A post-war challenge for Sri Lanka - Part Two

Dismantling the LTTE overseas and rebuilding a Sri Lankan identity

Lecture delivered August 02, 2010, at the Auditorium of the Sri Lanka Foundation Institute on the invitation of the Nandadasa Kodagoda Memorial Trust.

by Rohan Gunaratne
Professor of Security Studies
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

(August 05, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) Unfortunately in the run up to the final Wanni operation, most career foreign service officers appeared in the shadows without forcefully representing Sri Lanka’s interests and rebutting the LTTE and others influenced by its black and grey propaganda. There was no structure in place in the Ministry of External Affairs of appointing, promoting and rewarding based on merit, ability and performance in this domain. As such most career foreign service officers and political appointees did not adequately understand the importance of and hence did not embrace the responsibility of working closely with key international partners.

To ensure that the LTTE presence is dismantled in the countries to which they are appointed, they must proactively identify and build adequate working relationships with the influential leaders in the political establishment, security and intelligence services, law enforcement authorities, human rights groups, think tanks, media and the Tamil community. To this date, when LTTE generates false report there is no established practice to monitor, counter and rebut the adverse publicity within six hours. As government neglected this crucial dimension, the LTTE network was able to convince some host governments and host communities of "ethnocide,""genocide," and "war crimes," activities that were not perpetrated by the government and labels that Sri Lanka never deserved. Furthermore, the LTTE interfaced, interlocked, and galvanized a segment of the Tamil population overseas and used them as pawns to wage their vicious and malicious propaganda campaign.

The configuration of the LTTE network overseas evolved dramatically even before its defeat at home. The successor to K.P., Manivannan Veerakulasingham alias Castro, headed LTTE’s international network since 2003. Raising funds under the pretext of relief and rehabilitation, the LTTE invested the bulk of its finances in arms procurement from North Korea and propaganda in the West. Although the bulk of the LTTE ships have been destroyed, its propaganda network is still intact. Dismantling the LTTE infrastructure and countering the false propaganda can be accomplished by two principal methods.

First, government should create platforms and institutions in northern and eastern Sri Lanka to engage LTTE leaders and their activists overseas. Ideally working with the parliamentary opposition, government should build a mechanism, to invite these misguided LTTE leaders to witness for themselves the unprecedented economic development in the north and east, the humane treatment of the displaced and the rehabilitees, and create opportunities for their participation. Ironically, most Tamils including those who contributed to the LTTE and protested in Western capitals are tired and they want to visit their loved ones or return home to invest. In the larger interest of peace and national reconciliation, the President should grant an amnesty to those who engaged in not so serious criminal activity in support of the LTTE. Government should build a mechanism through its missions abroad to ensure that their travel is facilitated and they are engaged in a manner to facilitate others to re-enter the Sri Lankan mainstream. Sri Lankan political opposition should declare its support to the government for such a mechanism including to engage with Rudrakumaran, Father Emmanuel and Nediyawan. If they or other high ranking figures of the LTTE’s international network remains stubbornly uncooperative notwithstanding sincere attempts by the government, should be totally left out of the political discourse and thereafter exposed to the law enforcement authorities of their countries of domicile to be dealt with for their criminal activities.

Second, government should expand the mandate of its national and military intelligence services to operate overseas both to develop its coverage of terrorist support and operational activities. While the dominant strategy should be to engage, it is native for Sri Lankans to think that LTTE network aboard will not plan and prepare acts of terrorism overseas for striking in Sri Lanka. Although most Tamils including those radicalized see the sense of pursuing non violence to achieve their goals, there are a few fanatics with the mindset within the three factions determined to resort to violence. Already, LTTE cells in India and Malaysia that supported acts of terrorism in Sri Lanka have been detected. As an LTTE hardcore is active overseas, they need to be closely monitored and appropriate actions taken. There should be dedicated desks to every country and not every region where there is LTTE personnel, infrastructure and activities. Such desks should work closely with the diplomatic, political, intelligence, law enforcement - police, border control, and others - judicial and other branches of government. After 9-11, if there is a will, there are sufficient political commitment and mechanisms available globally to bring to justice anyone who is seeking to spawn, support and sustain terrorism.

