Contextualising the 2010 Presidential Election

By Laksiri Jayasuriya

Introduction

(January 27, Melbourne, Sri Lanka Guardian) The Sri Lankan Presidential Election to be held on January 26th heralds a critical phase in the social and political evolution of Sri Lanka as a democratic polity. Sri Lanka’s electoral democratic practices such as free and fair periodic elections and a high degree of political participation (around 75%) for a little over eight decades have been widely acknowledged as a distinctive feature of the of the Sri Lankan democratic polity.

Yet for all that this election takes place just six months after the dramatic events surrounding the end of a debilitating 25-year-old civil war, which had resulted in a highly militarized state conducive to a form of ‘militarism’ in social and political life (Jayasuriya 2010). The scenario that confronts Sri Lanka electors is none other than the demise of the liberal democratic social and political order often regarded as the epitome of a model social democracy in the Third World. Therefore, a fundamental and critical question we need to pose is the fate of democratic practices as well as a vibrant public sphere. Put simply, will Sri Lanka continue to retain its historical engagement with democratic institutions and practices?

The Growth of Electoral Democracy (1931-1977)

The cornerstone of this engagement with democracy was the introduction of universal franchise in 1931 (just 3 years after Britain) which led to 18 Parliamentary Elections since independence (these include both General and Presidential Elections). This has led to a mature and discerning electorate and politicians able to master the basic principles, institutions, and practices of a liberal democracy. This, as I have argued elsewhere (Jayasuriya 2010) was also largely a product of the twin processes of democratisation and modernisation, a legacy of British colonial rule extending from the early to the late colonial state. The late colonial state (1931-1977), which includes the first three decades of the post independence 1948-1977, no doubt constituted an important phase in the political evolution of Sri Lanka as it laid the groundwork for a model social democracy enmeshed within a liberal political culture.

This was also essentially a period of decolonisation dominated by the English educated e?lite, the brown sahibs, who despite their commitment to promoting political nationalism remained ideologically linked to the culture and institutions of the metropolitan centre. In this phase of the engagement with democratic institutions and practices we witness the growth of an electoral democracy alongside a vibrant civil society and in particular the blossoming of ‘party politics’ conceived of as a loose association of personalities divided between a ‘left/right ideological split and sustained by the dynastic politics of two patrician family blocs. This resulted in a bi-polar political system organized around two largely polarising party blocs, a Centre Right (UNP) and Centre Left (SLFP and Left wing Parties).

The Centre Right, United National Party (UNP), was a pragmatic and conservative secular, national political mainly comprised of the old guard, the comprador e?lite. Given its political credo of integrative secularism, it was able to secure government with the support of ethnic minority parties. By contrast the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) was cast in the mould of a progressive party with a strong rural powerbase. It was clearly a party with strong Sinhalese nationalist leanings, which was able to secure government only through electoral pacts with the Marxist Left parties located mainly in the urban working class and petty bourgeoisie.

The adversarial majoritarian electoral politics of the three decades of post independence governments (1947-1977) constitute a transitory phase in the social and political evolution of Sri Lanka which facilitated the transition from colonialism to ‘ post colonialism’, understood as the abandonment of cultural attitudes, belief systems and social practices associated with European hegemonic rule over many centuries. Politically this period (1947-1977) constitutes a precursor to the post colonial state which emerged from 1978 onwards. The groundwork for this transition to a post colonial state was laid by the ‘autochthonous Republican Constitution’ of 1972 which led to a fracturing of Westminster style political institutions and practices such as the separation of powers resulting in the abandonment of a bi-cameral legislature. More importantly, the 1972 Constitution represents an early manifestation of’ the growing sense of cultural nationalism among the majority Sinhalese. But this cultural nationalism went hand in hand with the fracturing of ‘national parties’ and the growing regionalization of politics setting the stage for the development of alliance politics that operated within a system of strong executive power.

