Police or military state: That is the question for India

By Ravi Sundaralingam

(January 29, London, Sri Lanka Guardian) Feudal-democracy is a term we have used to describe a system of government together with the process of selecting the government of a failed/failing state. Failed-state is a fairly modern term and, for us it is singled out by the absence or denigration of a dynamic civil society. By civil society we mean the functions and relationships that mediate between the basic social units at all levels and the layers of government, as well as different social or ethnic divisions (even if the socio-political system is not based on Western democratic model).

In the feudal-democracies the labels ‘President’ or ‘Prime Minister’ are borrowed terminologies as decorations for the over-lords, worn for outsiders’ recognition, not so dissimilar to the shiny medals worn by Idi Amin Dada all over his body. They need not be members of the leading-families or propertied class, but they usually are. However, they have to be the chiefs of the armed forces and gangs on the ground that decide on every matter at grass-root level. Their selection process, referred to as election to gear international credit, is not an affirmation to the principles of democracy. On the contrary, they are tests of strength for violence and power of wealth between the appointed chieftains of these forces. The victor is usually the man already occupying the seat of power, therefore has his and his clan’s hands in the state coffers to be the biggest spender, in GDP percentage terms more than the US Presidential candidates. He also has an enhanced capacity to do more violence than his opponent with the state police and other state apparatus by his side. When all else fail, the incumbent has the option of hijacking the ballet boxes or even the votes by stuffing them with many sheets of papers as he likes.

Those watching the Sri Lankan presidential election will easily identify all we have stated. They would have also noticed, the full force of the state being used by the present ruler, while the opposition has to do with the local government offices they are in control in support of their candidate, and the level of violence and intimidation increasing to a crescendo as the Election Day approaches. No matter what the world says the understanding is that ‘winning is all that matters and the world will come around to the victor no matter what’.

Able citizens as well as interested outsiders have always toyed with the fictitious question of a ‘regime change’ in such a failed/failing state, as though were changing the colour of the mask would make the hideousness disappear. As the local intellectuals argue about the meaning of the ‘regime change’ the outsiders scheme to bring ‘stability’, which usually meant a military government. We wonder, shouldn’t they be instead concerned with the empowerment of the citizens? Shouldn’t their question be about “transform the state and the means”? These may be far fetched and removed from the ‘practically mined’ policy formers.

When a total transformation of the state is required, what is discussed is a change of government, as if a scrappy verse would sound better when sung by someone else. Some ponder on a “Popular uprising without outside instigation”, an ideal choice for the dreamers. Could this be possible in a failed/failing state, which is fundamentally a police state?

The processes that take a ‘state’ to this degenerated stage are complicated, usually due to countless civil strife allied to socio-economic regression. Whatever may be, they don’t vouch for a popular uprising, even with outside help. The Kurds and marshland Arabs, who paid heavily for this misadventure against the Saddam regime, were the recent testimonies.

Even if the occasional ‘velvet’, ‘pink’ or any other shade of ‘revolution’ succeeded the history tells us, consolidating the recovered peoples’ power is yet another battle, usually usurped by the new ‘liberators’. Where the civil society is virtually non-existent, and the sole objective of those in power is to hold on to it at all cost, without an assured support of a nurturing outside power, it is only a word written on sand. Then again, such assistance can only be possible if there were the ‘right’ geo-political conditions.

In Ukraine, a homogenous population, the 2004‘orange’ revolution ushered in the Victor Yushcenko’s government and the ambitions of the West closer to home. Ukraine would be considered a 3rd world country if it weren’t in Europe and semi-industrialised to produce second-rate weapons for the 3rd world. Its economy, in terms of capacity is no better than Thailand’s, looked rosy with a lot of promises from their new friends, but suffered drastically during the recent crisis in capitalism. The civil society budding after the Soviet era has too shallower roots to withstand the new pressures as the peoples’ momentum was misdirected against Russia. The consequences are obvious, as the bankrupt Ukrainians were humiliated and accused of siphoning gas off the Russian pipes just so they can switch their lights on, and now are desperately seeking to mend fences with their Slavic big-brother.

Peacock- throned Shah was deposed by a popular uprising, only to pave the way for the Mullahs to take control of an ancient people. Some even considered a step forward, seeing them as a bulwark against the Eastward spread of Western power. What happened however, not necessarily as a direct result, is the complete opposite to every Asia-centric or ‘anti-imperialist’ view. Now, the US and its allies have permanent bases all over these parts, kidnap and lock up the locals and others in secret prisons in the region, and the NATO forces are on the borders of China, Russia, and India. As for the people, who sacrificed so much for the ‘green’ revolution, the price was a decade of war with Sadam’s Iraq and martyrdom, and that was it, and now in need of more bloodletting just so they can ‘change the regime’.