Sri Lanka was fortunate that by 2005, virtually all countries in the developed West and Europe had proscribed the LTTE. We will be failing in our duty, if we fail to recall with gratitude the untiring efforts of the late Minister Kadirgarmar with regard to successfully satisfying foreign leaders that the LTTE was no mere ‘liberation or freedom organization’, by a ‘criminal terrorist outfit’. It is the international proscription on the LTTE, which made it difficult for any foreign government to directly criticize the Government of Sri Lanka for its resolve to militarily demolish the LTTE. If we are serious in our current determination to continue to take all meaningful measures to eliminate the LTTE’s remaining tentacles located overseas, it is of paramount importance that Sri Lanka ensures that countries which have proscribed the LTTE continues to have on board the proscription, and countries such as Australia, New Zealand and South Africa proscribes the LTTE. It is vital that diplomatic measures aimed at achieving this objective, should be implemented following a comprehensive understanding of the divergent mechanisms in place in such countries. In certain countries the authority to designate an organization as an ‘International Terrorist Organization’ or as a ‘Terrorist Organization’ (and thereby proscribe it), rests with the Executive i.e. the Head of State, Minister of Defence or some other official of the executive. In certain other countries, the designation of an organization and thereby proscribe it should be done through legislative action i.e. by passing a law. In certain other countries, there is a need for both the central government and the federal government and their respective Parliaments to collaborate in this regard. Australia is one such example. This means that, proscription or designation, is basically a political decision taken in the backdrop of factual circumstances such as the conduct of the organization. Under these circumstances, if we are to ensure that the LTTE remains proscribed and countries such as Australia which has not yet proscribed the LTTE proscribes it, Sri Lanka has to necessarily have a positive diplomatic and political relationship with such countries. Furthermore, apart from continuing to brief those governments regarding continuing activism (aimed at re-activating terrorist operations) by LTTE organizational manifestations in those countries, Sri Lanka needs to have a better ground situation. This means that the government should in good faith necessarily address the genuine political needs of the Tamil minority. Foreign leaders should necessarily perceive that the Government of Sri Lanka is acting reasonably and will effectively protect the interests of Tamil people, in the aftermath of a full elimination of the LTTE.

Now that an armed conflict does not exist, the only legally tenable way in which LTTE activists could be neutralized and thereby prevented from continuing to engage in LTTE activities, is by successfully prosecuting them for their terrorist and other criminal activities. Sri Lankan authorities have been somewhat successful in that regard, by launching successful prosecutions against LTTE hardcore activists in Sri Lankan courts and thereby getting them imprisoned to serve terms of imprisonment, and by promoting investigations and prosecutions against LTTE activists who operated on foreign soil. Both due to keen interest shown by local authorities and due to initiatives of foreign intelligence and law enforcement agencies, successful prosecutions have been launched against LTTE activists in Canada, United States of America, United Kingdom, France, Italy, India, and Australia. If LTTE activists are to be kept at bay and dissuaded from engaging in LTTE activities on foreign soil, these investigations and prosecutions have to necessarily continue. However, now that LTTE activists operating in developed countries appears to have satisfied foreign powers that they are no longer engaging in terrorist or otherwise illegal activities on foreign soil and that their activities are limited to lobbying and political activism, the challenge for Sri Lanka would become considerably difficult. Though we as Sri Lankans will steadfastly argue that a Tiger never changes his stripes and hence LTTE activists would use political activism only to camouflage their determined efforts aimed at reviving the LTTE as a violent force, it is likely that foreign powers would prefer to adopt a ‘wait and see’ attitude and not continue to arrest LTTE activists, particularly since LTTE activists no longer pose a threat to the normal law and order in countries in which they presently operate. Therefore, Sri Lankan authorities would necessarily have to turn towards the Sri Lankan criminal justice system, to have LTTE operatives investigated, arrested, prosecuted and imprisoned. One major barrier in this regard, appears to be that Sri Lankan courts do not have extra-territorial jurisdiction, to try persons such as LTTE operatives who have committed offences overseas, and not engaged in any illegal activities on Sri Lankan soil. It would be important for Sri Lankan authorities to pay due regard to this weakness of the Sri Lankan criminal justice system and adopt legislative reform so as to vest extra-territorial jurisdiction in Sri Lankan criminal courts and to amend the substantive criminal law of Sri Lanka to recognize as punishable offences LTTE activism overseas.

