Giving the LTTE a Chance?

By N Sathiya Moorthy

(March 02. Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) Time is running out on the LTTE. The outfit would remain relevant only as long as it is able to halt/delay the advancing armed forces on their track. It does not seem to be happening. Orderly civilian transfer involving the ICRC, unlike the haphazard exodus on the earlier occasion, could provide a relatively legitimate alternative. It could also be the kind of CBM that the world is looking for.

Thus far in the current phase, the international community has imposed ‘sanctions’ of a kind on the non-State actor by denying LTTE access to weapons and else. Sanctions are now being mentioned in relation to the Sri Lakan State. Helping to wipe out terrorism is one thing but nudging the Government to revive the much-promised political process is another.

Unlike sanctions, this one often comes with an aid package. A distinction needs to be drawn – and by all concerned.The LTTE is not the Tamil community, but is still a part thereof. Any humiliation of the former, unintended or otherwise, should not leave a permanent scar in the hurt psyche of the latter. There can even be an “exit plan” for the LTTE. For the larger Tamil community, there can only be an “inclusive” scheme.

The Government would lose nothing by holding the mirror to the LTTE’s face and asking it to blunt its canines. That is the kind of chance that the Government should give the LTTE before deciding to pluck out the canines. If nothing else, it could then hope to have the Tamil people on its side – and that is what the ‘ethnic war’ was all about after a point. That is what would matter, as well.

With Chairman Tissa Vitharana confirming that the APRC has completed the work, there is now fresh hope of an early political settlement to the vexed ethnic issue, war and violence. If the Sri Lankan Government takes it to the logical conclusion, this by itself could lay the ground for the LTTE to free civilians, lay down arms and return to the negotiations table. Or, possibly walk into the oblivion.

The Government has options. It can invite the LTTE for negotiations, if the latter disavowed terrorism and laid down arms. It can take the APRC report to the TNA, which was kept out of the process, for the very purpose. It can go to Parliament, for a wider national discourse that would also break political barriers within individual communities, particularly the minorities. Or it can do all three, either in stages or at one go.

The Government needs to draw a line. Power-devolution is one thing, and the discourse on presidential and parliamentary forms of government, as addressed by the APRC, is another. Differences over the latter, if any, should not be allowed to derail the former. Such was the case with the ‘Chandrika Package’. The Tamils, in turn, cannot use the Majority Report and/or the Vitharana Recommendations as the base. They are at best reference points, meant for the internal consumption of the APRC.

The scheme now outlined by Minister Vitharana could negate the inadequate and/or insincere implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment, and also the ill-effects of the ‘unitary’ concept. If so, that could be a trade-off against de-merger. The Tamils could then have full devolution and two Tamil-speaking Chief Ministers in a total of nine. The LTTE and their sympathisers need to acknowledge the shifting military sands and the consequent strengthening of independent Tamil political opinion. They cannot claim to be the ‘sole representative’.

In a letter to the UN Chief Ban Ki-moon, US President Barak Obama and the Tokyo Co-Chairs, LTTE’s Political Wing head P. Nadesan linked weapons’ surrender to a political solution. He did not mention freedom for the civilians, though it was the LTTE that had highlighted their plight through Diaspora demonstrations a fortnight back. It could cut either way, not only with the international community but also the larger Tamil population back home, whose body and soul the LTTE claimed to protect.

The LTTE is apprehensive of the Sri Lankan armed forces wiping them out if the hostage-shield is removed. Having yielded to global pressure, the Government seems to have suspended aerial and artillery attacks. It has revived essentials’ supply to the LTTE-controlled areas. Together, the twin decisions may have removed the incentive for the civilians to risk their lives in daring escape-attempts. Yet, the scars would remain as indelible as those left behind by 1956 and 1983.

Both sides need to take lessons from the East. Once mainstreamed, the TMVP gave the Government no cause for concerns and complaints. In turn, the cadres were allowed to carry personal arms in self-defence, even after they had come to head an elected government mandated by the Constitution. The situation is truer of the North.

Time is running out on the LTTE. The outfit would remain relevant only as long as it is able to halt/delay the advancing armed forces on their track. It does not seem to be happening. Orderly civilian transfer involving the ICRC, unlike the haphazard exodus on the earlier occasion, could provide a relatively legitimate alternative. It could also be the kind of CBM that the world is looking for.

Thus far in the current phase, the international community has imposed ‘sanctions’ of a kind on the non-State actor by denying LTTE access to weapons and else. Sanctions are now being mentioned in relation to the Sri Lankan State. Helping to wipe out terrorism is one thing but nudging the Government to revive the much-promised political process is another. Unlike sanctions, this one often comes with an aid package. A distinction needs to be drawn – and by all concerned.

The LTTE is not the Tamil community, but is still a part thereof. Any humiliation of the former, unintended or otherwise, should not leave a permanent scar in the hurt psyche of the latter. There can even be an “exit plan” for the LTTE. For the larger Tamil community, there can only be an “inclusive” scheme.

The Government would lose nothing by holding the mirror to the LTTE’s face and asking it to blunt its canines. That is the kind of chance that the Government should give the LTTE before deciding to pluck out the canines. If nothing else, it could then hope to have the Tamil people on its side – and that is what the ‘ethnic war’ was all about after a point. That is what would matter, as well.

The writer is Director, Chennai Chapter of the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), the Indian think-tank, headquartered in New Delhi.The article an originally carried by the Colombo based daily news paper, the Daily Mirror

-Sri Lanka Guardian