May be because of its experiences, the US for covert operations and direct interventions for all seasons to topple or destabilise any government it thought to be against its interests, had changed its philosophy and approach in its neighbourhood. We are not suggesting that it is now a convert to socialism, cared about the poor everywhere, and thinking about winding up the war in Afghanistan by sharing the intended war expenditure among the locals.

President Clinton, who ordered the 1998 cruise missile attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan in retaliation for the Jihadi bombing of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, is no mug when it comes to projecting US power. Rhodes scholar, he was very wise to the changes around him, thus employed a more measured and constructive approach based on democracy and governance towards the Latin neighbours. Though the Bush fronted neo-con administration distorted his policy towards its most aggressive, the basic principles held firm and the benefits were obvious, and now under President Obama are the thrust of US policy in the region, may be with a few teeth to add bite.

This change of heart was partly due to the discovery that a ‘stable neighbourhood ensures greater security’, especially after identifying an enemy in the Jihadis to serve US interests better than the lacklustre ragbag Latino-revolutionaries. The US has also understood the trend in Latin America for greater independence and better economic relations within and with the US are real, and due to positive social progress.

Furthermore it understood the indigenous peoples’ attempt to assert themselves, after centuries of ‘white’ domination and oppression, and six decades of their revolutionary-ideologies, aren’t always against its interests despite the rattling noises coming from Venezuela.

The self-organised assassination to implicate the Left-government in Guatemala or military coup that deposed Ayala in Honduras or unstable political conditions against the Raul Castro’s Cuba would have been too much of a temptation for the old US, perhaps even for the neo-cons.

In South America at least, ‘setting the overall guiding principles for region in its entirety and being a partner for stability though better trading relations, entrusting the sovereignty with the maturing societies and communities, and allowing for their own initiatives and incentives largely though regionally based bilateral policies’ has been a cerebral policy decision, which has brought greater dividend to the US than the billions spent and the millions of lives lost with its policy of constant interventions.

Perhaps it is a lesson partly learned, and perhaps applied in parts by India towards its neighbours, so are its partial successes. There is no doubt India has the best relationship with Bangladesh since its inception, and also with Nepal, but with others it is a question of hit or miss.

The famines in the early seventies, the attempt to impose one-party socialist rule by its founder Mujib Rahman and the massacre of almost his entire family by the army followed by a sequence of coups that eventually brought General Ziaur Rahman to power and his attempt at multi party polity, Islamic radicalisation of a section of the society, then to another coup and Gen. Ershad, even through an anti-corruption drive, and now finally some economic progress and pointer towards social stability and the landslide election victory for Mujib’s daughter Sheikh Hasina, which means a torturous journey for the Bengalis for their craving for independence.

Meanwhile the 16 or so millions crossed the border, among them many Jihadis hell bent on causing outrage and mayhem with their bases and training camps over the border have brought nothing, but insecurity and instability to India itself.

Throughout this period the decision in Bangladesh has been about the choice between a feudal-democracy, i.e. a police state, and free licence for the rulers to plunder the wealth of its people, or a military rule under which it can be an organised affair, while there is an appearance of rule of law and some ‘stability’.

To the credit of India and few other powers, it seem the question has now changed towards the restoration of the sovereignty of the people in a failing/failed state, which they perhaps calculated will also achieve their strategic objectives.

India has been attempting to engage constructively with Bangladesh, even when Gen. Ziaur’s wife Khaleda was in power with settlements reached on water and border issues and offers of economic cooperation. It also helped, that the US and its allies deciding on the same approach perhaps, due to changes in geopolitical perspectives in the Bay of Bengal. The same argument is also not lost in Nepal, where India has consistently supported the Monarchy and the immigrant communities, which only helped to destabilise the state it wanted to protect. Strange may it seem, the twist of events have brought India and the West closer to the Maoist, than their ideological bedfellows, the Chinese.

Tough India has made progress with Bangladesh and Nepal, it is far away from instilling trust among all its neighbours, most are either failed or failing states.

We think it is the lack of an overarching policy for its entire region, just as the one the US put in place for South America during Clinton’s time, and the fundamental principles to underpin it to a long-term strategy are the main reasons for these discrepancies.

The Chinese invasion and the persistent failure against the Pakistanis couldn’t have helped the mandarins in Delhi, who can be accused of losing the initiatives and opportunities, and confidence in their own history. Whatever the reason, they have been fire fighting for most of the time and hardly credited for any long-term strategy for the region.