Radicalized Segments of the Diaspora:

A million Sri Lankan Tamils live overseas but only those exposed to LTTE propaganda voluntarily supported LTTE’s violent agenda. Although not all of them suffered from the war and was traumatized, the developments at home affected the entire diaspora to different degrees. Except for the pre-1983 migrants, it is very likely that a considerable percentage of the diaspora had lost a loved one or suffered humiliation – the subject of a cordon and search operation, a mistaken arrest, a rude remark by a member of another community. In war, everyone suffers - even those who flee the war zone. Not every family can leave the affected areas – nonetheless, many left behind their loved ones. What happens at home is reflected overseas. Additionally, the LTTE exploited the incidents of violence and magnified it for propaganda value.

The aim of the LTTE was to generate support, to different degrees. The LTTE indoctrinated segments of overseas Tamils both for lobbying and campaigning against the Sri Lanka government but also to raise funds. The LTTE funded its military campaign in Sri Lanka and political campaign overseas with funds raised and military goods procured from abroad. The bulk of LTTE’s budget was diaspora contributions both voluntary and forced. Although most did not contribute voluntarily, due to LTTE’s implicit coercion an appreciable segment of the diaspora contributed to the LTTE financially. The radicalized segment of the diaspora needed a return for their investment – that was Tamil Eelam, the imaginary state Prabhakaran created in their minds. The most indoctrinated believed that the LTTE was indestructible and Prabhakaran was invincible. They prayed for him, his portrait adorned the walls of their homes, and paraded his image even in countries the LTTE was blacklisted. Even a narrow segment of the diaspora saw Prabhakaran as God and Tamil’s savoir. Upon his death, they mourned. Their grief turned into suffering, anger, and resentment. To recoup that deep sense of loss, the LTTE created on paper a transnational government. Those who needed to fight back have joined this hollow idea which even the LTTE theoreticians know is not a recognized concept in public international law and pragmatic international affairs. It is only a political platform for overseas LTTE activists to retain their respective identities and to continue to harness the resources of the Tamil diaspora by blinding them in the belief that following the utter failure in waging a war, a transnational government in exile is a pathway to a state of Tamil Eelam. Only 10% of the diaspora voted for the Transnational government ideal. Those who were vulnerable to high degrees of indoctrination emerged as the most committed. Amidst this community of the indoctrinated, the tiny hardcore that specifically funded the fight – meaning, insisted that their contribution is to mount attacks, present a threat today. Until a terrorist attack is carried out in Sri Lanka, they feel deeply unhappy. The hardcore need the LTTE to be reconstituted and witness Sri Lanka’s return to violence. Nonetheless, this hardcore group is unrepresentative of the spirit of the larger diaspora that want to do something good for their brethren and positive for their land of birth and heritage. They too had suffered from the LTTE and the war, like most other Sri Lankans.

The best strategy to de-Eelamize the Tamils influenced and indoctrinated requires an effective strategy to dismantle the ideology that spawned and sustained the violence that plagued Sri Lanka during 30 years of conflict. Until then, the Tamils exposed to LTTE propaganda will be conceptually uncomfortable even with the idea of a united Sri Lanka. Thus to rebuild a Sri Lankan identity it is essential to engage the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora communities. As the diaspora is not monolithic, the Sri Lankan governments’ response to the diaspora challenge should be multipronged.

First, the best antidote for an active diaspora is to facilitate and encourage service to community and country. Whether galvanized by war or energized by LTTE propaganda, the government should eventually create a separate Diaspora Department headed by a top civil servant to encourage and facilitate the return and assist in the resettlement of Tamils and to help them to contribute towards economic and social development of their own brethren. The bulk of the diaspora waited for this moment either to focus their energy and resources towards Sri Lanka or to return to their motherland. The government should make use of this opportunity to facilitate the innate desire of every diasporan to invest in the people or the infrastructure in the north and east. To engage the larger Tamil diaspora communities in 15 countries, the Board of Investment of Sri Lanka should create points of contact for the diaspora at Sri Lankan missions or tourism offices overseas to channel that investment to AGA divisions in the north and east. Following the Afghan model, the diaspora as well as the host country should build a development partnership with a conflict affected AGA division. In addition to challenging the LTTE fund raising, such a positive engagement will help channel resources in a constructive manner. Working with NGOs and with the private sector, government can maximize the opportunities. To prompt diversion of resource in such a direction, the Sri Lankan government should create such mechanisms and the President himself should continue to request Sri Lankans and those of Sri Lankan heritage living overseas to return and unite. It is important to remember that one of the greatest resources Sri Lanka has is its human resources, a significant portion of it presently lives outside the country.