A distinctive and defining feature of the politics of this period was that it was driven by two assertive cultural nationalisms, of the Sinhalese and the Tamil people, leading to the emergence of a new political e?lite, What this signified was none other than a ‘changing of the guards heralding the end of the dominance of the ‘brown sahibs’ and the rise of a new bilingual political e?lite. It was, in short, the bitter identity politics of the emerging post colonial state that generated two militant armed rebellions (the Sinhala youth revolt and the Tamil insurgency) that was to radically transform the political culture, social institutions and culture of Sri Lankan society

The Rise of the Executive Presidential System and Exceptional Regimes

The post colonial state took firm root in Sri Lanka only with the election in 1977 of the conservative Centre Right UNP government promoting a neo liberal economic and political ideology. This new era of political governance was underpinned by a new Constitution of 1978 which departed radically from the political ethos of the colonial past. The new Constitution in adopting a highly centralized form of government was built around an Executive Presidential style of government. This was modelled in the form of the Gaullist State., reminiscent of the Fifth French Republic, where the locus of power shifted from an elected Parliament to an omnipotent Executive endowed with wide ranging executive powers. The raison d’etre for this form of authoritarian constitutionalism’ was conceived by the conservative Right as the political instrument needed to facilitate rapid social, political and economic changes linked to a neo liberal ideology.

Importantly, this was in part to be achieved by facilitating far reaching changes to the electoral system by the adoption of the method of Proportional Representation (PR).This was a significant departure from the ‘plurality system’ of first past the post voting at Parliamentary Elections which had existed for well over three decades The rationale for this change to the method of voting was to avoid pendulum swings which were characteristic of ‘turnover pattern’ of politics associated with the majoritarian politics of a bi-polar political system. These far reaching constitutional changes had a significant impact during the 1980s and 1990s on the conventional political party system based on two party blocs by creating a radical change in the socio demographic structure of the two politics blocs. Much of this was a direct consequence of the policy of ‘regionalization’ in the 1980s under the stewardship of Ranasingha Premadasa as Prime Minister and later President.

This regionalisation of politics led to the further entrenchment of local power lords – they were always important – in national politics. No longer were these regional political bosses subordinate to dynastic national politics they now became players on the national stage in their own right.

With this regionalization of politics the UNP was able to make inroads into the traditional rural power base of the SLFP and as one perceptive analyst put it the UNP was beginning to acquire the image of the SLFP as a Sinhalese nationalist party. At the same time during this period though the SLFP lost its dominance among the rural electorate was compensated by gaining considerable support among the new urban middle class made up of the bureaucracy, technocrats and the corporate sector. Furthermore the SLFP was able to gain a fair degree of minority support mostly drawn from plantation workers of Indian origin and the Muslim parties. By so doing the SLFP in its electoral politics was beginning to look more like a national and secular political party. But this regionalisation of politics led to the fracturing of the foundations of the party blocs signifies the early manifestation of the current a system of ‘alliance politics’ grafted on to the existing system of two party blocs, However this new pattern of electoral politics began to take firm hold after the 1994 General Election.

Electorally, following the 1994 General Election, the SLFP was able to claw back a great deal of the Southern rural power base which it had lost to the UNP as a result of the regionalization of politics. With the return to power of the SLFP Alliance under the leadership of Chandirka Banadaranaike, we also begin to see the first cracks in the system of ‘authoritarian constitutionalism’ which had existed under the Executive Presidential system of government for a little less than two decades (1977-1994). Besides other considerations a noticeable political outcome of the 1994 Election was an anomaly arising from the Proportional Representation (PR) system of voting adopted by the 1978 Constitution. In 1994, the SLFP Alliance, despite enjoying a sizeable majority of votes (50.74% as against 44% for the UNP) was a minority coalition government as it did not have a majority of seats in Parliament. This again only served to highlight the tensions between the executive centralism of the authoritarian constitutionalism and the regionalisation of politics that it set in train.

