Thirteen-Plus and Thirty-one-Plus


"There is no reason why the LTTE should not retain weapons in the interregnum to permanent peace if other para-militaries in the Tamil-speaking East, and even in the North, could do so – purely in self-defence."
_________________

By N Sathiya Moorthy

(January 12, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) The Sri Lankan Government's decision to proscribe the LTTE after a six-year gap comes in the wake of a similar ban existing already in 31 other countries, starting with the immediate Indian neighbour. Accompanied by the oft-repeated promises that the Government would simultaneously work on a power-devolution package based on the Thirteenth Amendment, the ban raises both questions and hopes of a political solution to end the ethnic war and violence.

The ban comes a year after the Government unilaterally abrogated the Norwegian-facilitated ceasefire agreement (CFA). Post-ban, the Government has reiterated willingness to talk if the LTTE surrendered arms and renounced terrorism.

There is no reason why the LTTE should not retain weapons in the interregnum to permanent peace if other para-militaries in the Tamil-speaking East, and even in the North, could do so – purely in self-defence. But renouncing terrorism, as different from conventional military capabilities, is another thing. A via media could be found, but it is more about intentions and trust, where the LTTE's scores are abysmally low.

If the ban was late in coming that implied the Government's continued willingness to talk to the LTTE. It also implied the Government's acceptance of a possible military reversal until the fall of the Kilinochchi headquarters of the LTTE. It had however become untenable for the Sri Lankan Government to ask foreign counterparts to proscribe the militant outfit on their shores when it had a legal presence nearer home.

President Mahinda Rajapaksa seemed to have deliberately kept out negotiations from his address to the nation, announcing the military victory in Kilinochchi. Only a week earlier, the Government had declared its intention to proscribe the organisation if it did not ensure freedom of movement for Tamil civilian population in LTTE-controlled areas.

Subsequent developments have proved that not only did the LTTE not heed the Government's call but it had also moved the tens of thousands of civilians into the Mullaiteevu jungles long before the armed forces could enter Kilinochchi. Leaving behind a deserted town ensured that the armed forces did not have anyone to suspect as an LTTE cadre or mole – for them to fight or suspect.

Reports suggested that the doors and roofs of homes in the 'ghost city' had been removed before rendering Kilinochchi a 'ghost town'. Aerial bombing and artillery shells from the armed forces do not target the doors and roofs, exclusively. Obviously, they have been removed to build new houses in the areas where the residents have since moved – forcibly or otherwise.

LTTE sources have confirmed that the relief material sent by India, particularly at the behest of the polity in southern Tamil Nadu, too had reached the beneficiaries. All this would indicate that the LTTE may have prepared the civilians for the long haul, if it came to their staying put where they are – and serving as the 'human shields' that they otherwise are.

All this does not mean that the civilian population would stick to the LTTE without murmur of protest, or murmur and protest. We did see it happen in Jaffna a decade earlier. The dramatic mass exodus of a record population into the jungles did not mean anything more than that in the end. Their presence and demands on depleting supplies led to the LTTE asking them to return home and wait for a future call to rejoin the war. The call did not come.

Kilinochci and the rest of the towns that the civilian population have now vacated are similar to Jaffna that their brethren had left, in terms of civic amenities. Their new homes would be a patch on the past, and health care and sanitation, apart from food and other supplies, could become a huge problem in the days and weeks to come.

All this, in turn, could render the LTTE's current defiance meaningless after a time. The question could then arise if the residual cadres in the LTTE's ranks would be adequate to wage an eternal war with a State army, whose current superiority the LTTE seems to have problems accepting – and strategising for.

The LTTE could still manage hit-and-run operations in the periphery of their current citadel, targeting army patrols and defence lines. The military action could thus be confined to the nation's northern periphery and this is what the Government and the armed forces had aimed for from the very beginning. On terrorism front, their capacity may remain in tact but that cannot be said any more of their proven capabilities.

The option thus would be for the LTTE to return to the negotiations table, with as much as the military strength as it could still retain. The alternative would be for the LTTE to encourage the TNA to present its case on power-devolution to the Sri Lanka Government – and the international community. There is no need for confusion as to who calls the shots – as the TNA has for long acknowledged the 'sole representative' character of the LTTE as far as the Tamil opinion is concerned.

It requires no great wisdom, where to begin. The Thirteenth Amendment is as much a beginning as anything else -- the two 'Sinhala majors' having acknowledged its relevance. The Sri Lankan Government has spoken about 'Thirteen-Plus', and so has the Indian neighbour about 'Thirteen-Plus-Plus'.

If there is a good beginning it is here, embellished as it may further be by the APRC report. The latter has seen enough ups and downs, delays and revivals. Post-Kilinochchi, any further delay on this score could make the entire exercise not only futile but also counter-productive, to say the least.

The writer is Director, Chennai Chapter of the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), the Indian policy think-tank, headquartered in New Delhi. The article an originality carried by the Daily Mirror, daily news paper based in Colombo.
- Sri Lanka Guardian