chief of Army Staff, is associated with the Observer Research Foundation. New Delhi.)
- Sri Lanka Guardian
If the Army fights them seriously, then more and more Army units get sucked into this mission, resulting in the dilution of the military posture on the eastern border. In such a situation, the Army will be perceived as fighting at Washington’s behest, and there can be possible alienation of the political/tribal leaders of FATA and the NWFP.
by Gen V. P. Malik
(August 14, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) The Pakistan Army’s summary reversal of the government’s notification placing control of the ISI under the Interior Ministry did not go well abroad as well as within Pakistan. The US, while welcoming Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani to Washington, had let the world know of the ISI support to the Taliban and others responsible for the July 7 bomb blast at the Indian Embassy in Kabul. Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai has often accused Pakistan of supporting the Taliban. He has termed the ISI as the “world’s biggest terrorists”. India’s National Security Adviser, not known for any adverse comment on the India-Pakistan security relations, has also accused the ISI of the embassy attack.
The ISI’s involvement in toppling democratically elected governments, rigging elections, autonomous handling of foreign relations, vigilantism, picking up people and making them disappear have tarnished its own image and that of the Pakistan Army. Shuja Nawaz, in his book Crossed Swords, writes of a sworn affidavit filed by Pakistan’s Defence Secretary in a High Court confirming that “his ministry had no operational control over the two rogue agencies (ISI and ISPR) and, therefore, he was unable to enforce the court’s orders on either agency in matters relating to detentions”.
But the ISI is not the only challenge facing the Pakistan Army. It faces some more serious strategic, operational and credibility issues. After nine long years of command, General Musharraf had handed over a thorny baton of the Chief to his successor, Gen Ashfaque Kiyani!
Pakistan has always been concerned with the non-acceptance of the Durand Line by Afghanistan along its Western border. From time to time, Afghanistan has claimed the Pashtun areas of Pakistan, exacerbating Pakistan's security concern. Although the Pakistan Army does not fear any outright attack from the much weaker Afghan military, any Indian footprint in Afghanistan creates unrest among Pakistani military planners fearing the prospect of a two-front war.
For long, they have followed the “strategic depth” policy to be able to use influence and space in Afghanistan to overcome Pakistan’s geostrategic disadvantages vis-a-vis India. The continuing support to the resurgent Taliban and covert ISI operations show that the Pakistan Army is still determined to convert Afghanistan into a client state for “strategic depth”. In the post-Cold War and 9/11 geopolitical environment, when it is no longer possible to redraw national boundaries with or without a conflict, the extension of “strategic depth” into Afghanistan makes no sense. Such a strategy not only causes antagonism and regional tension but also inhibits Pakistan from extending trade, commerce and culture to its western neighbours and beyond.
Pakistan’s military planners fail to realise that after 9/11, no one in the world is willing to accept the Taliban’s influence or wishes to see the Karzai government destabilised. The US and NATO forces cannot withdraw from Afghanistan without tangible results. For them, it is a question of their homeland’s security. The Americans lost 28 soldiers in June; the largest number in any one month since 2001. Since then Pakistan is under tremendous pressure to deal decisively with jihadis living across the 1,350-mile-long porous and rugged Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
Linked to the Pakistan policy on Afghanistan is the challenge of the rising tide of radical Islamic militancy in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the NWFP which threatens to tear the country asunder. The lawless FATA, an insurgent haven, is perceived not just as a national but a global threat. The Frontier Constabulary and the Frontier Corps, staffed by tribesmen from FATA have often surrendered rather than fight their fellow tribals involved in militancy. The casualties have been mounting due to an increase in the number and intensity of militants’ attacks on Army and para-military units that are ill-equipped and untrained for a low-intensity conflict.
The Pakistan Army has considerable experience in inducing terrorism and insurgency in other countries, but it has little experience in combating insurgents in its own country. This is obvious from the manner in which it has been handling the situation in Waziristan. Its policy of appeasement, striking deals and peace agreements with militants in return for “no attacks on government forces and installations” and “aerial assaults” shows a lack of will, experience and improper multi-disciplinary doctrine for such operations.
The Army is in a Catch-22 situation. Peace negotiations with militants in the present operational situation implies the following: One, socio-political fundamentalists’ influence gets encouraged and may increase eastward. Two, there can be greater international pressure. Three, the damage to Pakistan’s moderate Islamic image is bound to be caused.
If the Army fights them seriously, then more and more Army units get sucked into this mission, resulting in the dilution of the military posture on the eastern border. In such a situation, the Army will be perceived as fighting at Washington’s behest, and there can be possible alienation of the political/tribal leaders of FATA and the NWFP.
From a broader strategic cultural viewpoint, the Army continues to believe that Pakistan must be physically and ideologically protected from India’s influence. It neither accepts India’s geo-strategic advantages nor the fact that for regional security, India believes in Pakistan’s social, political and economic stability. According to Pakistani strategic analyst Ayesha Siddiqa, “Pakistan has never ventured to extend its security vision beyond India”.
The latest revival of the “bleed India, especially in J & K” policy along the LoC and in other parts of India may also be linked to the overall strategic insecurity. But there is a flip side here, too, of causing a setback to the confidence building achieved during the last three-four years and threatening to derail the India-Pakistan peace process, as warned by Dr Manmohan Singh on August 2 in Colombo. There will also be disappointment among people on both sides of the border, particularly in J & K, who support the ceasefire on the LoC and further dialogue.
The other challenges before the Pakistan Army are of its vested interests and institutional credibility. Criticism of the military, once rare, is now becoming widespread and well informed. General Musharraf’s initiative in Kargil without political approval became Pakistan’s Waterloo from the politico-military-diplomatic viewpoint. The demand to institute a public enquiry continues to be strong in civil society. Recently, Ayesha Siddiqa revealed a huge financial empire and vested interest of the Pakistan Army in her book, Military Inc. She estimates that Pakistan’s military-industrial complex is worth around $20.7 billion, covering hotels, malls, insurance companies, banks, farms, industrial units and 12 per cent of the state-owned land.
Military Inc analyses the internal and external dynamics of this gradual power building and the impact it has on Pakistan's political and economic development. The challenge for the Army is to make it publicly transparent in terms of financial reporting and in creating a distance between such operations and the military high command.
General Kiyani also has to cleanse the Army of fundamentalists and those who maintain organic links with the jihadis. As the “Zia bharti” (those who joined during General Zia’s time and are considered conservative and fostering religious ideology and dogmas) officers and men gain seniority, more and more soldiers may become vulnerable to the influence of fundamentalist outfits and their ethos.
Pakistan’s “strategic enclave” is dominated by the military with the support of professional bureaucrats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This group, like most bureaucracies, is slow to admit mistakes, remains resistant to alternative world-views, and tends to lean on organisational preferences when faced with new situations. The new political set-up is too weak to influence the antiquated, narrow and shortsighted outlook and agendas like the “strategic depth” idea and the use of Islamic groups in Afghanistan and India. There is nothing to suggest that the “strategic enclave” has the vision, will or inclination to change the course that the Pakistan Army has adopted since the days of General Zia.
( The writer, a former Chief of Army Staff, is associated with the Observer Research Foundation. New Delhi.)
- Sri Lanka Guardian
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