However the politics of this period was severely constrained by attempts made with international mediation involving the Norwegians to end the civil war (Jayasuriya 2005). But over and above these considerations there was a concerted attempt to obtain Parliamentary endorsement for a package of constitutional reforms which included abolishing the office of an Executive President and determining a more equitable electoral system. The failure on all these fronts and in particular the worsening of the civil war, following the catastrophic double edged policy of ‘peace with the bullet’, set the scene for the return of the UNP in 2001. This was once again in alliance (the United National Front UNF) with some of the minority parties and also crossovers from the SLFP (Jayasuriya 2005).

The new electoral politics of the post 1994 era has brought to the fore several new political players who were destined to play a pivotal role in Sri Lankan politics. Foremost among these was the growing strength of Sinhalese nationalist parties such as the JVP, SU and JHU, formed largely in opposition to the Tamil parties and any policy of appeasement of Tamil demands by the major political parties. The most significant of these nationalist parties was the JVP, originating from the militant youth revolt of the 1970s and 1980s. Besides the JVP, there were other minor Sinhalese nationalist parties including a party of Buddhist monks (JHU), who unlike the JVP, appeared to gain much of their support from the educated urban middle class.

The JVP was later consolidated in the 1980s as a political formation, as a result of the ‘regionalization’ of politics. Ideologically the JVP with its strong nationalist and left wing orientation represented an awkward mix of left wing politics, derived from the old Marxist Left of the 1950s and 1960s and the growing momentum towards a cultural nationalism among the new bilingual e?lite. There is no doubt that the JVP was coming to be seen as a ‘third force’ in Sri Lankan electoral politics with the potential to deliver government to any one of the two main political parties of their choice (Jayasuriya 2005).

The growth of Sinhalese nationalist parties was paralleled by coalition of Tamil nationalist parties in particular the grouping which came to be known as the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), and reputed to have strong links with the LTTE Tamil militants. Lest it be forgotten, the Rajapaksa victory in 2005 was by the good grace of the late Prabhakaran, leader of the LTTE, who decreed that the supporters of Tamil parities abstain from voting. This left the field clear for the SLFP. It should also be borne in mind that a splinter group from the party of the Indian Plantation Workers (the CWC), the DFC, has steered clear from its previous support of the SLFP.

Given these political developments hereafter the electoral political success of the two main political parties, the UNP and the SLFP, was heavily dependent on ‘alliance politics’ not the personality politics of charismatic leaders, or contested policies, arising from differences in political ideology. This was in many ways a direct outcome of the 1978 constitutional reforms in particular the PR system of electoral voting. A direct but unfortunate consequence of alliance politics was that it gave rise to a politics’ based on political patronage such as appointments to public office including appointments as Ministers or Parliamentary Secretaries and other salaried positions Overall , the outcome of electoral politics in 2000 (Presidential Election) and 2001 (General Elections) was a reaffirmation of the earlier ‘turnover pattern’ of electoral politics associated with the bi-polar system operative post independence era. (Jayasuriya 2005)

What this ‘turnover pattern’ of electoral politics shows is the overall consistency of the two main party blocs within the new genre of alliance politics that arose post 1994. In this style of electoral politics, the regionalisation of national politics confounds and exacerbates the volatility of the electorate. Unless there are more compelling reasons for making decisive party realignments and changes in party identification, voters switch party political allegiances in the short term for a variety reasons such as dominant concerns at the time of election. These concerns or issues may be the erosion of confidence in the incumbent government to cater to immediate pressing voter concerns such as unemployment, corruption, economic downturn, or distaste of some particular policy outcome, e.g., increased cost of living

