by Tisaranee Gunasekara
“The Sinhalese are the only organic race of Sri Lanka. Other communities are all visitors to the country, whose arrival was never challenged out of the compassion of Buddhists. But they must not take this compassion for granted. The Muslims are here because our kings let them trade here and the Tamils because they were allowed to take refuge when the Moguls were invading them in India. What is happening today is pure ingratitude on the part of these visitors” Champika Ranwaka (Daily Mirror – 16.10.2008).
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“The future of Tamil race has become a question mark. I am unable to sleep whenever I think of it. Let us save the Tamil race and its honour. Let us avoid the racial genocide in Sri Lanka at whatever the price” Karunanidhi (Murasoli – quoted in Hindustan Times 18.10.2008).
(October 22, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) With a modicum of intelligence and a shred of historic memory the reactivation of the Tamilnadu factor could have been prevented or, at the least, its toxicity minimised. Though the Tigers are the main beneficiaries of the reactivation of the Tamilnadu factor, they could not have accomplished that critical task without considerable help from the Rajapakse administration. It is the regime, together with its hardline Sinhala allies, that enabled the mood in Tamilnadu to undergo a critical transformation, from one of indifference to mounting anger and belligerence. If the Rajapakses’ approach to the Fourth Eelam War (and to governance in general) had been Sri Lankan rather than Sinhala supremacist, the Tamil backlash across the Palk Straits could have been avoided.
The crisis in Tamilnadu did not burst out fully formed, the way Athena emerged from the head of Zeus. It evolved gradually over a period of two years, with many fits and starts. Consequently there were many points at which it could have been contained, stemmed or even completely neutralised. It was a series of missteps by the Rajapakse administration which led Sri Lanka to where she is today, once again the cynosure of Tamilnadu politics and vulnerable to pressure (and even outright intervention) by Delhi.
Making the Avoidable Inevitable
If a specific moment could be identified when Tamilnadu’s interest in Lankan affairs became reactivated, tit was the aftermath of the Vallipunam raid, with the revelation that the victims were dozens of Jaffna schoolgirls compelled by the LTTE to attend a short training session. For the first time since the Gandhi assassination rumblings could be heard in Tamilnadu, not just from the minor pro-Tiger parties but across the political spectrum. When a resolution was introduced in the state assembly condemning the attack, it had multi-party backing, including the DMK, the Congress, the AIADMK, the BJP, the CPI and the CPM. Still the situation could have been salvaged if Colombo reacted with sensitivity and showed some contrition, since the raid was most likely a mistake due to faulty intelligence. All that was needed were the admission of an error, a public apology and a message of sympathy (ideally backed by some compensation) for the bereaved families. That way the regime could have prevented the Tigers from benefiting from the tragedy and in fact turned it to its own advantage. Such a humane response would have diffused the tension in Tamilnadu, discredited the Tiger propaganda that the Fourth Eelam War was a war against Tamils and drawn a clear line of demarcation between the Lankan state and the LTTE in their approach to civilians.
It could have been done but it wasn’t. Perhaps the regime, which has shown in inclination to claim fallibility for itself and its armed forces, did not want to admit that it could make mistakes. Perhaps it just did not care because in its eyes any Tamil is an actual or potential Tiger. Be that as it may, the regime’s response varied from denying that the victims were schoolgirls to justifying unprovoked air raids on schoolgirls conscripted by the Tigers. “If the children are terrorists what can we do?” Brigadier Athula Jayawardene a military spokesman infamously and rhetorically asked (The Independent – 16.8.2006). This was fodder to the fire of Tamilnadu opinion. Describing the air raid as ‘barbaric, uncivilised and inhuman’ (it was all three) the Tamilnadu state assembly observed a two minute silence in honour of the victims.
The Chennai resolution criticising Colombo for the Vallipunam raid was the first time, since the death of Rajiv Gandhi, Tamilnadu officially criticised an action by a Lankan government. When Colombo, in turn, criticised the resolution Chief Minister Karunanidhi defended the rights of the Tamilnadu Tamils to stand by their brethren in Sri Lanka. The remaking of an old vicious cycle has begun.
That was August 2006. In the intervening two years much could have been done to prevent Tamilnadu from moving itself to the Tiger’s corner. All it needed was for the government to seem less Sinhala and more Sri Lankan in the prosecution of the war. Greater concern for the plight of civilian Tamils, a sincere effort to come up with a political solution to the ethnic problem, less truimphalism and more sensitivity in dealing with Tamils in and out of the war zone could have sufficed. Instead the regime did the opposite. In fact the regime’s response to the Vallipunam raid became its trademark, the way it would respond to any error, any criticism – with inane arrogance; hubris as the ancient Greeks called it.
As the Fourth Eelam War progressed the Tamils within and outside the war zone were increasingly treated as enemy aliens. The infamous attempt to expel North-Eastern Tamils from Colombo lodges was followed by other racially motivated measures (masquerading as national security measures), the latest being the census of North-Eastern Tamils in Colombo. Each deed created a sense that Tamils were not fully equal, not real citizens of Sri Lanka. Each measure was a reminder of the bad old days when Sinhala centric governments felt that they could treat Tamils any way they like – and did. Each measure caused dismay, humiliation, alienation and anger. Each measure had its reverberation in Tamilnadu and even Delhi. The extremist utterances of such powerful/influential political and military leaders as Minister Champika Ranawaka and Army Commander Sarath Fonseka reiterated the message that Tamils are here on sufferance and the way they are treated would depend on the way they behave. Unconsciously the government was substantiating the Tiger charge that this is a war by the Sinhala state to subjugate Tamils.
