LTTE forgot it was not a regular army

By A.S. Kalkat

(May 01, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) It’s probably endgame for the LTTE and Prabhakaran but certainly not the endgame for Sri Lanka’s Tamils. Remember that it was not Prabhakaran who had created the ethnic conflict, rather it was this conflict that had spawned a Prabhakaran. If the legitimate demands of the Tamils are not addressed, it would only be a short-term victory. The defeat of the LTTE is self-inflicted: after their successes in 2006 and 2007 the Tigers developed illusions of having achieved "Eelam" and took on all the trappings of a state, including declaring Killonochi as their "capital" and acting like a regular army. Thus a guerrilla force fought like a conventional army against a genuine conventional army, and of course they were no match and lost heavily. This was a lesson that he had learnt to avoid during the earlier fighting with the IPKF, but appeared to have forgotten.

No movement can succeed if it does not have the support of the people. The LTTE became unpopular with Sri Lanka’s Tamils due to the brutality they committed on them — including forced conscription, extortion, usurping of international aid meant for the Tamil civil population, reducing ordinary Lankan Tamils to second-class citizens while LTTE cadres remained first-class citizens.

While the LTTE always claimed it stood for the rights of Lankan Tamils, their ulterior motive was to have an autocratic dictatorship. LTTE chief Vellupillai Prakhabaran could not countenance a democratic setup. I believe Prabhakaran will not surrender; if it comes to the worst, he will bite the capsule. Or he may just disappear and mingle with the population, and hope to fight another day. I do not think he will try to escape to India as he knows India has not forgiven him for the assasination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

The main worry for the Sri Lankan government would be if the remaining hardcore LTTE elements melt into the civil population. Sri Lanka must address the political problem and find a political solution. If Sri Lanka’s Tamils do not feel that they have equal rights, then ethnic strife could spawn another Prabhakaran.

India’s priorities are clear. It must now demand that the LTTE lay down arms; that it must let the civilians go free; that Sri Lanka follow up a military victory with a a ceasefire declaration; that the Sri Lankan government immediately announce an economic and rehabilitation relief package for Tamils; and, finally, follow this up with a political dialogue to address the Tamils’ legitimate demands.

The message for Sri Lanka is that in neutralising the LTTE, the symptom has been addressed but not the cause. Sri Lankan Tamils can now express their views more freely; the threat of LTTE retribution is no longer there. Sri Lankan Tamil intellectuals must now involve themselves in the political dialogue with the Colombo government.

President Mahinda Rajapakse is committed to a political dialogue and has indicated willingness to allow devolution. The problem is that there is no draft political paper on the table. In this vacuum, there is no better blueprint for a political dialogue than the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of 1987, which detailed a possible structure for devolution of powers. Mr Rajapakse’s position in Parliament is not strong enough for him to take major political decisions; he has to contend with Sinhala chauvinist forces even within his own party since the military victory over the LTTE has been won with a lot of Sinhala soldiers’ blood. I think that with his ratings now high, he might go in for a general election to get more of his supporters elected to Parliament, to enable him to enact the necessary legislation.

I am also confident that Indo-Sri Lankan relations will continue to be cordial and we will remain friendly neighbours. In case Prabhakaran is killed, there could be some fallout in Tamil Nadu, but no large-scale upheaval is expected. Tamil politicians in India are making various points for political purposes, but India has done everything it possibly could for the welfare of Tamil civilians. It should be clear that India is committed to the welfare and legitimate rights of Tamils, but no commitment to any militant organisations or leaders. It cannot now be claimed that Sri Lankan Tamils have nowhere to go; the LTTE has made them hostage in the war zone of just 8 sq km now. The reality is that all the rest of the northern and eastern Provinces are now safe for them. These area includes towns like Jaffna, Vadamarachi, Vayunia, Trincomalee and Batticaloa.

There are lessons to be learnt from India’s 1987-90 military intervention in Sri Lanka. A major one is that in any such conflict, the ultimate resolution has to be political: and that can only be given to its people by the government of that country, not by any outside power. If any outside agency intervenes without being in a position to provide such a dispensation, that mission cannot succeed as it will remain dependent on the whims and fancies of that government. We should intervene in another country only if we also have the power to provide such a just dispensation, which may involve effecting necessary statutory or constitutional changes. When India intervened in the late 1980s, (then) President Junius Jayewardene was sincere about the political dialogue but his Prime Minister, Ranasinghe Premadasa, was anti-India and went on to succeed Mr Jayewardene. He declined to give the promised political devolution. The IPKF accomplished the military objective of India’s intervention in Sri Lanka, by neutralising the LTTE and creating a secure environment in which elections were held; but the political mission — devolution of power — could not be accomplished.

When we intervened in Sri Lanka at that time, that intervention was essential as it was a compulsion. The situation in southern India was serious: there were agitations in Tamil Nadu. People were asking why we could not intervene as we had done in Bangladesh. There were also 2.5 lakh refugees in Tamil Nadu then. This was the domestic dynamic. The military dynamic was concern about the presence of foreign powers who could be inimical to India in our backyard and in the strategic harbour of Trincomalee, which sits on India’s lanes of communication. The edifice of India is based on a pluralist society, and we simply cannot accept ethnicity, religion or language as a basis for breaking away from the republic. India then intervened at the express request of the Sri Lankan President. If any request for intervention comes in the future, it must be considered but keeping in mind the cardinal principles of intervention.

(As told to Sridhar Kumaraswami)

Lt. Gen. A.S. Kalkat (Retd) was commander of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force in Sri Lanka in the 1980s

-Sri Lanka Guardian