Looking for alibis, not action

The political leadership is seized of a marked somnolence in tackling difficult situations across the country

by Col. R. Hariharan

(November 02, Chenni, Sri Lanka Guardian) I am no great admirer of Henry Kissinger. But his pithy remark, “America needs a strategy, not an alibi”, in a recent article on the US operations in Afghanistan sums up the situation. If you substitute India for America it would aptly describe the desperate straits of New Delhi in handling our own internal situation across the country, whether it is Kashmir or the Maoist and Northeastern extremists. Kashmir is in an undeclared “intifada” with the disgruntled youth indulging in “stone warfare” against the police and paramilitary forces. It does not require the World Cup Nostradamus – octopus Paul – to guess the hidden hand of jihadists in whipping up emotions there. They have now done more damage to upset the state apparatus than the terrorists ever achieved. Both the ruling and opposition political parties are dithering. And Srinagar and New Delhi appear to favour the firefighting measure of deploying the Army rather than taking concrete action to put out the fire.

Not only internal security, but governance as a whole appears to be in slow motion.

The Home Minister’s much publicized “war” against Maoists appears to be going awry. The grim scorecard of the police and paramilitary losing lives at the hands of Maoists is going up. They continue to flout elementary rules of insurgency warfare despite the Home Ministry spouting data about their special training. The Ministry tried to get the Army into action though Army men come from a similar background as the Central police troops. Veteran cop EN Rammohan, who investigated the Dantewada incident, calls the CRPF a “lathi force”. If that is so, why offer them as sacrificial goats?

New Delhi still appears to be confused as it gropes for a common strategy. At the Chief Ministers’ meeting on July 14 in New Delhi, dissonant voices of some of the worst-affected States showed the Home Minister’s problem is far from over. Four worst-hit states – Chhattisgarh, Orissa, West Bengal and Jharkhand – agreed to form unified commands for anti-Naxal operations modelled after those existing in Jammu and Kashmir, and Assam.

In spite of the Maoists fighting the state in over 170 districts, the government recently objected to a UN report calling it an “armed conflict” though the Home Minister has called it a “war”. The report, produced by the office of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and submitted to the Security Council, had highlighted the recruitment and use of children by the Maoist armed group in some districts of Chhattisgarh.

The core issue is, do we want to fight the Maoists or not? Or do we want to carry party politics down to the State level and carry on a slanging match on television? If not, why is there lack of professionalism in all avenues from planning to action? Clearly, there is something seriously wrong in the handling of the issue and nobody knows who is responsible.

It seems the somnolence in managing the internal situation is everywhere. Take the case of the Manipur blockade. Over two million people of the State were held to ransom for two months when the All Naga Student Association of Manipur (ANSAM) established road blocks at entry points into the State. The blockade was “suspended temporarily” at the “request” of the Prime Minister and Union Home Minister. Of course, the media, quoting government sources, reported that Central paramilitary forces “lifted” the blockade.

The ANSAM blockade was ostensibly against the ban on the visit of Th Muivah, the leader of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim – Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM) to his hometown of Somdal in Manipur. But, as the Manipur government has pointed out, the real reason was the NSCN-IM’s opposition to the holding of autonomous district council elections in Manipur.

This is a direct consequence of New Delhi’s inability to reconcile Muivah’s demand for Naga sovereignty and “greater Nagalim” with the conflicting interests of neighbouring states. This is after New Delhi’s 56 rounds of talks for the past 13 years with Muivah! The only gainer seems to be Muivah, who is calling the shots. He has established his armed followers in the heart of Nagaland in “peace camps”. They have become fat cats thriving on extortion. With this kind of governance, how can Manipuris feel they are part of this country when the state cannot ensure their right to normal life?

Not only internal security, but governance as a whole appears to be in slow motion. For instance, government inaction for political reasons has empowered khap panchayats to pass the death sentence! But the worst example is the Bhopal tragedy. Twentysix years after the disaster, a GoM deliberates on the issue for a few hours and discovers that it needs to prosecute Anderson, the then CEO of Union Carbide in the US.

IT would be charitable to describe the decision-making process as lethargic; it is best described as poodlefaking. The public is equally guilty in allowing the government to get away with it time and again. It is time we started meaning what we say and do what we mean.

The US has not covered itself with glory in the war in Afghanistan against the Taliban and Al Qaeda terrorists. It has poured in money – over $80 billion – and its Army continues to suffer casualties. All it has to show there now is a democratically elected government steeped in corruption, controlling barely 21 per cent of the country. But, even in the midst of all this adversity, in the US there is a sense of urgency of thought and action. The people held President George W Bush responsible for the failure and elected a Democrat as President. There is free airing of opinions and fixing of responsibility.

President Barack Obama continues to monitor performance of his generals. He does not hesitate to sack General McChrystal, the chief executive of operations, and appoint General Petraeus in his place. So, though Kissinger may suggest strategy rather than alibi, at least the US government shows it is alive to the situation.
Though American operations in Afghanistan are not worth emulating, the Indian government can take a cue from them on maintaining clear focus on the core issue.

And that is what we are not doing. We are only looking for alibis and not action. There is not even knee-jerk reaction anymore, only paralytic spasm. At best we can hope for another Group of Ministers to sit, discuss and debate this issue. If that happens we will be where we started. Tell a Friend