If Rajapakse had at least given an impression of neutrality the problem could still have been contained. He did not. Perhaps he could not, given his inability to understand that the ethnic problem gave birth to the LTTE and not vice versa. In fact Rajapakse on numerous occasions made clear that he does not believe in the very existence of an ethnic problem; he often reduced the North-Eastern crisis to a terrorist problem which could be dealt with and is being dealt with militarily. He seemed to believe that Tamil people do not have grievances specific to them, stemming from their minority status, nothing that a bit of development and some administrative decentralisation cannot take care of. In his election manifesto, he had accepted the unitary state and rejected the concept of a Tamil homeland. His political allies were instrumental in obtaining a judicial de-merger of the North and the East. He stymied his own APC. He inducted the rabidly anti-minority JHU into his government and gave its abrasive lay parliamentarian a portfolio, thereby ensconcing the Sinhala supremacist fringe within the political mainstream.
In an interview with the Rolling Stone magazine, US Presidential candidate Barrack Obama characterised John McCain, the politician, as “……being impulsive, not getting all the information that he needs, surrounding himself with people who are predisposed to agreeing with him. And as a consequence I think he made bad judgement” (Rolling Stone – 30.9.2008). This was the way the Rajapakse administration acted vis-à-vis Tamilnadu and India in particular and the world in general. He acted as if Tamilnadu, India and the world did not exist and Sri Lanka was a political island as well as a geographical island. Perhaps he, like JR Jayewardene, believed that he could counter Tamilnadu and Delhi with Islamabad and Beijing. Perhaps he thought that the Rajiv Gandhi assassination would suffice to keep India always on the Lankan side. Perhaps he believed that India could be kept at bay with promises, made to be broken. Suffice it to say that neither he nor his administration understood the evolving situation in Tamilnadu and how it could change Delhi’s Lankan policy. Prey to his own ‘irrational exuberance’, Rajapakse failed to discern signs of the gathering storm across the Palk Straits.
Dead-end?
Rajapakse’s remarkable ability to ignore reality is evident even now. In fact he seems to believe that he can get out of this bind by making some conciliatory noises towards Tamils and giving some empty promises to India. On the one hand he will get the APC to ‘speed up’ deliberations over a political solution and send his brother with a conciliatory message to Delhi (possibly armed with yet another deadline for a political solution and a promise to sign the CEPA). On the other hand he will get his political allies, the JHU and Wimal Weerawansa, to engage in loud Indian bashing. Then he will wait for the storm to blow away. Whether he will succeed will depend on how serious Tamilnadu is and how much electoral importance the Congress attributes to the Tamilnadu factor. And even if he manages to weather this storm, it will be only a reprieve until it bursts out again.
That is why the only real way out of the crisis is a course correction on the part of the Rajapakse administration. The war should continue, but it can continue only if it is accompanied by a more sensitive approach to civilian Tamils and more openness to devolution. Whether the President can make such a course correction given his own ideological blinkers and those of his most trusted lieutenants is quite another matter. After all, the crisis was mostly a creation of the Rajapakse regime and unless it undergoes a paradigmatic shift it will remain part of the problem rather than become the author of a solution. If Rajapakse is sounding uncharacteristically flexible on devolution right now, it is not because he is convinced of the need to reach out to Lankan Tamils. It is purely and simply because of Indian pressure. The moment that pressure is removed he is likely to revert to his old self. That is the unfortunate truth about the Lankan situation. As in the case of JR Jayewardene this president too is unlikely to concede any devolution to the Tamils unless he is forced to do so by an outside entity.
Forced by an intolerant (and anti-reality) Rome to publicly retract his theory of earth moving around the sun, Galileo is said to have murmured, ‘nevertheless it is true’. Rajapakse regime kept reality at bay for almost three years but denial cannot change reality. In 1987 the beginning of the end commenced with a flotilla carrying aid from Tamilnadu being stopped by the Lankan Navy. The Indian air drop followed. The rest, as they say, is history. But behind that history there is a story - that India was considering doing a second Bangladesh in Sri Lanka. “Most Tamil separatists from Sri Lanka had accepted the Indian offer at its face value, thinking that New Delhi was reaching out to them out of genuine concern for their condition. However an extraordinary revelation began to unfold as the training started…. The militants were surprised because besides just training them, some trainers asked leading questions that indicated that India might one day do a Bangladesh in Sri Lanka…. The trainers wanted to know details about road bridges, railway tracks, landing fields, the depth of the sea and the coastline…. Shanker Raji of EROS was stunned when an Indian officer announced that Tamils would be just an auxiliary force for the Indian army when and if the latter invaded Sri Lanka” (Prabhakaran: Inside an Elusive Mind – MR Narayan Swami). That ‘option’ could have worked had the LTTE been less fiercely independent or Ranasinghe Premadasa did not become the President. Whether there will be voices in Delhi advocating the reactivation of that old plan is unknown but there is certainly a very powerful voice in Tamilnadu doing so, and publicly. When a reporter asked him how India can intervene in the affairs of a sovereign nation Chief Minister Karunanidhi replied:
“The Centre clearly knows how to bring about peace in Sri Lanka. I hope they will decide to act. People know what happened in Bangladesh” (NDTV.com). After Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the world is more conducive to such a move by India, if it can be depicted as a last ditch attempt to save Lankan Tamils from their own state.
Fredrick the Great of Prussia once famously warned that those who seek to defend everything will end up by defending nothing. By trying to remake Sri Lanka as a Sinhala country the Rajapakses may effectively destroy the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. By trying to impose a Sinhala peace on the Tamils the Rajapakses may be compelled to forego a chance to defeat the Tigers. Such are the prices extracted by history from those who fail to heed her lessons.
- Sri Lanka Guardian
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