Shifting ‘Alliance Politics’: A Key Issue for the 2010 Election

Pivotal to understanding this new phase of Alliance Politics which extends over two armed rebellions (the Sinhala Youth revolt of 1980’s and the Tamil Insurgency post1983) was the constant resort by all parties to emergency and exceptional powers to circumvent normal constitutional processes (Manoharan 2006). In fact many of these emergency measures became normalised over time and exist in parallel to formal legal and institutional processes. The two armed rebellions served to consolidate the authoritarian constitutionalism that emerged post-1977, and associated with the neo liberal political economy. Both rebellions, it was argued, created a national catastrophe requiring quick action by whatever means, such as infringements of the rule of law and suspensions civil liberties. In short, this warranted a ‘regime of exception’ in the defence of a just war and national security which tended to ‘make the unthinkable not only thinkable but doable and to result in tyranny’ (Loveman 1993: 404). These measures have created new centres of power within the military and other agencies whose influence has expanded even more during the Rajapaksa Presidency post 2005.(Jayasuriya 2010)

In the light of the foregoing the critical question we need to pose is whether the 2010 Presidential Election – which is, after all, only an agenda setting exercise prior to another Parliamentary General Election in 2010 – will initiate another ‘turnover’ with the return of the UNP alliance (which includes sections of the JVP and the TNA). This is an alliance strengthened by the nomination of a non political figure, Sarath Fonseka who was a former army General of repute. Fonseka and the UNP alliance are pitted against the incumbent President Rajapaksa from the SLFP seeking re election after his much acclaimed military victory in defeating the LTTE after a protracted civil war of 25 years. But, will the Presidential Election of .2010 replicate the Churchillian factor where Winston Churchill won the war but lost the Election? Only time will tell.

However, a notable feature of the 2010 Presidential election is that old SLFP alliance, which previously included the JVP confronts an unexpected alliance of parties including a substantial section of the JVP supporting the UNP led by Sarath Fonseka Equally significant is the decision of some of the Tamil parties, foremost being that of the TNA to support the Presidential candidate of the UNP alliance. Interestingly this support of the Tamil minority parties including DFC, the breakaway from the CWC (the Plantation Workers Party), to go along with the UNP alliance reverts to the past where as a rule these parties have supported the UNP as a secular party. But on this occasion these Tamil parties have chosen to cohabit with a Sinhalese nationalist party the JVP. Undoubtedly a key factor in this election is the decision of the JVP – though splintered – to take the unusual step of supporting the UNP which it has opposed in the past for ideological reasons. This may, among other considerations, suggest that economic and social issues do not appear to have gained any importance as key election issues. As there seems to be an unwritten consensus between the two main parties on social and economic questions, reading between the lines the guiding factor for this unusual, nay unholy, alliance of the UNP and the JVP may have been the arrogance, hubris that the present regime has shown by its blatant abuse of power and readiness to engage in patronage politics.

Furthermore, an oft-repeated criticism of the Rajapaksa government is that it has shown a blatant disregard for abiding by well established conventions and basic practices of democratic governance and its contempt for the institutions of fair and just government. In this context not surprisingly the common candidate (Sarath Fonseka) of the UNP-led alliance has pledged to reactivate the 17th Amendment to the Constitution which provided for an independent Constitutional Council and other similar structures of government. At face value, this appears to make a moral commitment to reclaim the lost liberal political culture by giving priority to the need for restoring democracy and engaging in constitutional reform, especially an end to the Executive Presidential system The abandonment of authoritarian constitutionalism originating from the 1978 Constitution is also seen as a precondition for negotiating the peace process and reconciliation following the end of hostilities and achieving some degree of communal peace and harmony. In the end, lurking in the background these are some of the intriguing questions confronting not merely the two contestants, but also the country as a whole.

( The writer professor emeritus, University of Western Australia )

References

Jayasuriya L (2005) The Changing Face of Electoral Politics in Sri Lanka 1994-2004.Singapore. Marshall Cavendish

Jayasuriya L (2010) Taking Social Development Seriously: the Experience of Sri Lanka New Delhi: Sage (forthcoming)

Loveman, B. (1993) Constitutional Governments and Regimes of Exception. Pittsburg: Pittsburg University Press.

Manoharan, N. (2006) Counterterrorism Legislation in Sri Lanka: Evaluating Efficiency. Policy Studies 28.Washington. East West Centre.