Second, the government should also engage the radicalized segment of the diaspora and not permit them to live in that state of continuous ignorance. Government needs to create platforms for engaging them through diaspora meetings both at home and overseas. The government convened the first such meeting for nine Tamil diaspora leaders in May 2010. The meeting provided both the government an assessment of the extent of LTTE indoctrination and in return the diaspora leaders realized the humane approach government had adopted in resettling the displaced and rehabilitating the LTTE leaders and cadres in custody. Furthermore, these leaders visited the north and east and saw for themselves the unprecedented development as well as the cordial relationship between the government including the military and the civilian population. The Minister of External Affairs G.L. Peiris and the Secretary Defence Gotabhaya Rajapaksa assured them that the war had ended and everyone must work towards a common identity as Sri Lankans. The diaspora leaders underwent a cognitive and emotional shift after they spoke to the doctors and the displaced who were rescued from the last No Fire Zone and the LTTE detainees. Many of them realized rather than be informed that the cycle of violence that destroyed the north and east was reinforced by their contributions. By continuing the engagement of meetings and visits and facilitating security and opportunities of diaspora leaders, the radicalized segment of the diaspora can be guided. The same leaders that influenced the diaspora to imagine that there was genocide, has the best chance of correcting this misperception. If properly guided by a leader with the correct understanding, that sense of wrong, guilt or shame is sufficient to create a spark to devote the rest of their life to serve those who suffered in the north and east.

The engagement with the diaspora leaders also helped the government to better understand the diaspora needs. Government realized the need to create an information centre to provide sound and timely information for the diaspora. The LTTE exploited the absence of such information. To counter LTTE misinformation, the best government strategy is to maintain a public database especially about the IDPS, detainees, and rehabilitees.

Of the two principal approaches that can be used by the government to accomplish this feat, both engagement and enforcement is necessary. Especially in a post war context, engagement of Tamils at home and overseas should be the preferred tool. The battle to win hearts and minds cannot be fought with guns, tanks, ships and aircraft. Engagement leads to genuine transformation but enforcement only to strategic calculation. Genuine departure from abandoning an ideology comes not from repression and fear but understanding and facilitation. That is creating attractive pathways so irresistible where an individual exits and transforms from one ideology to another. A bad idea can only be replaced with a better idea. Such strategies to reducing the costs of leaving can be created by creative leaders in government and government working in partnership with the private sector. Although to fight terrorism enforcement is the best strategy, engagement is the best strategy to dissuade support for terrorism. Such a strategy is beginning to work. Rajan, the former LTTE leader in Malaysia revealed: "During my father’s time we fought politically, my generation fought militarily, at least the generation of my children and grandchildren must campaign peacefully. That is our hope."To disband LTTE’s highly destructive ideology, the government must create platforms for former militant leaders who repent such as K.P. to articulate their points of view publicly. Certainly some of those holding extreme views regarding the conflict on both sides of the divide, neither understand nor endorse such a strategy. To prevent the political opposition from attacking the idea, the government should adopt a bipartisan approach when taking the process forward. Otherwise, as the Sri Lankan culture of confrontational politics dictates, the political opposition may not support it. Ideally, on matters of foreign policy and national security bipartisanship should prevail.

A Paradigm Shift:
To build permanent peace in Sri Lanka, there must be a change in ideality and reality. That is creating the institutions to change the reality on the ground and to counter possible root causes for development of a political motive to move towards separation. This can be only achieved by a sincere appreciation by all regarding the multiple pluralities of our diverse society and by recognizing and enforcing absolute equality. Not only should there not be discrimination, there should not even be the opportunity to give rise to a perception of possible discrimination. To achieve this goal, there has to be indeed a degree of attitudinal change in all Sri Lankans. Respect to the other and tolerance should be the cornerstones of our routine behaviour. Recognition and protection of human rights, democracy, mechanisms to ensure good governance and optimal devolution of executive and legislative functions of government within the framework of a single sovereign Sri Lanka, should necessarily be the basic principles of the new Constitution of Sri Lanka. This, in my view, is the pathway for the establishment of sustained peace, and the realization of a truly Sri Lankan identity wherein no person of this blessed nation would ever want to move towards separation all over again. It is through such change that we can achieve sustainable peace, and move towards national unity and prosperity of our beloved country.

Part One

Concluded