Impressions of the modern world, dominated by the West may have persuaded them to look for their guiding principles elsewhere, as though were having lost their keys at home they had set out to search for them under a lamppost in a street, because there was more light. It is this nature of their policymaking that brings confusion between India’s global policy and regional policy and the indecision about which of them came first. There is no better illustration for this than the disappointments in their expectations of the US because of the closeness of their policies, and the US behaviour when it comes to Pakistan. It is during the periods of strong leadership under Indira Ghandi and Atal Bihari Vajpayee exceptions are found, and policy decisions that added dynamic and cutting edges to modern India.

For India, an aspiring global power the primary assets are its people, including its Expatriate communities, and those in its region, and it is based on them the secondary assets are built up externally.

The value of the Expatriate communities is huge, provided the value of the local communities isn’t compromised and also has relatively high value. Others do not treat India or its people with respect because of the Expatriates. However, the Expatriates’ input to increase the value of the local assets is well recognised, hence the value of the Expatriate communities.

Indian elite may be also slowly beginning to understand value of its own people, at least as a labour and intellectual pool, considering they will have the advantage over their Asian competitor in terms of younger age groups within a few decades.

For our purpose here, this leaves the question how it should view its neighbours.

Indian policy makers and the elite are naturally proud and see the benefit of their state being a democracy. Outsiders reinforce their pride by often referring India as the largest democracy and compare its economy favourably than China because of it. Yet, they are also aware and accept that the basic parliamentary democracy can only address the issues of the stakeholders in the state and the vast majority of the minority communities are socially disenfranchised, therefore have severe grievances. Home Minister Cithambaram’s reluctance to accept Naxals as terrorists, and distinction of the Islamic militants within India as terrorists in a recent television interview/ discussion with a public panel was an example for this. India therefore, proposes negotiations and social contacts, and partnership through development with its agitated communities, and how much of this will ever become a reality is another matter.

For us only the following conclusions we deduce from the recent political history of India are important here.

Firstly, encroachment by the big businesses on the state is not complete as in the advanced nations, and India is not yet a corporate state.

Secondly, India accepts the concept of stake holding as the basis of a democracy than mere political representation through parliamentary system, a commitment to full democracy.

Thirdly, even if the policy makers didn’t believe in our philosophical mambo jumbo, they will at least be in agreement with us about the link between social development and security than brute enforcement of law and order.

But, can India achieve its security on its own to protect its internal assets, let alone its external assets without regional settlements? What is the value of its external assets when it has to depend on other powers to safeguard them?

If India went along with the destruction of the LTTE, its security concern would have been a reason at the top of its list. It would also be the main reason for the friendship it has been trying to cultivate with Bangladesh. But, are these parts of a regional settlement or ad hoc policies in the same vein, what we call fire fighting?

We believe India’s relationship with its neighbours must be based on a long-term strategy founded on firm principles, most of which are enjoyed by the ordinary Indians, whom not contended would want to extend their scope even further.

Firstly, it must have a comprehensive socio-economic package for the region based on (i) pluralism, and (ii) empowerment of the communities at grass-root level as it basic aims.

Secondly, India should not make a choice between a police state and military state because of narrowly defined security or economic interests therefore, must put together a long-term diplomatic program, incorporating other powers with vested interest in security and stability of the region, to restore the sovereignty of the peoples of the region.

Thirdly, it should initiate and be part of institutions that are necessary for such programs and put them into action where possible without delay.

Any action encompassing all these three elements can be considered the basis of a regional settlement, which can be improved by considered opinions from informed people and officials.

We realise principles are easy to identify, and perhaps any programs are easy to plan, but how do you ensure they are making the effect on the ground as intended? Well, there shouldn’t be any confusion about what we are suggesting here. In the globalised world, where the economy is an enmeshed affair, and the tin pot dictators and despots rely on their sponsors for survival, it is not our job to propose how to set up a system to do that.

India is not US to erect huge fences along its borders to keep its neighbours out, which is an impossible and more importantly, an unethical task. India’s neighbours are not aliens but their cousins and brothers with historical links that cannot be separated by geopolitics and a few politicians.

As an aspiring power India doesn’t have permanent outposts like Australia or New Zealand or Falkland Islands or South African European communities like the West can count on. These observations add to our argument for a comprehensive settlement that includes all the peoples in the region.

It is the realisation, it is from within and its region Indian power emanates’, which will allay the confusion between its regional and global policies, while securing and extending its assets in foreign fields. India will find itself fall short of the mark if it were to treat its neighbour differently than its own.

(The writer is a London based expatriate Sri Lankan Tamil and the The Academic Secretary of ASATiC. He can be reached at E-Mail:- academic.secretary@gmail.com)